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Knowing when to talk

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Ex-British service chiefs have just been slapped by Cameron about launching loud warning on defence, basically accusing them to do that “to sell books”. I hate him for the remark, but the worst part is that he is (kind of) right. He’s being given too easy a job in slapping down ex-service chiefs, because those same chiefs did not speak when they were in charge. If British top brass invariably wait until after they retire to sound their warnings, they become less credible for it. It is when you are serving that you must show some guts. Even if it means putting your careers at some risk. Do dare: fight your corner in public, not just behind multiple closed doors. You are given chances to do so without necessarily asking for the Telegraph to interview you: use the hearings of the Defence Committee in Parliament. Granted, the committee has little actual power, but it is supportive, and will add its voice to yours if you finally speak up. The hearings with serving chiefs are normally facepalm-worthy, filled of visible embarrassment and void of the courage needed to answer sincerely to the questions, and make the problems known. At times it gets abysmally depressing. One of the last hearings I watched had the MOD Deputy Chief for military capability unable to spell out the number of Typhoon squadrons and the number of C-130s and A400. Either you are completely incompetent, or you are all too valiantly following the line of the government. In either case, you are entirely useless and should be removed from post immediately. Apologies for my bitterness, but the poor showing of the, let me say It again, deputy chief in charge of delivery of military capability was nothing short of horrendous. Even more so because he is an Air Marshal, so the question touched his very own service. You can’t possibly be that ignorant.

Armed forces chiefs hold a big share of the blame for the sorry state of the armed forces. The focus is all too often entirely pinned on politicians, but the direct responsibilities of the MOD should not be denied. The feeling is that the whole thing is rotten and basically resigned to fate. It doesn’t show just in the embarrassed “I don’t know” in front of the Defence Committee, it shows even in planning and, after the SDSR 2010, even in the force structure of the army.
The MOD plans for the future are murky at best. They are vague, they lack details, they are left for later. Take the fabled equipment plan. It is about as vague as it can get. It names purchases and programmes only after they have happened, and for the rest provides only the most indeterminate description of how the money in the graphics is due to be used. There is no public commitment to procuring anything specific that isn’t already under contract. There is not even an acknowledged requirement. “We plan this many of this, we need that many of those.” It is obvious that numbers change and that money will ultimately determine how much of the requirement is covered. But here there is not an expressed requirement. Specific program voices aren’t even revealed. “We promise there will be this much money for helicopters”. That’s it.
There is no visibility about what actually happens to equipment programs. When we hear that the “equipment programme will be protected”, we effectively don’t know what it means. Also because, of course, even assuming that the equipment budget is protected for real, it will still have to change if the personnel is dramatically cut and there is no one left to operate the kit. The whole thing smells of travesty.

Some more information is given to the elite of officers and press which has access to some particular conferences and events, but even in these, details are becoming increasingly rare. I’ve been given access to a presentation document used at a recent armoured vehicles conference event. There is not a single number regarding Challenger 2 Life Extension Programme (CR2 LEP), no detail on Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme (WCSP), even less on Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicle (ABSV). A planned presentation about the Multi Role Vehicle Protected was cancelled entirely. A very restricted number of persons seem to be aware of what is going on. This way, there is no way to track what is happening, and cuts can happen without outsiders even realizing it. This is no operational secrecy: this is a deliberate effort to cut by stealth. Chop things off without it being known. And it is being done with the silent cooperation of service chiefs.

If I look at the Military Programme Law in France, or even to a degree in Italy, not to talk of the exceptionally transparent and detailed US documents, I do see what is being funded, and what the targets are. France’s military law document is pretty detailed about what will be ordered and what is expected to be delivered during the year, and out to the end of the 5-year period. What do we know about what the MOD is due to get in any given year? Very little. We know something of the very larger programmes, and some information can be obtained by the yearly NAO report, but that's it.
Months ago the purchase of a 9th C-17 was reportedly almost done. It came quite out of the blue, as the requirement wasn’t really acknowledged in public before (although the hope was, reportedly, that there would be 10 C-17 in the end). And in the deep blue it sunk again afterwards, dying presumably a silent and unannounced death.
WCSP is another example. Numbers are a complete uncertainty. Was over 600, then 445, now possibly just 380, and there are rather vague indications of how many will be IFVs, with the new turret, how many repair, how many recovery, how many artillery observation posts. Turret numbers is assumed to be “around 250”, but it is like there wasn’t a plan, there wasn’t a requirement. 250 vehicles is absolutely insufficient to equip the planned six battalions, but there is no stated requirement. Not even the effort to say “we need this many to equip these formations”. 
No. Silence, until eventually, after much budget raiding, a contract will be signed (hopefully) and only then we will know (maybe) how many vehicles of each variant will be handed to the army.
Type 26 frigate. “We are aiming for 13, but, really, we’ll decide… sometime. Don’t you worry.”
SSBN? That would be four, but maybe 3, or even zero.
ABSV? We really, really need to replace ancient FV430s in a wide variety of roles, but we can’t say how many vehicles we need and in which variants. We will just wait until we know if we can start the programme, because we aren’t even sure about that.
MARS FSS? Who knows what the hell is going on with that one…

 
A detailed list of equipment deliveries as for Military Programme Law in France. It is perhaps not necessary to publish the number of every single missile, but the MOD's way of doing things in the dark is right at the other extreme.

There isn’t even an attempt to plan. There is no acknowledgement of requirement. We had an SDSR, we decided we will have six battalions, surely we can say what requirements come from it? No. Not in public, at least. Say nothing, cut at leisure.
And no, it clearly isn’t about protecting military capability. Because when the numbers are finally announced, anyone with a little bit of experience in the field will know if two battalions worth of vehicles are missing from the count. Any potential enemy will easily know. The only ones who will be fooled are in the general public and in the parliament’s benches, as they will not be able to understand on their own how much of a hole there is.

Even Army force structure seems to have embraced this desperate “live for the day” method, in recent times. The Adaptable Force in particular seems to me to be “adaptable” in the sense that it is a container of battalions and brigade HQs “ready” to be cut when the budget is chopped. Seven brigades, each with just bits of the capability of an actual brigade, meant to be “put together” to generate, with well over a year of notice, a light deployable brigade, and another one six months later, just so the army still has (barely) the ability to keep a brigade in the field for a long period without entirely messing up the harmony guidelines for troops (6 months in the field, 24 resting and training before going again, requiring 5 people to keep 1 constantly deployed over the long term). Seriously? Seven brigades that actually equate to two. A pure political trick to mask up the cuts and to limit the number of disappearing capbadges, because, of course, capbadges are what really makes the news. There’s more infantry battalions than strictly needed for the brigade-level ambition, but that’s just because the numbers of battalions cut has been kept artificially low by depleting the strength of each and making every Light Role battalion dependent on having a whole company worth of reserves to get back to decent strength.
General Carter has recently made it all even more facepalm worthy by saying reserves are for “national emergencies” only. Clarity will be needed on this point, and on what a national emergency is supposed to be in the army’s plan. Because 14 of the army’s battalions now depend on reserves showing up to get to a decent, standard structure of 3 companies of 3 rifles platoons each, plus support company. Not to talk of support elements, where reserves also have a big weight, and the Light Cavalry regiments too. An enduring brigade-sized deployment is to be considered a “national emergency”? If not, Army 2020 does not work, because a very significant reserves component is needed in the fourth and fifth deployment of any enduring operation lasting over 18 months.

It is all very depressing. It is the image of armed forces which seem resigned, even prepared to die a slow (perhaps not even so slow, we’ll see with the new SDSR) death by a thousand cuts.
Service chiefs, we need you to talk when you are in charge, not when you are retired and can be easily ignored and even ridiculed.

Royal Logistic Corps of Army 2020

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Thanks to a Freedom of Information Request, the answer to which has been published today, it is finally possible to map the sub-unit structure of the Royal Logistic Corps of Army 2020.


1 Regiment, 3 Regiment and 4 Regiment are Close Support Logistic regiments, part of 101 Logistic Brigade and assigned to the Reaction Force. They are aligned respectively with 20th, 12th and 1st Armoured Infantry Brigades.
9 Regiment, 27 Regiment and 10 The Queen's Own Gurkha Logistic Regiment are Theatre Logistic Regiments, again assigned to 101 Log Bde in the Reaction Force and aligned with the three Armoured Infantry Brigades. 27 Regiment contains the last remaining Tank Transporter squadron in the army. This particular sub-unit, for obvious reasons, supports all of the heavy brigades.

6 and 7 Regiments are described as Force Logistic Regiments and are assigned to the Adaptable Force, staying under 102 Logistic Brigade. They are meant to provide the logistic element of the Adaptable Brigades which get deployed in the fourth and fifth tour of an enduring operation abroad.

The list does not include 132 Aviation Support Squadron, which supports the Army Air Corps and is part of 7 REME battalion. The RLC involvment in the Royal Marines Commando Logistic Regiment is also not detailed.
Interestingly, there is no 65 Squadron in 13 Air Assault Regiment. The squadron was brought under command in July 2013, and 15 Air Assault Squadron was disbanded as a consequence. Now 65 Logistic Support Sqn is nowhere to be seen, for some reason. 

On the way to the SDSR

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It is quite depressing and alarming to be navigating towards an uncertain election with even greater uncertainty about what will be left of the armed forces afterwards, even while the events in the world most certainly signal that the assumptions of the SDSR 2010, and the belief that State on State warfare was (kind of) no more, were both wrong.
It is also quite embarrassing, and there can't be another word for it, that the UK seems set to miss the 2% defence spending target barely months after rightfully and wisely campaigning for the NATO members to strive to achieve that level of investment. Not the Tories nor Labour are giving assurances about maintaining the 2% line, and they aren't even giving real assurances about sticking at least to a flat in-real-terms budget with a 1% increase on equipment spending, which is the absolute minimum level of spending the MOD was promised when Future Force 2020 was devised. With the extremely significant caveat, by the way, that the flat-in-real-terms budget has to be calculated, of course, starting from a base amount. And the base MOD budget has been falling significantly each year since 2010. Depending on which fiscal year serves as base for the calculation, the budget over five years changes by several billion pounds.
Even worse, there seem to be almost certainty that there will be new, vast cuts to the budget. Something that, inexorably, would entirely wreck Future Force 2020, changing yet once more the plans, imposing new cuts even before the last ones are completed. And putting a very big nail in the coffin of Britain's role as a military power. If not the final nail, close to it.

The british GDP has been growing at a rather imposing rate, so the 2% budget target would indeed equate to a significant increase in defence spending, something that is supposedly not doable due to the need for more austerity. Curiously, the same isn't said of the 0.7% target for Aid Budget. In 2013 aid spending soared above 13 billion pounds, and it will keep growing. While the armed forces will be gutted to save a few billions. Effectively, more than closing the deficit, part or all of the money removed from the armed forces will just head completely out of the country, spent in "aid".
I think it is nothing short of criminal, but you are free to think whatever you want. Just, please, don't say that Britain can't afford to keep its soldiers employed. It could. The money is there. It is just going to be used in other ways. And not even at home. Not for education, or the NHS, or even welfare. No. For aid programmes which, often, don't even work, and at times are actually counterproductive.


The 2% target's greatest importance is in its serving as a sort of rock bottom. For decades it has been the barrier supposed to prevent the complete dismantling of the armed forces. What i fear the most, is what happens when even that "rock bottom" is smashed through. There is no anchor left afterwards. The risk is that it becomes a true free fall. Especially because there most evidently isn't the maturity to set out a strategy, articulate what the minimum range of capabilities needed are, and stick to it for more than a few months. Future Force 2020 is already an exercise in a definition of the bare minimum force which can still serve the political purpose of keeping Britain militarily relevant. It is a very bare minimum target in some ways, something that many do not understand. The current level of ambition requires, for example, the ability for Britain to deploy a brigade-sized force enduringly. It takes five brigades taking 6 months tours to do that without completely wearing out men and equipment, and Army 2020 delivers those five brigades. Just. In theory. In fact, already as it is, the last two brigades of the 5 are pretty weak, very light in terms of vehicles and protection and firepower, and somewhat bare of the support elements needed. There is a recognized shortage of Logistic support and, even more, of Signals support. All Light Role Infantry battalions now are understrenght by design, and need a company's worth of reservists trained and available for deployment just to achieve a complete, standard structure on three rifle companies of three platoons each.

And there are other rather dramatic capability gaps as well. The most unacceptable is the lack of a maritime patrol aircraft, ASW capable. The SDSR also badly damaged CBRN resilience dismantling the Joint CBRN regiment and withdrawing the Fuchs recce vehicles from service. A very bad decision, which i questioned from the very beginning (and i wasn't alone in doing so, i'm sure) and which eventually was reversed. 9 Fuchs are being returned to active service, albeit with significant challenges to be faced still, due to lack of money and loss of skills and knowledge. They haven't been gone for a very long time, but i'm told that the dismantling of the Joint Regiment resulted in a severe loss of know how in several ways.

Even scarier is, i believe, the awareness of just how much more capability seems to be hanging by a thread due to budget shortages and aging equipment which might go out of the door without being replaced. The defence spending stories that appear on the press are often not taken seriously due to how they seem to talk of imminent war against Russia, or other major crisises that do not sound realistic, that get downplayed easily. I've already written about this problem, and about the not very helpful input of defence top brass which only seem to speak once they are retired.
I was often warning people about Russia in discussions already back at the time of the war in Georgia, if not earlier. Unlike too many others, i do not undervalue Russia. And i think it must return to be a serious element to consider in strategic planning. But i wouldn't suggest using Russia in a too direct way to write stories which otherwise end up almost ridiculed as scare tales. Besides, there is no need to. Hard realities, numbers and facts are more than enough to sound the alarm. Actually, they do it better.

I think it is pretty scary that the Royal Navy has a young LPD tied up in port, in controlled humidity seal-down, because there are not enough men and pennies to let it sail while her sister ship also serves. But this isn't the worst. It is scarier that much of the army's mechanisation still depends on the FV432 vehicle, which dates back to the late 50s and early 60s and has an official out of service date set for 2030. And the worst part is not even the 70 years career of this vehicle, but the fact that it could go out of service earlier than planned, and anyway without being replaced. The army has a programme (kind of), the Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicle (ABSV) to replace it by removing turrets from surplus Warriors and convert them in APCs, mortar carriers, ambulances and other sub-variants needed. But uncertainty and shortage of money rules supreme, and who knows what will actually happen. Even in the best case, ABSV will replace the FV432 Bulldog just from the armoured infantry battalions. A number of other FV432s will keep soldiering on, as ambulances in Armoured Medical Regiments, in HQs of other mechanised units such as brigade and division HQ, but also command battery of 12 Regiment Royal Artillery, for example. Their replacement will be a problem once more left for later. In the uncertainty. And this, as of today, is assuming that ABSV can be funded and delivers.
Challenger 2 Life Extension Programme, another one up for much uncertainty. There are 227 tanks left, enough for 3 decent regiments plus training fleet. But the number could fall further, or anyway only a part of those might get the LEP. And even the best case scenario left on the table, anyway, has long lost any ambition of fixing the rifled gun issue, or replacing the engine.
The Warrior CSP programme itself has not reached the point of contract signature yet, so is quite exposed as well. And the numbers circulating regarding how many vehicles get the upgrade are depressing, since they would suffice, at most, for 4 battalions plus training fleet allocations. So, on paper the british army has 6 armoured infantry battalions. In reality, it might soon enough have enough vehicles for four at most. Even before new cuts eventually happen.

Wherever you look, a little bit of scratching the surface reveals potential gaps just about to burst open. I will make some more examples. A very big one is the fact that both the major vehicle depots of the Armed Forces, Ashchurch and Ayshire Barracks in Germany, are heading towards closure in the coming few years. They have already appointed the company tasked with planning the redevelopment of the Ashchurch area. Very little is known, instead, about where the forces will be supposed to park their vehicles after the current depots close. In 2014 the army made it known that they envisage building a new "UK Vehicle Hub". Inevitable, really. The vehicles need a place where to stay, in controlled humidty storage, looked after, protected and maintained. They must be in a well organized depot from which they can pulled out quickly and efficiently, and carried, by rail or truck, or driven towards their parent units and the ports and airports from which they will move onwards to the crisis zone. The problem is that there is no MOD decision on how, when and where to proceed with such a new hub. No plan in motion. I don't even know how it is possible to plan for closure before setting out a plan for relocating the vehicle fleets in a logistically sound way.

F-35, a major programme where uncertainty rules. Will there be 48? Will the hoped-for additional purchases ever happen? Or will even the meagre 48 number be slashed even further?
Tornado GR4 will be soon gone, and while i can only welcome with a huge sigh of relief the fact that there is now a contract to integrate Brimstone 2 on Typhoon (although just 2 launchers, for 6 missiles, at least for the moment), i must point out that any delay in integration (or a speeded up Tornado GR4 withdrawal, say) would still leave yet another gap. Moreover, there's at least two other areas where a capability loss is, at the moment, assured: bunker-busting, and tactical reconnaissance. With Tornado, both the RAPTOR recce pod and the Paveway III 2000 lbs bunker buster will be gone. And there is no recce pod in sight for Typhoon; while the bunker-buster variant of Paveway IV (which by the way, being a 500 lbs weapon, fails to convince me that there won't be a capability loss, even accounting for much more modern warhead design) is not yet on contract either.
Not to mention the ability to suppress enemy air defences: the ALARM anti-radar missile is gone from 2013, and with it much of the kinetic part of the RAF's SEAD capability. A key weapon, SPEAR 3, which is supposed to partially remedy to this weakness and also keep alive UK design and industrial capability in the sector of complex weapons, is another one of those bits at risk. SPEAR could be sacrificed to save the development money, settling for the US Small Diameter Bomb 2, which is cheaper but a glide-only weapon. SPEAR 3, having its own engine, can be launced from a greater distance and with less limitations due to weather, altitude, flight profile. All these things make a huge difference to the ability of SPEAR to serve as SEAD/DEAD weapon and destroy enemy missile batteries. With ALARM gone, it is important to have that kind of capability. 

Type 26: contract signature target date widely missed, a "demonstration phase" gimmick launched which contains long lead items for just 3 ships, leaving all the uncertainty about how things will progress. MARS Solid Support Ships: who the hell knows what the status of the programme even is. The equipment plan documents, as i've already explained, are deliberately bare of any detail and specific programme indication, so things can appear and disappear without proper tracking of changes. 

At times my warnings get played down by "what are you saying, we have 6 Type 45s, 2 carriers, best kit in the world, Typhoon...". And it is true. In part. But there is too much hype, and too little realism. The carriers aren't yet safe. Two are being built, but will both make it into service? Will they be blessed with a decent airwing? So much could still go wrong.
Type 45 is a great ship, but with its own very clear limits. Very single role due to missing equipment fits, which second-hand Harpoon (for 4 ships only) is only partially fixing. Harpoon itself hangs by a thread: it could go out of service in 2018, and the road to a replacement is a huge, floating question mark right now.
Sea Skua will go out of service with the Lynx MK8, in 2017, and it'll be at least three years before the replacement starts being available. Come 2018, the Royal Navy could be, at least for a few years, completely without anti-ship missiles of any type. Which is quite amazing, in a bad way.

On paper, Future Force 2020, especially after the 2014 U-turns and adjustements (Fuchs resurrected, Sentinel R1 and Shadow R1 extended to 2018, Reaper extended to 2019) is still a good force, with some world class capabilities. But much of Future Force 2020 exists only on paper and depends on key programmes which are almost always exposed to huge risks in the coming review. Other capabilities remain, effectively, tied to a time-bomb. For example, Sentinel R1, which is an immensely effective and precious bit of kit, is still at risk, only having gained a life extension out to 2018, not that far away.

Future Force 2020 is quite decent, and could be good if some major weaknesses in it were fixed (and i will write an article setting out such an "Adjusted Future Force 2020" as a second part to this piece). But Future Force 2020 is very much at risk of being torn apart by the new SDSR. A huge number of key components face risks and extreme uncertainty. Numbers which look decent now could be dramatically revised downwards, or anyway be badly compromised by the cancellation of some key programmes.
This is the big issue.

I wouldn't worry about the 2% per se, if there was a mature approach to defence and a firm committment to stick to the plan for once. But that maturity is nowhere to be seen, and so arbitrary spending levels must be advocated, so that at least there can be, finally, a bit of stability over which building is then possible.
Mind you, there is still room for efficiencies (the real ones), and more must be done to squeeze more buck out of the MOD's bucks, because the budget is indeed still sizeable, but quite often does not seem to deliver as well as the french budget, which is the most closely comparable. The MOD definitely has a role and a responsibility in spending better. The SDSR 2010 has introduced some welcome financial discipline and improved several habits and methods, and the good trend must continue.
But it is really, really important that the armed forces are given a stable and reasonable budget, if they are to stay effective and relevant.
 



An F-35 update

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A brief summary of where we are 

The F-35B test fleet has received the F-135 engine fix that makes sure there won't be a repeat of the hard rubbing of fan blades and stator that lead to the fire on the USAF AF-27 aircraft last year. The only aircraft in the test fleet which has yet to receive the pre-trenched stator is BF-5, and that's because it spent the last 6 months inside the McKinley climatic laboratory in Eglin, to undergo extreme climatic testing. 
The whole fleet of F-35s is due to be fitted with the pre-trenched stator element by early next year. The stator element received a "trench", cut in during production, which ensures there is not excessive rubbing with the fan blades. The alternative, used to quickly fix some of the test aircraft, is to fly a series of manoeuvers planned out to gracefully cut the trench in. 
The fix is said to be effective. The loss due to the greater gap in the stator is said to be just around two degrees, which is not significant. However, engineers are considering whether a more effective change is possible, affordable and needed.

As mentioned, BF-5 has recently completed climatic testing. The results seem to have been good, and there have not been particular issues arising either from extreme heat or extreme cold, or everything in between. 

 
Sun bathing to replicate the intense heat of a day parked on a runway in hot climate zones


Icing cloud test
Flying in the freezing air
Flying without moving from the spot, including in VTOL modes. Testing the F-35B required a complex infrastructure.


In May, 6 F-35B of the USMC are due to deploy at sea on the USS Wasp for the first Operational Testing phase (OT-1). This test deployment will be a work-up to the incoming IOC, still scheduled for July. USMC F-35Bs are moving through the depots to receive the modifications they need to get up to the latest standard. As of March, 5 jets were undergoing the refit at the Cherry Point Fleet Readiness Center - East. 2 more should have already been redelivered, and other work is being done by the USAF's own Depot, in Utah. 
A total of 10 frontline aircraft will be modified in order to achieve IOC. 

F-35B Ski Jump trials have begun in Patuxent River, and are expected to finish by mid-May. The first images of an F-35B taking off from ski jump are expected soon, and this will be a significant milestone for the british and italian needs. 

AF-1 has begun flying test sorties with a very asymmetric external load (one wing with clean pylons, the other with two GBUs and one Sidewinder) as part of the work needed to clear external carriage of weapons in the Block 3F software. 
Test sorties have been flown with 4 Paveway IV and 2 ASRAAM on the wing pylons, as well, to begin the integration of the british weapons load configuration expected at Block 3F (up to 6 Paveway IV, 2 internal and 4 external, and 2 external ASRAAM). 

AF-2 and at least another F-35A have been flown in a first series of trial sorties, testing basic fighter maneouvering with the assistance of F-16s. These have been defined "dogfights" in some press reports, but it seems we are still talking mostly about testing the handling and finding where the flight control laws can be adjusted. Building on high Angle of Attack testing and departure trials, the test pilots have begun flying with and against F-16s to see what the F-35 can do. The report says that there is margin to relax the flight controls to achieve greater agility, perhaps leading to a reversal of the degradation reported a few years ago. 

AF-2 is also preparing to begin, this June, the firing trials with the 25mm gun. The gun becomes available with the Block 3F software. 

Earlier, Col. De Smit of the dutch air force and Lt Col Lee Kloos, USAF, both coming from the F-16, went on record saying that an F-35 compares nicely in terms of turning to "an F-16 with combat load". They both said that a clean F-16 will turn better, but noted that a clean F-16 has little to offer in terms of range and weaponry, and is never actually flown operationally in such a way. 
Transonic acceleration, as well as climbing and descent, are described by the two pilots as matching those of a clean F-16 Block 50.  
Later on, with the beginning of Air Combat Manoeuvre training, we will no doubt hear more. 

 
The F-35C is due to have its DT-2 period of trials at sea between august and september. This time, the carrier involved is expected to be the USS D. Eisenhower. 



Remaining issues

Issues remain in the development of ALIS, the logistic planning software. Progress is slower than desired, and this impacts on the time needed to carry out maintenance. It is also one of the problems remaining on the road to USMC IOC, as the portable, deployable ALIS terminal isn't yet ready. 

Software development also remains, unsurprisingly, challenging. At IOC, the USMC seems set to not have access to the intended "4-ship fusion", which connects 4 F-35Bs in a package able to share the complete situational awareness picture, so that any target spotted by one aircraft is made visible to the others as well. 
Fusing the sensors inputs coming from 4 different aircraft is currently causing issues, as the differences in how each aircraft see the target generate multiple symbols on the screen, effectively making it hard for the pilot to know which target mark is the correct one. 
Fusion will initially be limited to pairs, while software clear up progresses with the aim of fixing this issue by October. 

The F-35B is still dealing with the Dunlop tyres, which, despite improvements made since 2013, still wear out quicker than planned. A new tyre design will follow. 

Software aside, the greatest issue still standing is the F-35B's 496 Bulkhead, which in 2004 was switched to aluminium from its original titanium design in order to reduce weight, with the unwanted result that, during airframe durability testing on the ground, it cracked, and then severed, at just after one simulated flying life. 
In order to be certified for its intended 8000 hours life, the F-35's fuselage must survive 2 simulated life cycles, with a third life cycle planned for validating the possibility of extensions beyond the 8000 hours. 
Durability testing on the F-35B's airframe has been stopped many months ago because of the 496's failure, and a redesigned bulkhead is needed. 
The problem will not affect the F-35B in the immediate (it'll be years before any of the aircraft produced so far enters the dangerous number of flying hours), but it is to be hoped that airframe stress tests will resume soon. In April 2014 Rear Adm. Randy Mahr, deputy program manager, said that the solution to the 496 problem was known and a redesigned bulkhead will be embodied into production from the LRIP 9 onwards, with the same component retrofitted during depot maintenance on the F-35Bs of the earlier lots. It is not clear at the moment if this is still the case, or if the development of a full, effective solution has slipped. It remains one issue to work upon. 

One non-issue which instead made a lot of noise on the press is the fix to the F-35B's weapon bay in order to fit the Small Diameter Bomb II. The apocalyptic tones used in some reports are definitely excessive when the fix is actually about a small change to the passage of an hydraulic line and some wire bundles. Moreover, the F-35 cannot exactly be blamed here, since the B's weapon bay was downsized all the way back in 2004, while the SDB II, which is not yet in service, began development in 2010. The "fault" is of the weapon, but the fact is that is simpler to carry out the small modification to the weapon bay rather than try to further miniaturize the bomb. Much drama has been made about how the SDB II won't be available on the F-35 before 2022, without considering that the SDB II won't be operational before 2017 at the earliest (on USAF F-15E), which becomes 2019 on US Navy Super Hornets. 
Moreover, it is not like F-35 will instantaneously make up the whole of the US air power: for many more years there will be F-15Es and F-16s to carry out a big share of the game. No real need to panic. 

The F-35B modification will be part of Block IV work, and the Joint Project Office is designing the fix keeping track of the requirements for partner weapon requirements as well. For the UK, this includes Meteor and SPEAR 3. 



British Status of Play

On a british-specific perspective, the 17 (R) Squadron stood up in Edwards AFB as the F-35 OEU squadron. For now it is equipped with BK-1 and BK-2 only. These aircraft came out from depot maintenance and received the latest modifications. 
BK-3, which is not instrumented, is in Beaufort as training aircraft, embedded in the USMC training squadron 501. 
BK-4, the next aircraft to be delivered, is instrumented and will joint 17(R) Sqn as third and last test platform. 

Procurement of a first batch of 14 aircraft has been authorized. The expected LRIP split is 4 in LRIP 8, 6 in LRIP 9 and 4 in LRIP 10. This should lead, by end-2018 or 2019 to the following situation: 

- 5 F-35B training fleet in Beaufort
- 3 F-35B test fleet in Edwards
- 9 F-35B in 617 Sqn, to RAF Marham 

Where to find F-35s in 2018


Speaking of RAF Marham, more than 300 million pounds have been assigned for infrastructure preparation in the base. Back in June 2014 it was announced that 3 Landing Pads will be built in order to practice vertical landing. A runway renovation is planned. The current Hardened Aircraft Shelters used by IX squadron with Tornado GR4 are due to be modernized ahead of welcoming 617 Sqn when it arrives from America (although the extension of the service life of the third Tornado squadron on base complicates somewhat the management of spaces as the major building work begins). 
Marham is also expected to receive an Integrated Training Centre which will train british pilots from 2019 and that will welcome other european crew training needs too, probably beginning with Norway's. 
Again, Marham is expected to eventually include a MRO plant for maintenance and upgrade, and this will require a large hangar and serious infrastructure. Another hangar complex is needed to host the stealth coating maintenance and the RCS testing laboratory which certifies the Low Observability after each coating re-application. 

Meanwhile, a Virtual Analysis Laboratory has opened in Ampthill, UK, to allow british-based software experimentation, analysis and development through simulation. The work done here will inform and direct software development carried out at the ACURL (Australia, Canada, United Kingdom Reprogramming Laboratory) at Eglin, in the US.


In Culdrose, funding is expected soon to rebuild the current Flight Deck training facility (the "dummy carrier" HMS Siskin) so that it ceases representing an Invincible class deck and enters the Queen Elizabeth age instead. The 14 Sea Harriers currently used for deck handling training are also expected to be replaced as they do not "impersonate" the larger and heavier F-35B well enough. A small number of F-35B mock-ups will be procured instead, for the handling and parking proper, while an option for deck runs and engine-on rolling training is getting back some ex-RAF Jaguars, which are thought to provide a more F-35B like feel. 

A Navy News graphic shows the existing HMS Siskin, surrounded by the shade of what Queen Elizabeth's deck would look like. In reality, it seems that there will not be a whole deck mock-up, but just the stern area, up to and including the first elevator.

A busy HMS Siskin training deck handlers. This is where you can still see Sea Harriers engines in action, although none of the aircraft can fly.
 
The 5-strong F-35B training fleet is expected to move out of the US to begin operating in Marham in July 2019. That's when US-based training of british F-35B crews is expected to end. 
Actually, the last of a planned 24 british pilots to be trained at Beaufort is expected to complete the course by May 2018. 

There is not yet a date for the standing up of the second frontline squadron, 809 NAS. For now, the stated purchase target stands at 48, including the test fleet. Greater clarity is hoped to come from the new SDSR. 



Where do we go from here? 

The beginning of the F-35B in british service will be relatively modest, at least compared to what the aircraft will be able to do later on. With Block 3F, the F-35B at IOC in 2018/19 will be able to carry 2 ASRAAM externally and up to 4 AMRAAM internally in a fighter role; or 2 AMRAAM and 2 Paveway IV in internal-only configuration, or up to 4 AMRAAM, 2 ASRAAM, 4 Paveway IV, or again 2 AMRAAM, 2 ASRAAM and 6 Paveway IV using both internal and external carriage. 
 
The gun pod will be available as well, provided that a new "no gun" budgetary stunt is pulled, like that, then aborted, which was played with the Typhoon.  


Block 3F capabilities


Block 3F comes with some limitations to the use of the EOTS as IRST sensor; and with no video-downlink capability, which is unfortunate as in recent years this has become a key factor in providing air support to the troops on the ground, sharing imagery with the JTAC. 
In defence of the F-35, it must be said that when the requirements were written and development started, the ROVER video-downlink did not exist yet. Clearly, the capability to share sensors imagery with the troops on the ground will be high on the list of priorities for development of Block IV, the software load for the 2020s. An IR pointer is also likely to be added. 

At entry in service, the F-35 will be able to share targeting information through self-determined GPS position data. Not quite the same thing as having full imagery, but it should be enough of a beginning. 

A notional road map for future developments



The capabilities will expand a lot going forwards with the Block IV software. Last 17 march, the deputy manager of the F-35 programme, Rear Adm. Randy Mahr, provided a document explaining some of the planned next steps. The presentation includes a table of enormous interest about british weaponry plans.
Block IV apparently is now going to comprise 4 different software releases, and I can’t quite say at the moment how this relates to the earlier assumption of having two stages, Block 4A in 2021/22 and 4B in 2022/23. 

March 2015 document showing the list of candidates for Block IV integration.


The four releases will incrementally add new weapons to the F-35, and for the UK the first candidate is SPEAR 1 – Penetrator, which is the new bunker-buster warhead developed for the Paveway IV bomb. This new warhead, which keeps the external shape of the current one but comes with an hardened penetrating body inside, is the de-facto replacement for the current 2000 lbs Paveway III used on Tornado GR4. The III is destined to go out of service alongside Tornado, it seems. Raytheon Uk and the MOD have been working on the new warhead option for the Paveway IV for a while now, and a production contract is expected soon.

The second candidate is “SPEAR seeker”. The definition is somewhat puzzling and not detailed, but I believe it probably refers to the proposed addition of an IR Imaging seeker again on the Paveway IV, in order to dramatically improve its ability to hit moving targets.
Spiral development of Paveway IV is all included in Selective Precision Effects At Range Capability 1 (2 being the Brimstone developments, and 3 the whole new weapon by the name of Spear).
There is also a “ASRAAM new build” candidate, which suggests that the Royal Air Force thinks it is time for a Capability Sustainment Programme for the ASRAAM. This has been loosely planned for years, and is supposed to build on what is being done for the CAMM / Sea Ceptor missile, itself an ASRAAM derivative.

Most important is the planned addition of Meteor. Integrating this weapon is particularly crucial to make best use of the F-35’s stealthness, firing from very long range. Moreover, integrating Meteor on F-35 is an indispensable step to move if the AMRAAM is to effectively leave british service in the near future.
The UK once planned to get rid of AMRAAM by 2017, but Meteor delays have forced a rethink. I would expect (and hope) that AMRAAM stocks will be extended a little more, to bridge the gap on the F-35, even after Meteor becomes the weapon of choice for Typhoon (should happen from 2018).

Finally, SPEAR 3 is expected to become available. Decisions regarding SPEAR 3 are expected in the coming months: MBDA is progressing with the design of the new SPEAR missile, but final development and production is expected to cost several hundred million pounds. There is a risk that the MOD will accept the Small Diameter Bomb II as SPEAR Capability 3 solution. However, this is not desiderable, as it would hurt the ability to design and produce complex weapons at home and moreover because the SDB II is a gliding weapon, while Spear has its own turbofan engine, offering greater range, greater Acceptable Launch Zone, more flexibility and greater range. All these advantages are crucial if SPEAR 3 is to provide, among others, a Destruction of Enemy Air Defence capability (DEAD) to compensate for the removal without replacement of the ALARM anti-radar missile. 

A single MBDA SPEAR missile seen on a Typhoon during development work
 
The end result the programme aims for. 2 Meteor and 8 SPEAR 3 will make for a powerful and versatile weapons load.

It becomes dubious if there will ever be a Storm Shadow integration on F-35. It won't happen that soon, and in the meanwhile the missile is aging. According to french budgetary documents, the Life Extension Programme for Storm Shadow / Scalp EG, which is a joint cooperation initiative between France and UK, is supposed to begin moving this year. We will have to see if the programme starts and how it goes. The number of missiles updated and life extended and the new OSD date will be crucial to understand if the F-35B will move on directly to the Storm Shadow future replacement. 
The SDSR 2010 imposed stock cuts on the Storm Shadow holdings for some 170 million pounds, according to the Telegraph. This is likely to have resulted in the removal of 170 to 200 missiles. Around 100 more have been used between Iraq and Libya, maybe more, leaving possibly around 600 rounds in stock. 

Brimstone is also not mentioned, at least for now. Brimstone, even in its Brimstone 2 iteration about to enter service is a rail launched weapon, so that internal integration is a problem (you need to eject the missile downwards and clear out of the weapon bay before its rocket motor ignites). However, SPEAR might include further developments of Brimstone, and if the missile continues to be the weapon of choice for CAS into the future, it will have to be added in at some point. 

Not mentioned in the table, but planned, is the addition, on the sole F-35A, of the tactical nuclear capability with integration of the B61-12 bomb for internal carriage. It does not concern the UK, but it is a factor in planning for Italy, Netherlands and, reportedly, for Belgium as it begins evaluating its options for replacing its F-16s.

Looking further into the future, the US are already planning years ahead, in particular by basing the research for new, more effective jet engines for the future on the F-135 powerplant. The future Adaptive Engine Technology Development (AETD) engine will be retro-compatible with the F-35, and is expected to bring massive advantages, in particular to combat range through much greater efficiency. The engine is expected to adapt to the various phases of flights to optimize its power output and fuel consumption. 

Funding is already being provided for cyber / electronic warfare capability insertion. In particular, a "cyber warfare" pod is in development already. Although not officially confirmed, the cyber payload will probably be carried into the TERMA-produced "multi-role pod" which is currently best known for containing the B and C's 25mm gun. 

Serious consideration is being given to directed energy weapons, in particular to lasers, but all this is of course quite a few years into the future.
   

REME of Army 2020

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Thanks to another FOI answer, another bit of the absurd wall of silence held up by the British Army has fallen off, and we have a list of the intended sub-unit level structure of the REME under Army 2020. 
Thanks to the friend who made the FOI request, but it continues to be absurd that it even takes a FOI for the army to share some information about its post-cuts structure. 

 

ADAPTABLE FORCE

1 Close Support Battalion REME
-          4 CS Coy
-          12 CS Coy

Paired with 102 Battalion (Reserve)
-          124 Recovery Coy
-          186 Field Coy
-          146 Field Coy
-          147 Field Coy



2 Close Support Battalion REME
-          7 CS Coy
-          11 CS Coy

Paired with 106 Battalion (Reserve)
-          155 Recovery Coy
-          157 Field Coy
-          152 Field Coy
-          153 Field Coy





REACTION FORCE

3rd Armoured Close Support Battalion REME [aligned with 20 Armoured Infantry Brigade]
-          5 Armoured  Coy
-          20 Armoured Coy
-          18 Field Coy

Paired with 105 Battalion (R)
-          131 Recovery Coy
-          130 Field Coy
-          158 Field Coy
-          160 Field Coy



4 Armoured Close Support Battalion REME (aligned with 12 Armoured Infantry Brigade)
-          9 Armoured Coy
-          10 Armoured Coy
-          17 Field Coy

Paired with 103 Battalion (R)
-          150 Recovery Coy
-          128 Field Coy
-          133 Field Coy
-          169 Field Coy



6 Armoured Close Support Battalion REME (aligned with 1st Armoured Infantry Brigade)
-          3 Armoured Coy
-          14 Armoured Coy
-          13 Field Coy

Paired with 101 REME Battalion (Reserve), even though the battalion is under command to 102 Logistic Brigade, Adaptable Force
-          119 Recovery Coy
-          125  Field Coy
-          127 Field Coy
-          159 Field Coy



5 Force Support Battalion REME
-          1 Field Coy
-          2 Field Coy
-          15 Field Coy

Paired with 104 REME Battalion (Reserve), even though the battalion is under command to 102 Logistic Brigade, Adaptable Force
-          118 Recovery Coy
-          126 Field Coy
-          129 Field Coy
-          148 Field Coy





Despite the pairing relationships being at odds with some of the assignments, the battalions are distributed through 101 and 102 Logistic Brigades in the following way:

101 Logistic Brigade, Reaction Force
3 Armoured Close Support Battalion REME
4 Armoured Close Support Battalion REME
6 Armoured Close Support Battalion REME
5 Force Support Battalion REME
103 Battalion REME (Reserve)
105 Battalion REME (Reserve)



102 Logistic Brigade, Adaptable Force
1 Close Support Battalion REME
2 Close Support Battalion REME
101 Battalion REME (Reserve)
102 Battalion REME (Reserve)
104 Battalion REME (Reserve)
106 Battalion REME (Reserve)



The REME also supply equipment support to 16 Air Assault Brigade, and carry out 2nd Line Equipment maintenance on the Army Air Corps helicopters. These tasks are covered by 7 Battalion:


7 Air Assault Battalion REME
-          8 Field Coy (PARA)
-          71 Aviation Coy
-          72 Aviation Coy
-          73 Aviation Coy


8 Field Coy is based in Colchester and directly supports 16 Air Assault Brigade.

8 Field Company had an establishment of some 150 men in 2012. Based in Colchester with 16 Air Assault brigade, it will re-ORBAT to support the cycle of readiness, probably by mixing its Forward and Support Platoons together and splitting the Airborne Forward Repair Team (the first technicians to parachute into an area of operations to support Drop Zone activities and early brigade movements) to form a couple of identical, full-spectrum platoons to rotate into readiness alongsides the other pieces of the Air Assault Task Force. 



71 and 72 aviation companies are based in Wattisham and aligned with the two Attack Helicopter Regiments, to which they provide 2nd Line Equipment Support expertise.  
They alternate yearly into the High Readiness “Vanguard” role alongside the Apache regiments, being kept at R2 (5 days notice to move). Each company has two platoons, and each platoon will be responsible for 6 months of readiness, during which it will have to generate two Forward Repair Groups of 10 specialists each. This means one FRG for each of the Apache squadron's Close Support Sections REME in the at-readiness regiment. 

73 Aviation Coy will transfer from Wattisham to Yeovilton in the coming months, to permanently assume the role of provider of 2nd Line Equipment Support for the Wildcat helicopters of 1st AAC Regiment. 1st Line Equipment Support is carried out by the REME elements of the Apache squadrons and of 1st AAC regiment respectively. Apache squadrons have recently reverted to having their own REME workshop, while 1st AAC Regiment is expected to have one centralized REME squadron from which workshops will be generated to support deploying squadrons. The Royal Marines / Royal Navy technicians of 847 NAS will, when on base, be part of the centralized maintenance squadron, but will maintain their maritime focus and shipboard role when 847 NAS deploys at sea. 



T-14 Armata: tank evolution ongoing

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I won't call the T-14 Armata a "revolution". It might be excessive to do so. But it sure is an evolution of the concept of Main Battle Tank, and promises to have several interesting features.Observation of the close-up photos coming from Moscow, however, leaves little doubt in me about the current models being prototypes, and incomplete as well. The external shield of the turret, and much of the sensors in it, appear to be representative mock-ups only. When seen from close by, the outer layer of the turret is seen to be a very thin metal sheet, which has also been assembled in a not too brilliant way.



The Armata project is not "just" about a new MBT, but about delivering a solid common base hull which will be produced in many different variants to cover multiple roles. At the Moscow parade we see the MBT (T-14) and the heavy IFV (T-15); but it is expected that engineer, fire support and possibly even a self propelled howitzer variants will follow. Specifically, a contract has been signed recently to build prototypes of new breaching and mine-clearing vehicles, to be trialed in 2017, which will eventually replace the current armoured bulldozer IMR-3 (on T-90 chassis) and BAT-M and BAT 2 combat engineer tractors. It is thought that these new vehicles will be based on Armata. The self-propelled howitzer should use the Koalitsya unmanned, automated 152mm howitzer turret on Armata hull. At the moment, the Koalitsya can be seen at the parade installed on a T-90 chassis (with six wheels, Armata has 7), with a heavily modified hull with all three members of the crew sitting in the front. It is not entirely clear if a move to a pure Armata base is still envisaged.
Another variant suggested is a new BMPT Terminator tank-support vehicle. The BMPT, based on the T-72 chassis, was proposed to the russian army, but rejected due to its elderly base vehicle. It is thought, but at this point it is hard to separate facts from speculation and fantasies, that such a fire support vehicle variant, based on Armata, will instead be procured, as the russian army endorses the idea, just not the mechanical base.


An Armata-based "Terminator" fire support vehicle is one possible variant.

Another variant is the BMO-2, a proposal by industry aimed at replacing the heavy APC BMO-T, basically a T-72 which has swapped the turret for an armoured "box" especially thought to carry, under thick armour protection, a team of up to 7 soldiers armed with RPO thermobaric / incendiary rockets (classed as "flamethrowers" by the russian army). These specialised support teams can force the enemy out of buildings and strongholds very quickly. In the industry brochure about the proposed BMO-2, the Armata derived vehicle is armed with a large remotely operated turret with a 30 mm gun and two boxes of rockets, for 24 rounds which can be fired from under armour.

An early industry proposal for a BMO Armata variant.

The current BMO-T carries over 30 high power incendiary and thermobaric rockets. But the men have to get out to employ them, and the hatches on the back of the converted T-72 aren't the most practical. These special teams bring huge firepower to bear, however.

In the next few years, in short, we could see several further developments of the Armata base. The T-14 is earmarked as replacement for the old MBTs currently in service, and the T-15 should equip the infantry battalions within Tank Brigades. These will thus become very heavy formations, with the infantry riding into battle with MBT-like protection.
The more numerous motorised infantry brigades will instead receive the new Kurganets-25 IFV, another whole new tracked design, lighter than T-15 (but armed in the exact same way) and with full amphibious capability; and the new Bumerang, an 8x8 IFV also fully amphibious.

The T-15, Kurganets and Bumerang, in their IFV variants, all share the Epoch-Almaty unmanned, remotely operated turret, armed with a 30mm gun with coaxial 7.62 machine gun and with two twin pods of Kornet anti-tank missiles.
The Kurganets-25 and Bumerang also have a lighter armed APC incarnation, with a smaller RWS with heavy machine gun (12.7 mm, it would seem, but 14.5 might follow). Many more variants can be expected if the plan to replace the BMPs, BTRs and supporting vehicles with these new products will go ahead.

The T-14's evolutionary aspect comes from having the crew all in the hull, inside a safety cell well protected on all sides. The turret is unmanned. However, it is suspected that the autoloader system has an architecture similar to the carousel on the T-72, and this could still be a major weak point, compared to the sealed ammunition compartments with blow-out panels used on other modern tanks. The autoloader's shape and the protection of the ammunition stock from catastrophic failure is one key factor to judge the Armata's true evolutionary potential, and there aren't yet good answers.

The T-72 ammunition storage and handling system has been the cause of the well known nasty habit of the tank of exploding and throwing its turret away. Moving the crew into a safe cell inside the front of the hull reduces the immediate lethality of such a nasty habit, but it will be interesting to find out if Armata's design does something to reduce the vulnerability in this area.


Another key element of the T-14 and T-15 is the new Active Protection System, reportedly known as Afganit. This should use a variety of sensors, mainly radar, to detect incoming missiles and even APFSDS darts, and counter them with soft and even hard kill ammunition. The intended position of the Afganit's radar antennas are visible in the T-14's turret, but close observation suggests that what we are seeing now is just demonstrative material.

The Armata's turret is apparently composed by a "core" tower containing the main and coaxial gun and related weapon sight. On top, there's the panoramic sight, with high elevation machine gun RWS. But all around this, there's a modular outer shield, comprising also a significant extension to the rear, which could contain additional systems.
The observation of photos coming from Moscow, however, shows that, at the moment, the outer shell is just a very thin sheet of metal. The radar arrays and some of the sensors also seem to be only mock ups. This suggests that development of this part of the tank is still ongoing, and thus what we see might not be exactly like the finished product.

Earlier concept art and at least one industry model seen in 2012 suggested that the T-14 would also be armed with one or two light guns (a 30 mm autocannon and a gatling machine gun in the 2012 model). These do not currently appear on the tank, but there is a possibility that the module sticking out of the rear of the turret could contain the ammunition and hold one or two guns in elevable pods at the sides.

Look at how thin the metal plates are. The sensor aerial installation also isn't looking very concrete. The assembly work also doesn't look too high quality. It is fair to assume that at least the outer shell of the turret is currently only a mock-up. 

Again, the poor assembly and sheer thinnes of the outer shell are evident. The core turret can be guessed behind the large tubes at the bottom of the structure, which are thought to be the launchers for Hard Kill interceptor projectiles of the Afganit APS.

The large hole on the left side might be a port for the ejection of spent stub case elements of the ammunition. 

The large module sticking out from the back of the turret is not expected to contain any key system. Maybe in the future it could be used for the installation of the small calibre guns seen in models and concept art. The rear-facing sensor of the Afganit can be seen. Another circular port is present on the bottom rear of the turret, under the protruding basket.

The Object 195, an earlier prototype MBT, had a 30 mm gun on the turret, which could be elevated to take out targets high above. Useful in urban scenarios, it can partially be seen here, with the barrel sticking out to the right of the main (152 mm!) gun.

Light, high elevation guns were test mounted on the T-72M2 Moderna as well. Here, it is armed with two 20mm guns. 

T-72M2 Moderna with a single 30mm gun. It is still early to say that Armata won't have an installation of this kind.

This photo by Andrey Kryuchenko shows the Armata T-14 from above. There is a bit of a mistery about the third crew member, who seems not to have a proper, personal hatch. Supposedly, the gunner sits in the middle, between Commander and Driver. He might have to get in and out through the commander's hatch, unless there's an opening he can use (at least when the turret is turned to the sides)

As the top image shows, there is a large maintenance hatch on top of the tower. More interesting, the Afganit APS includes substantial banks of smoke grenades and other munitions, including a large number apparently meant for vertical launch. The exact purpose and employment method can only be guessed: supposedly, Afganit should intercept top attack munitions as well. Curiously, the photos seen so far show that the rear of the tank has no evident APS coverage.

This photo, again by Andrey Kryuchenko, shows the T-15 IFV variant. The crew's positions are much clearer here. The turret is also definitely more mature than the T-14's. The Epoch-Almaty has a 30 mm gun, coaxial machine gun, sensors and 4 Kornet missiles. It does not penetrate into the tank, leaving plenty of space for the embarked infantry squad. 



The T-14 Armata, at least for the moment, has a 125mm gun. It is not clear, however, if Russia has effectively abandoned the 152mm gun it has been experimenting for years, or if it might be adopted later. The main drawback of the gigantic 152mm is the huge size of the ammunition. If a fully automated system is not as concerned as a human loader by the weight and bulk of the shells it moves, it is still true that the sheer massiveness of the projectiles inexorably means carrying fewer rounds.

Soldiers near the door in the rear of the T-15. The door is protected by an application of bar armour, and opens into a large ramp which can be lowered to ease combat embarkation and disembarkation. The impressive armour protection and several APS elements are visible.


The heavy AFV modernisation of the russian army is certainly impressive, especially when we add in the Kurganets-25 and the Bumerang. The airborne troops are also receiving new equipment, namely the airdroppable IFV BMD-4M and the Rakushka airdroppable APC, which preserve the exceptional level of mechanisation of the russian paras.
The 2S25 Sprut-SD airdroppable tank seems to have been substantially abandoned. 24 were procured, but it was found to have significant flaws. However, the Paratroopers will still have a 125mm tank which can be parachuted into action, as a contract has been signed to design a successor to the Sprut, based on the BMD-4M instead of on BMD-3.

Kurganets-25 IF. Russian MOD image. 

Bumerang, in APC variant. The IFV variant has the same turret as T-15 and Kurganets-25 IFVs. Kurganets-25 also has an APC variant, with the same RWS seen here on Bumerang. Russian MOD image

A BMD-4M and Rakushka APCs, the main vehicles in the Airborne Force's shopping list. The BMD-4M has a 100mm gun, with 30mm coaxial weapon. Image by Ura.Ru
The Sprut airdroppable tank hasn't proved entirely satisfactory. But the Airborne Force has signed new contracts to develop an alternative. Russian airborne formations can bring a lot of firepower and armour to bear via air drops. A capability that no western airborne formation, not even the armerican ones, retains.








I've been collecting images of the new russian armour on the web for a while, now. I don't have a reliable way to establish who was the original author behind the photos. If you see your images in this article, let me know so i can acknowledge you, or remove the image if you'd so prefer. 

Royal Army Medical Corps in Army 2020

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A FOI answered this month allows us to take a look into the Army 2020 structure planned for the Royal Army Medical Corps.


As already happened with the RLC list, there are some discrepancies. At least one squadron seems to be missing from the list: for all i know, in fact, 3 Medical Regiment also includes 251 Sqn (Reserve) in its structure. In the FOI document, 251 does not appear, for whatever reason.

The regular / hybrid medical regiments are as follows:



2 Medical Regiment  (Hybrid) – move from Hohne to North Luffenham in July 2015
2 Medical Regiment is part of the 1UK (United Kingdom) Division’s Adaptable Force Medical Group

29 Medical Squadron
22 Support Squadron
222 Medical Squadron (R)
250 Medical Squadron (R)

3 Medical Regiment  (Hybrid) 
3 Medical Regiment is part of the 1UK (United Kingdom) Division’s Adaptable Force Medical Group

 

64 Medical Squadron (R)
251 Medical Squadron (R) - does not appear in the FOI list, but probably just a mistake
12 Medical Squadron
18 Medical Squadron

4 Armoured Medical Regiment
July 2013 re-organization with Bulldog, support 12 Armoured Infantry Brigade  

11 Medical Squadron
4 Medical Squadron
36 Medical Squadron
13 Medical Squadron

5 Armoured Medical Regiment.
1 September 2014 the Regiment was reorganized as Army 2020 armored medical unit for 1stArmoured Infantry Bridade.

35 Medical Squadron
39 Medical Squadron
7 Medical Squadron
24 Medical Squadron

1 Armoured Medical Regiment
1 April 2014, assigned to 20 Armoured Infantry Brigade

30 Medical Squadron
31 Medical Squadron
28 Medical Squadron
14 Medical Squadron
 



16 Medical Regiment
19 Air Manoeuvre Medical Squadron
23 Air Manoeuvre Medical Squadron
127 Medical Squadron - mentioned in the FOI, but not sure about this. 127 used to be the forebear of the current 23 squadron.
81 Air Assault Medical Support Squadron 
144 Parachute Medical Squadron (Reserve)  




Reserve medical regiments: 



225 (Scottish) Medical Regiment (Reserve)
RHQ and 174 Support Squadron (Dundee)
152 Evacuation Squadron - Glenrothes.
153 Medical Squadron and - Dundee
154 Medical Squadron – Stirling
 


253 (North Irish) Medical Regiment
Regimental Headquarters and 110 Support Squadron -Belfast
107 Medical Squadron - Belfast
109 Squadron - Belfast
108 Medical Squadron - Limivady and Enniskillen




254 (East of England) Medical Regiment
Regimental Headquarters and 163 Support Squadron (Cambridge)
161 Squadron (Colchester)
162 Squadron (Hitchin)
220 Squadron (Ditton) - Not listed in the FOI, but appears elsewhere included in document about Reserves 2020 reorganisation. FOI answer incomplete...?
 


On Field Hospitals, there again is an element of confusion as the 2013 "Summary of Army 2020 Reserve Structure and Basing Changes" identifies the squadrons with letters, and several Field Hospitals have more than three squadrons as the FOI suggests. Specifically:

204 has A, B, C and D squadrons.
205 has A, D, E, G and I squadrons.
207 has A, B, C and G squadrons. (but with B and G merging by December 2014) 
243 and 256 Field Hospitals also have each a fourth squadron.

I'm not sure how the difference is explained. The FOI seems to identify the squadrons by role, and it is possible that two recruitment squadrons in two different locations form part of the same role-squadron. But it is just a guess.

Moreover, the FOI unfortunately does not identify the squadrons in the other regiments by role (Evacuation Sqn, Area Medical Sqn, etcetera).

As a result of these discrepancies, the RAMC's structure in Army 2020 remains somewhat mysterious.



France's adjusted Military Planning Law

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France has changed course on military reductions, cancelling a good share of the planned reduction in the number of personnel and making a sizeable adjustement to funding, which has brought about an update to the plans, which include a major restructuring of the Army, under project Au Contact!, "in contact". 

The main items in the reworked plans include: 

- Army's operational, deployable manpower at 77.000 (versus 66.000 target with the earlier cuts)
- 1000 more men to the Special Forces with the creation of the GAOS, Groupement d'Appui Auix Operations Speciales; a support battalion not unlike 1 PARA SFSG in the UK 
- 1000 men to the Intelligence and ISTAR forces
- 1000 men to cybersecurity 

The Army's new structure will be detailed on May 28, but we know that the restructuring will deliver 6 land manoeuvre brigades (a cut of one HQ, the current 3rd brigade), of which two will be heavy armoured, two medium, wheeled and equipped with the new VBMR 6x6 vehicles and EBRC 6x6 reconnaissance vehicle, one Parachute and one Mountain. These brigades will have some 7000 men each, with up to 7 regiments. Two deployable Division HQs will command the brigades, three each. 
One Aviation Brigade is to be formed to bring all helicopter regiments under a unified command. This airmobile brigade will not have organic ground units, it seems, but will provide airmobility to the infantry of the line brigades. 

The Navy says that a 7th Commando unit will be raised. Its unit name hasn't yet been selected. 

 
A first graphic showing the reorganization of the army commands. More details should become available on May 28.


Several important items of equipment have been added: 

- 7 Tiger attack helicopters, bringing total planned purchase up from 60 to 67. The procurement of a laser-guided rocket to complement Hellfire missiles is planned. Hellfire itself will be replaced in 2021, most likely with an air launched development of the new MMP anti-tank missile in development for the Army, would be my guess.
The Tiger will continue to be complemented by around 80 armed Gazelle helicopters. The aim is keeping attack and reconnaissance helicopters at 146 in total.

Replacement for the elderly Gazelle should come under project HIL (hélicoptère interarmées léger) in the 2020s. The HIL should replace Army Gazelle and Air Force Fennec, and Navy Dauphin and Alouette III. The programme used to be earlier known as HC4 - Hélicoptère Classe 4 Tonnes.


- 6 more NH-90 TTH battlefield utility helicopters, bringing planned purchases to 74. These will complement 8 Caracal in use by the Special Forces, plus 26 Cougar and a number of Pumas. The total of utility helicopters in the long-term is set at 115, and more NH-90s are planned to be purchased later to keep the total unchanged as the Puma is phased out. The reductions will be progressive: in 2020 there will still be more than 115 helicopters, considering all types.

- A 3rd MUSIS satellite will be acquired. This is a space based imagery intelligence asset. CERES will deliver national, space-based electronic intelligence. 

- An electronic intelligence package for use on MQ-9 Reaper will be acquired. 12 Reaper remain planned, and deliveries are underway.
On Monday 18 may, France also signed a MOU with France and Germany for the cooperative study and development of an european MALE UAV for the 2020s, that will be the Reaper's replacement. This follows the falling apart of the UK - FR TELEMOS project. Ever since, the UK has been silent, and to this day it remains uncertain how the UK plans to move on and still deliver a UAV for the SCAVENGER requirement, which is also supposed to mitigate the loss of Sentinel R1 and Shadow R1 (pushed back to 2018, but still planned). RAF MQ-9 Reaper themselves have a funding line out to 2019, but the way ahead is uncertain. Answers on this vital requirement will be needed soon.

- 2 of the existing 14 C-130H will be fitted with a weapons capability to be employed in special forces support. 

French armed forces have made it clear that they want to keep a number of C-130s for their needs, arming them as well. Will UK special forces manage to get the MOD and government to listen to their well known, identical wish?


- France will "study", with a decision to be taken by year's end, whether to procure 4 additional C-130s, two of which would be equipped as tankers, in order to provide tactical air refuelling to the Army and Air Force's Special Forces Caracal helicopters. This is due to the delays with A400M, which reportedly include difficulties with the helicopter AAR capability. 

- Deliveries of the new A-330 MRTT "Phènix" will be accelerated. All should be delivered between 2018 and 2025. 

Phènix: what the RAF's own Voyager could and should have been, but isn't.

- 25 new generation targeting pods (the new TALIOS) will be procured in addition to 45 which were already planned. 

- The first batch of 60 SCALP cruise missiles renewed and life-extended is expected in delivery during 2019. UK and France were collaborating on a project for upgrading and life extending the SCALP / Storm Shadow. This might imply that the RAF will start to get upgraded missiles in the same years, but we don't really know. 

- In 2017, design of a successor to the MICA air to air missile will  begin. 

- A GEOINT deployable capability will be procured under the GEODE 4D project. There might be an export chance here for the system the UK has recently developed and put into service, the TIGAS.

- In 2019, the Army will seek to replace the EBG, Engine Blindè du Genie, the combat engineer tractor. France has been looking into (and trialing) the british Terrier as a candidate solution, and while the production line in the UK has shut down, BAE has mothballed the machinery in order to be able to re-open an assembly line, eventually abroad. Terrier thus remains a very likely candidate. 

- The navy will acquire a 4th B2M patrol vessel. Actually, news released since are that this fourth vessel will be a B3M: Bâtiment Multi-Mission Mutualisé. This is due to the ship being destined to be shared between the military, which will employ it for patrolling French Southern and Antarctic Lands, and the polar research institute Paul-Émile Victor. The B3M will be based in La Reunion, and will replace the patrol vessel Albatros (which will be decommissioned within days) and the ship L'Astrolabe, which supplies the Dumont d'Urville base in Antarctica. 
The previous 3 B2M vessels are replacements for the BATRAL light transport ships which for years have flown the flag in the french waters overseas. The first B2M will be based in New Caledonia, the second in the french Polynesia and the third in the West Indies. 

France is also procuring two light patrol vessels specifically designed to serve in Guyana. Having very limited draft, they will be able to push up into rivers. The Patrouilleurs Légers Guyanais were ordered back in december.
By 2020, the french navy will thus have 4 B2M/B3M ships and 2 PLGs covering overseas committments, and 7 old A-69 vessels, plus another 6 legacy patrol vessels of various kinds. The A-69 and other patrol vessels will be replaced under the BATSIMAR project expected to start in 2020. 
6 surveillance frigates based in overseas territories also remain in force. Today this is the Floreal class, but a replacement will be needed later. 

- The FREMM frigates are the losers. It is official at this point that the french navy will receive only 8, two of which configured for Air Defence (FREDA variant). 6 ASW vessels will be delivered by 2019 - 2020, despite the selling of Normandie to Egypt: building times will be speeded up. In 2021 and 2022 the two FREDA will be delivered. 
From 2023, France now plans to be launching a new design frigate, the FTI, frégates de taille intermédiaire, the design of which is not yet known. There is a possibility that it will build upon the new italian PPA design, with some discussions having reportedly already taken place. 
The target of 15 "first rank" warships remains unchanged. The tally is to include 4 anti-air defence warships and 11 frigates. Currently, the total is made up by the 2 Forbin / HORIZON class AAW destroyers, 2 F70 AAW legacy ships, old F70 ASW frigates and FREMM ships entering in service. 
The 5 La Fayette frigates will be upgraded and fitted with sonar to help keep the total at 15 as the old F70 ASW ships are withdrawn from service. 
The two FREDA will replace the F70 AAW in 2021 and 2022. 
Then, from 2023, the La Fayette themselves will be replaced by the new FTIs. 

- From 2021, SLAMF (Système de Lutte Anti Mines – Futur) is supposed to deliver new solutions to the MCM requirement. Eventually, the minesweepers will be replaced by 8 systems of unmanned surface and underwater vehicles, deployable at sea with four large motherships.
Apparently, and very surprisingly, five separate ships are also planned as bases for clearance divers, according to the MOD's document. 
The development of the unmanned vehicles and general architecture for the umanned, stand-off clearance of minefields at sea is a collaborative project with the UK, with several demonstration contracts awarded in the last few months. The UK's MHC solution will use many of the same drones. 

- Funding is provided for 4 Bâtiment de Soutien et d'Assistance Hauturier (BSAH), ocean-going tugs and support ships. 

- From 2017, France will be ordering a new assault rifle to replace FAMAS 

- For the future replacement of the C-160 Gabriel electronic warfare aircraft, France plans the procurement of Charge Universelle de Guerre Electronique (CUGE), a modular payload which will be embarked on cargo aircraft (A400, or maybe C-130 or even the smaller C-235) as necessary, removing the need for a dedicate, specific platform. 

- France will be in the market for a new solution for the training of jet pilots under the Formation Moderniseè et Entrainement Diffèrenciè des Equipages de Chasse. There is a possibility that France will collaborate with Italy, maybe even sending pilots to the 61st Wing training school at Lecce Galatina, Italy, for training.  




Other plans remain substantially unchanged from earlier versions. The army will still want to procure a tactical UAV, and the Watchkeeper is a leading candidate. 

In 2020, the Navy will seek to launch FLOTLOG, the programme for the acquisition of 3 new supply ships for the logistics of the fleet. 

Acquisition of all 630 VBCI will be followed by projects of modernisation, including the addition of turret-mounted missile launchers and enhanced networking within the SCORPION project. 
The Army plans to acquire 2080 VBMR, including 358 in "Light", 4x4 variant to replace the VAB.
248 EBRC Scouts will replace the AMX 10RC and Sagaie ERC 90.  
At a later date, 1470 VBAE (véhicules blindés d’aide à l’engagement) are expected to be procured to replace the VBL light armoured cars. 
200 Leclerc MBTs and 18 Leclerc recovery vehicles are under contract for modernization and life extension. Artillery is going to be a bit short of guns if there will not be additional purchases of CAESAR truck-mounted 155/52 howitzers. Currently, 77 are on order, but as the tracked self-propelled guns retire, more would be needed. 
13 launchers are being upgraded to GMLRS. 

The Air Force continues to plan for a long-term figure of 185 combat jets, between Rafale and modernized Mirage 2000.  
The Navy will add 40 Rafale M of its own, as the last Super Etendard Modernisee is withdrawn by 2017.

The nuclear deterrent will continue to be based on some 300 warheads. Three full sets of 16 M-51 submarine launched missiles will be maintained for the fleet of 4 SSBN; and the air force maintains a stock of some 54 ASMP-A missiles.  

The fleet of maritime patrol aircraft will shrink to 15 upgraded ATL-2 over the long period. These will continue to be complemented by a further 4 ATL-2 used for surface surveillance, as well as 4 Falcon 50M, 5 Falcon 200 Guardian and a further 4 Falcon 50 due to be converted and fitted with SAR radar. 

The main helicopter of the Navy will be the NH-90 NFH Cayman, 27 of which are on order, along with 14 palletized ASW kits with sonar Flash to employ on them when and where necessary. These will still be complemented by some 40 more light helicopters (Alouette, Panther, Dauphin)in 2020.  




SDSR 2015: solving the problem of hollow army 2020

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In general, the SDSR 2015 is far more likely to bring more cuts and bad news than it is to bring wisdom. So I fear that trying to reason on how to fix problems is most likely going to be wasted time. But nonetheless, I plan to write about some of the major challenges ahead, and explain what I think should be done to fix Future Force 2020 by making better use of what’s available, and by adding targeted investments in some specific areas.

I’ve decided to start from the army, since it is no mystery that Army 2020, in many areas, has never convinced me. If you’ve been following this space for some time, you are very likely to have read my sometimes harsh critique of certain decisions. Two of the many points I raised from the very beginning have actually been addressed (kind of): the demented decision of sacrificing the CBRN Area Survey and Reconnaissance has been subject to an epic U-turn, and the Fuchs vehicles and related equipment have been brought back into service. Meanwhile, 16 Air Assault brigade has been brought back to a three manoeuvre battalions structure by moving 2 Royal Gurkha Rifles under its command. This in itself does not make 16 Air Assault a viable brigade, since supports (medical, engineer, artillery, logistic…) have all been cut down to Binary structure and there’s no sign that they will be rebuilt (manpower, after all, is not available for that unless something else is cut). Nonetheless, they are steps in the right direction, and they are both things I had been calling for.

Now, let’s go in some detail. About these two changes, and about the remaining other weaknesses of Army 2020 as currently thought out.



AREA CBRN

Regarding CBRN, unfortunately, the U-turn has come not before a lot of hard won experience has been squandered in an unbelievably stupid way: according to the Royal Tank Regiment, which has been tasked to rebuild CBRN AS&R in its FALCON squadron, the withdrawal of the Fuchs and the passage to a Light Role only CBRN structure in the RAF Regiment has come with the outright cancellation, on the part of Air Command, of most of the documentation about Fuchs operations.
It is difficult to overstate how rushed and stupid such a decision was. FALCON squadron has now embarked on the reconstruction effort, seeking out veterans of the disbanded Joint CBRN Regiment, to get information from them. Germany’s help has also been sought and obtained. The Fuchs training simultator has been brought back into operations and the vehicles themselves are following.

FALCON Squadron is now planning for an establishment of some 80 men and 30 vehicles. The unit will be at permanent Very High Readiness, as AS&R elements are rightfully planned to be an enduring part of the Army’s VANGUARD pool of ready-to-use units. No Whole Fleet Management: the squadron owns 100% of its vehicles, full time, and it is responsible for keeping them going.
There are going to be 4 Sections, each with 2 FUCHS. Earlier reports suggested another would be in HQ squadron for follow-on confirmation of Section findings, and the remaining two would be kept back for evaluation and demonstration purposes. However, there must have been a slight change as apparently one FUCHS is actually going on a plinth to serve as Gate Guardian at the Harman Lines barracks.
The squadron is also receiving 6 COYOTE MEP vehicles fitted out for Command and Control and for Logistic support. The MEP (Military Enhancement Programme) is not the open-top Coyote 6x6 best known these days, but the closed-cockpit, shelter-carrying variant which was originally procured (in 35 units) to serve as prime mover for the SOOTHSAYER EW kit, which was sadly cancelled later on. The mechanical base is more or less the same, the Supacat HMT 600 6x6. Each Fuchs section will receive one MEP, with two held in Echelon Squadron.
A number of Panther CLVs are on the way, while the Multi Purpose Decontamination Systems should have been refurbished and put back in action by this point. For now, they will move on the legacy DROPS trucks, but by 2017 the MAN EPLS trucks will be assigned, presumably becoming the MPDS movers. 

The MEP was originally procured to be the prime mover of the SOOTHSAYER EW system, carried inside the shelter visible in the photo. The cancellation of SOOTHSAYER left 35 vehicles without an immediate use, and a big gap in the Army's EW capability. A gap which has yet to be closed, with the LANDSEEKER programme.

 
It will be interesting to see what FALCON squadron's MEPs end up looking like. New shelters might be a possibility.
 
As is to be expected in the British Forces, the chain of command for the squadron is a bit… complex. With the Joint CBRN Regiment gone, FALCON squadron is an additional sub-unit of Royal Tank Regiment. But its actual manager is 22 Royal Engineer regiment, so that the squadron sits under 25 (Close Support) Engineer Group, itself part of 8 Engineer Brigade, controlled by Force Troops Command.
Force Troops Command is responsible for task-generating the AS&R element at Very High Readiness from FALCON Sqn, with the ultimate 4-star owner of FALCON being the Commander, Joint Forces Command. 
Confused? Understandable if you are.  

The FUCHS simulator is back online

With the good news out of the way, the bad ones: even after the U-turn, the long term future of CBRN AS&R is floating in the air more than we all would like. As said elsewhere, FRES Scout brings sensors of its own to help in the wide-area detection of CBRN threats, but what comes after the FUCHS is still uncertain. Apparently, the Army is assuming that UAV-based sensors will take up the role. Not clear if it might be a Watchkeeper role fit equipment one day, or if there will be a specific CBRN UAV, or what.
I’m a bit… unconvinced still by the UAV idea, but as always it is the uncertainty that disturbs the most. It looks pretty likely to me that, barring the eventuality of FUCHS being chopped again (with HMG and the MOD, you never know), FALCON Sqn can expect to work for quite a bunch of years with what it has.




Bringing back some jointery with the now 20 Defence CBRN Wing, RAF Regiment might be desirable for obvious reasons, but the Army has now awakened to the importance of green control over CBRN, and the RAF Regiment on the other hand is unlikely to want to let go of the Defence CBRN scepter without a fight. Watch out for possible incoming mess.



Hollow force

Now for the biggest problem of Army 2020: despite the best efforts of Nick Carter and his team, the political orders about the preservation of capbadges at all costs have forced the adoption of what is, at least in part, a hollow force. 16 Air Assault Brigade itself is an example of hollow force: it is a brigade, but really isn’t. Its supporting elements have been cut down to size, and are now enough (barely) to support the generation of an Air Manoeuvre Battlegroup at VHR readiness, with the sub-units alternating yearly into the role.

3rd Commando brigade has partly suffered the same fate, since it continues to suffer a chronic shortage of engineer support, and, even though harsher cuts have been fought back successfully by Navy Command standing up to the Army, the Artillery element also has suffered indirect reductions (REME, for example) which make the survival of all 3 the batteries (down to just 4 guns each, by the way) somewhat symbolic only.

The “Adaptable Force” is a collection of false brigades to be raided whenever it is time to build an actual deployable one during an enduring operation, with supports having been preserved (partially) to enable the 7 brigades to form just 2, to cover the fourth and fifth 6-month tours in an enduring deployment.
I say “partially” because there are recognized shortages of resources even for achieving this base target, which is the key to achieving the SDSR target of an army capable to sustain a brigade-level operation in enduring fashion.
Specifically, these is a well known and rather dramatic shortage of Royal Signals: the need for them has never been higher, yet their number has been cut and one regiment removed from the count. In the current army structure, not a single signal regiment is aligned with the brigades of the Adaptable Force. Gen. Sir Peter Wall named Logistics and Royal Signals as points of concern in Army 2020 during hearings in front of the Defence Committee, and while presenting the Corps’s future after the SDSR, the Royal Signals’s journal made clear that there is notenough manpower to properly support the brigade-sized enduring operation ambition. 

Royal Signals are precious and more necessary than ever, but their number is currently insufficient to support enduring brigade-sized operations.

Finally, the infantry battalions: the Army was denied the chance to cut more of those, with a firm ceiling put at 5, to prevent the loss of capbadges, notoriously a politically sensible subject. However, the battalions remaining are simply tiny: Light Role battalions have now an establishment of a mere 561 men, all ranks, all trades. This is very, very little indeed, and has been achieved by, among the rest, cutting all companies down from 3 to 2 platoons. A (very) partial mitigation has been obtained by re-distributing the GPMGs of the Machine Gun Platoon into fire support sections assigned to each Rifle Company.
This, at most, partially corrects a long standing deficiency of firepower in british infantry units, by adding a Fire Support Element in each company, like other armies have been doing for many years. But it is a nice dress up for bad news: the machine guns are just removed from the Heavy Weapons Company and reassigned, and the missing platoons remain missing, and they are supposed to come out of the paired reserve regiment. In principle it is a decent idea, but whether the reserve regiments will ever be able to effectively deliver all the pieces needed, is a very big guess to make.
The 561-strong Light Role Battalion should be uplifted to as many as 750 men for deployment, a value better in line with what is found in other NATO armies, the Army says. This in theory requires almost 200 men from the reserve unit, which is a 50% output from regiments which are established for 400. Can it be done?
Ideally, yes. In practice, it seems very, very likely that the regular regiments of the Adaptable Force will be raided far and wide to piece together something that can be deployed.
This makes the Adaptable Force very virtual indeed, with a realistic output which is a small fraction of what would be expected by reading a list of 7 brigade HQs, 3 cavalry regiments (+ 3 Reserve) and some 15 infantry regiments (+ 13 Reserve; 1st SCOTS and the Gurkha battalion don’t even have a paired reserve unit).

To me, this is a hollow force. There’s an acute shortage of Signals; enough supports for 2 brigades at most; a whole lot of questionable, under strength infantry battalions and the elite brigades which are handicapped by lack of a few hundred men in support roles.
It is pretty clear to me that this is not what 82.000 regulars could and should deliver. Infantry battalions, even understrength, are never useless, but it is clear that actual military value comes, at the lowest level, from battlegroups and then brigades.
Brigades, comprising of infantry, cavalry, signals, artillery, logistics, REME, medical and intelligence, are the main element of power for the army. And by associating support sub-units and infantry, they can produce battlegroups.

A very honest and in depth look must be given to the other 2-star commands in Army 2020: are a 2-star London District and a 2-star UK Support Command actually needed on top of the 2 divisions plus JRRF?
Can’t the London District and UK Support Command be combined into a single non-deployable Division HQ? I think it is more doable and less damaging than other cuts we have seen. The resulting Divisional HQ could control a couple of non-deployable brigades: Guards Bde, for the Public Duty units in London, and 11 Infantry Bde as administrator for the units posted to Brunei, Cyprus and for the Falklands Infantry Company. 

The Army will dismiss it as heresy, but i would also suggest tough questions about the ARRC. Is it justified? Is it a good use of precious Signals specialists and of manpower in general? The UK, Italy, France, Germany and Netherlands, Greece, Turkey, Spain... each have one NATO Corps 3-star HQ. But by now, in Europe, there are not enough deployable brigades, and even less Divisions, to form Corps. 
Sometimes i read of people saying that the Royal Navy's carriers are a "vanity project". I couldn't agree less. If there is a vanity project within NATO, is the ridiculous number of deployable 3-star HQs. I would suggest the ARRC is an ultimate vanity item: it is there so there is a capability to go in the field and command a big badass Corps of multiple divisions. 
The divisions to build the Corps up aren't really there, but everyone gets a Corps HQ. Read this list without laughing: 



These headquarters are multinational, but are sponsored and paid by one or more ‘framework nations’ who provide the bulk of the headquarters’ personnel, equipment and financial resources.  The United Kingdom is the framework nation of the ARRC, while France, Greece, Italy, Spain and Turkey have sponsored the NATO Rapid Deployable Corps France, Greece Italy, Spain and Turkey, respectively. Germany and the Netherlands share costs for the German-Netherlands Rapid Deployable Corps, while Denmark, Germany and Poland are the three framework nations of the Multinational Corps Northeast and Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain are the Eurocorps framework nations.  Romania is currently establishing a Multinational Division Headquarters for south-eastern Europe, which is expected to be operational by 2016.

 http://www.aco.nato.int/natos-rapid-deployable-corps-.aspx


Neat, huh? 
Perhaps it is time to shift the precious resources down to "lowly" deployable divisions. It will not seem much at first, but getting back a Signals regiment for use with actual deployable brigades would actualy do a world of good...  

I will stop short, in this article, of assuming the disbandment of ARRC and re-roling of 22 Signal Regiment, but i want to write it here: it might really be time to consider it.



How many infantry battalions?  

Solving the problem entirely is always going to be very problematic, as there are other considerations that need to be made. One of the UK’s battalions is committed in Brunei and is kind of out of the scope. Two more are routinely committed in Cyprus: one as garrison, one as Theatre response unit, forward positioned for action in the Med and Middle East.
Two more, plus elements of a third, get swallowed up by the Public Duties in London, with 5th SCOTS - Balaklava company in Edinburgh.
Another battalion is a Ranger-type unit, the SOF backup to the Special Forces proper.

This means that a minimum of 6 battalions are committed outside of a notional brigade-level Force Generation Cycle. There are also political (and in lesser measure military) considerations that dictate the presence in both Wales and Northern Ireland of regional brigade HQs and of at least a battalion.
Assuming an ideal force structure made up by 16 Air Assault brigade, 3 Armoured Infantry Brigades and 3 Medium/Light brigades, the minimum number of infantry battalions needed is 27.
That is four less than the current 31, and includes 3 battalions for 16AA, 18 for the 6 “line” brigades, and 6 for the other tasks. The Light Brigades would have to forcefully “lack” two or three battalions as these would be based in Northern Ireland and Wales, and under daily control of brigade HQs in those regions.
Effectively, they would however be part of the force generation cycle for the three Light deployable brigades.
Two of the current 7 brigade HQs would also be cut.

A cut of 4 battalions, while keeping the 82.000 men target, would release some 2250 invaluable regular positions, which would shift out of the infantry to go to supports. Some reserve manpower would also be made available for other uses, while there would be no more unpaired regiments.
The problem is even these numbers would not be quite enough to obtain the ideal force structure.



Brigades first

The ideal structure would have two Deployable Division HQs, each with 3 deployable brigades and with 16 Air Assault in addition. 3rd Division would not need to change from how it is now, while 1st Division would lose 2 subordinate brigade HQs and four regular infantry battalions in favor of uplifted supports. The Divisional HQ itself would need a manpower uplift to be restored to deployable status. Currently, it is envisaged as deployable only with augmentation, within the scenario of an enduring operation.

Obtaining a third light brigade for 1st Division and restoring 16 AA and 3rd Cdo to actual brigade efficiency would require significant additional Signals, plus reinforcements to the support units in 16 AA and 3 Commando, and the third of the Light brigades would need to gain a hybrid artillery regiment, a hybrid engineer regiment, a hybrid medical regiment, a REME and a Logistic regiments.
The biggest manpower drain would come from new Royal Signals regiments, followed by the new RLC regiment and by the engineer. The Artillery would be relatively better placed as the regular regiments in the Adaptable Force already have an additional Tac Gp battery which could migrate to the new hybrid regiment.
Existing Artillery Regiments would be split to supply 2 gun batteries to each of the three hybrid regiments, which would come with two regular gun batteries and a regular Tac Gp battery.
The number of reserve batteries wouldn’t change, while the regulars would provide an additional RHQ and two additional gun batteries.

The Adaptable Force currently has two Hybrid Engineer Regiments. Under my restructuring suggestion, each gains a second reserve sqn. They were already technically planned to have 2 reserve squadrons each, but this was to be achieved only by taking control of the reserve Commando and Parachute engineer squadrons. This most evidently made very little operational sense, and the decision was changed, with 299 PARA and 131 Cdo now due to joint respectively 23 Parachute Engineer Regiment and 24 Commando Engineer Regiment.
A third hybrid engineer regiment would be required, with 2 regular and 2 reserve squadrons. The additional Engineer reserve would use part of the manpower freed by adjusting the number of infantry battalions.
The situation is identical on the Medical front, with two hybrid regiments that would need to be supplemented, ideally, by a third.
There are also two RLC regiments in the Adaptable Force, with a third needed for the third brigade.

The Royal Signals factor is worth a better look: currently, the regular regiments are roled as follows:

-          1 Sig Regt is principally aligned to 20 Armd Inf Bde and provides deployable communications for operations
-          16 Sig Regt is principally aligned to 12 Armd Inf Bde and provides deployable communications for operations
-          21 Sig Regt is principally aligned to 1 Armd Inf Bde and provides deployable communications for operations

-          2 Sig Regt provides general support communications services to the Reaction Force Division HQ and to the Reaction Force Logistic Brigade

-          3 Sig Regt provides general support communications services to the Reaction Force Division HQ and to the Reaction Force Logistic Brigade


-          10 Sig Regt provides specialized deployable support, including ECM (Force Protection)
-          15 Sig Regt provides Level 3 support for delivered and deployable CIS
-          14 Sig Regt (EW) provides electronic warfare teams
-          11 Sig Regt is the training unit
-          18 Sig Regt delivers communications to the Special Forces units

-          22 Sig Regt provides communications and data for the ARRC HQ

-          30 Sig Regt has a mixed role.1 sqn is committed to ARRC alongside 22 Regt; 1 sqn (244 Sqn) is the air support role, providing communications to the Support Helicopter Force; the remaining two squadrons deliver HQ infrastructure and communications for the deployable HQ of the UK Joint Rapid Response Force

There is no regiment aligned with Adaptable Force brigades. As said in other occasions, the brigade signal squadrons, no longer sufficient on their own, have been removed from the army’s brigades and absorbed into the regiments. The so-called Multi Role Signal Regiments are meant to provide theatre-wide networking and communications points. The signal units no longer provide Life Support to the brigade HQs. The change is one of the most noticeable in the whole of Army 2020, and the Army is still experimenting and working on defining how deployable HQs will be resourced, structured, deployed and supported in the future. The final outcome depends also on the choices that will be made on LeTacCIs (Land Environment Tactical Communications and Information Systems), which is in practice the replacement for the Bowman radio and data infrastructure, supposed to deliver around the middle of the 2020s.
Whatever the outcome, it seems evident that, at a very minimum, 7Royal Signals Regiment needs to be resurrected as a Multi Role Signal Regiment aligned with the brigades in 1st Division. As the divisional HQ is brought back to deployable status, one between 2 and 3 Sig Regts would also move to support it.
One single additional regiment might well not be enough, moreover. As we know, the Army works to a 1 in 5 rule, which means that 5 brigade-aligned regiments are necessary to ensure that an enduring deployment of one brigade can actually be supported. The “ideal” force structure would have to include a careful study on the need for communications and networking in brigade operations, so that each deployable brigade receives the support it needs, adjusting the regiments again as necessary.

Restoring 16 AA brigade to a true 3-battalions structure will also require an additional troop and other uplifts within 216 Parachute Signal Squadron, the one and only remaining signal unit which is organic to its brigade and which also maintains a life support role in the field.
16 Air Assault would also need to uplift to 3 subunits each its artillery, engineer, logistic and medical units.

16 AA could use a Reconnaissance and Surveillance Sqn of its own, incorporating the Pathfinder Platoon and adding a bit more land-manoeuvre capability, considering that it has lost the support of D Sqn, Household Cavalry. One solution might be to stand up a Command Support formation, like 30 Commando IX in 3 Commando Brigade. This unit would include the brigade recce squadron, the HQ support and 216 Signal Sqn, plus the other supporting elements task-generated by Force Troops Command (vSHORAD missile troop, RMP troop, EW team…).

3rdCommando would need an uplift to its engineer regiment (it has been planned since 2008, but never really happened) by restructuring on 54, 59 and an additional (56) Sqn. Sub-units within 3rd Commando and 16 AA should continue to have an even split of capabilities among them, as they will continue to rotate into Very High Readiness, as well as training to support a possible brigade-level deployment.



Ideal, minus

The “ideal” force structure is not achievable within the manpower and budget figures of Army 2020, so a bit more change is actually going to be required to go as close as possible to it. One possible solution is having only 2 “full” (complete with supports) brigades in 1st Division. The manpower margin from the removal of 4 infantry battalions would be used to reinforce 3rd Cdo and 16 AA, and to remove the worst weaknesses, principally the lack of Signals for the “light brigades”. It is not enough to do more.
The result would be a non laughable 5 “true” brigades, plus para and commando, and some additional infantry battalions. It would still be better balanced than Army 2020 as currently envisaged.

Another option is the removal of 3 further light infantry battalions from the ORBAT, and the transfer of the Heavy Protected Mobility battalions from the Armoured Infantry Brigades to the Light/Medium brigades.
The Heavy brigades would lose their wheeled element, focusing on tracks only. They would have only two infantry regiments each, but of course, they include the tank regiment as third manoeuvre unit.
The Light/Medium brigades would have each one Heavy wheeled battalion, and two light wheeled battalion (with Foxhound vehicles). The Heavy brigades would become somewhat “lighter”, shifting part of their support train to the “light” division.
With the additional sacrifice of a further 1680 infantry posts, more manpower could be moved towards support units, to build up the elements needed to have 3 brigades in both Divisions, plus full supports for 16 AA and 3 Cdo.
I tend to support this option more, since having two complete divisions, one specializing in heavy & tracked and one on Wheeled and Light/Medium is the most balanced option. This way there are two harmonic force generation cycles going on at any one time, and two brigades available. They can be combined to deploy a single, larger / mixed brigade to a single theatre, or be deployed separately to better achieve the Defence Planning assumption of two contemporary dispersed operations.

One remaining problem for consideration is the higher cost of some support elements, primarily, once more, the Signals, due to their special training and equipment. Although the manpower count remains the same, the cost might well not be. Whole Fleet Management and other carefully thought out measures might be necessary to fit into the budget.

Cutting so many infantry battalions would cause a capbadge outcry rarely seen before, and is not something that I suggest with particular pleasure. And it is most clearly something that could happen only with a government and Army leadership with some serious courage.
I make the proposal, despite the clear difficulties it would imply, because in an age of cuts and shrinkage, all the manpower available must be used to deliver actual effect, not to keep alive scrawny battalions purely to preserve symbols. Symbols are immensely important, but if we continue on this course at some point the regiments will have the strength of companies and the brigades will be battalions, and without supports to add insult to injury.
A working brigade is always to be preferred to a great number of disjointed light role battalions, in my opinion. The usefulness that can be squeezed out of a brigade is countless times superior.

In the wake of Army 2020 there has been a great amount of talking about flexibility, adaptability, task-organizing, centralization and other catchwords which, again in my opinion, make little actual sense 90% of the time.
For all the innovation we might try and achieve, the army remains a construction made of brigades. At the end of the day, for any operation of any kind of complexity, it will be necessary to put in the field a communications network and a command and control HQ; maneuver ground units, artillery support, logistic support, equipment repair and support, medical support, engineer support, plus police, air defence, EOD etcetera. The Adaptable Force and Force Troops Command are no revolutions and no great adaptability innovations. There is nothing more adaptable than a brigade complete of its supports, to which higher commands can require to task-generate battlegroups for the need at hand. There might be some merit to centralization of support elements into their own brigades to oversee administration and training in an organic way, but that is about it. Force Troops Command can certainly stay, but the balance of infantry to supports needs to change if Army 2020 is to be a realistic fighting force and not a paper tiger.



Combat Aviation Brigade?

Personally, I would also recommend the formation of a Combat Aviation Brigade to unify, not just at 2-star administrative level (JHC), but at the daily working level, the crucially important aviation elements.
In practice, the Combat Aviation Brigade would take the Chinook and Puma squadrons of the Support Helicopter Force, and organize them into regiments.
The brigade would be structured as follows:

-          244 Signal Squadron (Air Support)
-          1st Army Air Corps Regiment (4 Wildcat Sqns)
-          3rd Army Air Corps Attack Helicopter Regiment (2 Apache Sqns)
-          4th Army Air Corps Attack Helicopter Regiment (2 Apache Sqns)
-          1st Support Helicopter Regiment (2 Chinook, 1 Puma Sqn)
-          2nd Support Helicopter Regiment (2 Chinook, 1 Puma Sqn)
-          Aviation Support Regiment RLC (would be built by bringing together the existing 132 Avn Sqn RLC and the Tactical Supply Wing to organize a complete ground-support formation for the combat and support helicopters)
-          7 REME (existing 2nd line aviation support teams, reinforced by taking in the RAF Support Helicopter ground elements where applicable)

The Combat Aviation Brigade would be assigned, alongside with 16 AA and 3 Cdo, to the Permanent Joint HQ, specifically to the Joint Rapid Reaction Force. Not just for deployment, but routinely.
The brigade would be tasked with supporting a binary Force Generation Cycle, in which, each year, a Support Helicopter Regiment, an Attack Regiment and 2 Wildcat Sqns are put at very high readiness, alongside the relevant package of ground support elements from RLC, REME and Signals.
In my opinion this would help in obtaining the most out of the very significant Air Manoeuvre fleet of some 60 Chinook and 24 Puma HC2. The regiments at readiness would primarily support the Air Assault Task Force and the Lead Commando Group. Like it is planned for the 2 Apache squadrons at readiness, the 2 Chinook squadrons at readiness would focus one on the Air Assault Task Force and one on shipboard ops with the Commando battlegroup.
The Commando Helicopter Force would remain responsible for providing one Merlin HC4 squadron at readiness for the Commando Battlegroup, plus 847 NAS with its Wildcat for the shipboard side of operations.

The training units would sit outside the Combat Aviation Brigade, as well as the Joint Special Forces Aviation Wing. The Chinook force, once at full strength, would be organized on 4 “line” squadrons of around 12 machines each (HC4 and HC6), with 6 Chinooks assigned to the joint Puma-Chinook OCU (28(R) Sqn, which will stand up soon in RAF Benson, once 28 is disbanded from its current form as Merlin HC3 squadron) and with the 8 HC5 assigned to 7 Sqn, inside the Joint Special Forces Aviation Wing.The HC5, with the ""fat" fuselage with the enlarged fuel tanks, was originally procured for SF work. Once upgraded and even retrofitted with Digital Flight Control, i would suggest it finally is assigned to the mission it was procured to do.

7 REME currently includes also the 8 Parachute REME Field Company, which is the equipment support element of 16 Air Assault Brigade. I would finally split the two units, which are already located in completely different bases and doing pretty different jobs, forming 8 Parachute REME.



Summary of Changes

2 deployable division HQs, plus JRRF HQ

1 less 2-Star HQ,

1 Combat Aviation Brigade added by regrouping existing resources

Regular manpower total unchanged or inferior to current target

24 Regular Infantry Battalions (2 PARA, 1 Air Mobile, 6 Armoured, 3 Heavy Protected Mobility, 6 Light Protected Mobility, 1 SFSG, 5 Light Role)  -  Down from 31, with removal of 7 Light Role battalions

Restructure 3 RHA and 4 RA into Hybrid Artillery Regiments, each with 1 Tac Gp Bty, 2 Gun Batteries and 2 Reserve Gun Batteries; add a third regiment of the same type

Form a third hybrid Engineer Regiment

Form an additional Hybrid Medical Regiment

Form an additional REME Close Support formation

Form an additional RLC Brigade Support formation

Rebuild the third sub-unit within 16 Air Assault’s support regiments

Build a Command Support formation within 16 Air Assault Brigade

Form up to 3 Multi Role Signal Regiments for the brigades of 1st Division




Total Reserve manpower target maintained or possibly decreased

11 instead of 13 reserve infantry battalions

Remove 2 Reserve Artillery Regiment; spread the batteries in 3 Hybrid Reg-Res Regiments (4 RA, 3 RHA and another to be formed)

Add 4 Reserve Engineer Squadrons (1 to 21 Engineer Regiment; 1 to 32 Engineer Regiment; 2 to a new Hybrid Regiment to be formed)

Reorganize Reserve Medical Regiments to account for a third Hybrid Regiment (2 Sqns to be assigned to it)



The resulting 1stDivision will have all the pieces necessary to support a 3-year Force Generation Cycle of three wheeled brigades. Up to three battalions will however be assigned to 160 and 38 Infantry brigades (Wales and Northern Ireland), while being part of the force generation cycle under 51, 4 and 7 brigades.

Each brigade will be able to field:

-          1 Light Cavalry Regiment + Reserve
-          1 Heavy Protected Mobility battalion
-          2 Light Protected Mobility battalions + reserve
-          1 Hybrid Artillery Regiment
-          1 Hybrid Engineer Regiment
-          1 Hybrid Medical Regiment
-          1 RLC Force Support Regiment
-          1 REME Equipment Support Battalion

The Armoured Infantry Brigades will have:

-          1 Heavy Cavalry Regiment
-          1 Tank Regiment
-          2 Armoured Infantry Battalions
-          1 Heavy Artillery Regiment
-          1 Armoured Engineer Regiment
-          1 Armoured Medical Regiment
-          1 RLC Close Support regiment
-          1 RLC Theatre Support Regiment
-          1 Armoured Close Support REME Battalion

16 Air Assault and 3Commando will both be again able to deploy as complete brigades. The availability of 3 units per role will greatly ease the constant provision of a battlegroup at Very High Readiness.

16 Air Assault Brigade will include:

-          1 Command Support Battalion (Identity to be determined; will have a Reconnaissance and Surveillance squadron combining Pathfinder Platoon with patrol troops; 216 Signal Sqn plus the supporting elements force generated from 14 EW Signal Regiment, 33 EOD and others)
-          2 Parachute battalions. The para companies will rotate into Very High Readiness.
-          1 Air Mobile Battalion (Gurkha). Gurkhas will not be trained to parachute, but will help generate the 2 air mobile companies at very high readiness, spreading the work load on a larger base
-          1 Parachute artillery regiment on 3 Batteries (+ HAC Gun Troop as reserve), each combining all functions, so that they can routinely alternate into VHR
-          1 parachute engineer regiment on 3 squadrons (+ 299 Squadron reserve), each combining all functions, so that they can routinely alternate into VHR
-          1 parachute logistic regiment with 3 Air Assault squadrons to rotate into VHR, plus Air Despatch and Log Sp squadrons
-           1 parachute medical regiment with 3 air assault medical squadrons to rotate into VHR, plus support
-          156 Provost Company, 4 RMP Regiment
 
3 Commando stays basically as it is, with one squadron added to 24 Commando Engineer Regiment and reinforcements given to stabilize the 3 sub-units mechanism in the rest of the support elements.

Adding also the output of the Combat Aviation Brigade the Army’s VANGUARD pool would include, each year:

-          1 Armoured Infantry Brigade
-          1 wheeled “medium-light” brigade
-          1 Commando battlegroup with full supports plus 1x Apache Sqn, Chinook and Wildcat support and 1 Merlin HC4 sqn
-          1 air assault battlegroup with 1x Apache Sqn, 1+ Chinook Sqn, 1 Puma Squadron, 1 / 2 Wildcat squadrons

Force Troops Command would continue to add CBRN, EOD, STA, UAV batteries, theatre entry logistics, VSHORAD and Local Area Air Defence and so on. 



About that 2%

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It was a surprise when the Chancellor committed to keeping defence spending at 2% of GDP for the lenght of this parliament. It should not have been a surprise, since the promise to stick to this NATO target is ancient, made to close allies and reaffirmed very loudly at the NATO summit in Cardiff last year. But it has been. For a long time, the UK has appeared to be on a steep slide to decline which would bring the defence budget well under the 2% mark, also due to the (very welcome) growth of GDP.
Now we have the relief of a 2% promise. It is obvious that it beats the alternative, which was falling even lower, but there is no reason for particular cheering: even before we learn how genuine the committment is, we must remember that all we have obtained is the setting (at least for now) of a limit to the decline which goes on and on from decades.
In percentual terms, defence spending will effectively fall further, compared to this year (where it amounted to some 2.1% of GDP) and will have fallen rather dramatically from the 2.4% it was in 2010.

The importance ot the 2% figure is merely in being a "rock-bottom" (as long as it holds) under which spending will not go. It is a limit put to decline, nothing more.

Moreover, we will have to keep our eyes very, very widely open to catch the devil in the detail. Financial tricks might have a part in making up that 2% figure: expenditure which used not to be counted against the GDP target for defence has already been included, and more gimmicks might well be on the way. That's part of why it is wise to keep expectations down, and be realistic in how much we cheer.
It is really a case of "well, it could have been SO much worse", more than anything else.
Suspect has immediately flared about the new £1.5bn Joint Security Fund for investment in military and intelligence agencies, but Mark Urban reports that it does not seem it will be part of the defence budget, thankfully. Still, the financial aspect of the 2% figure will have to be watched closely.

Another factor to guard against is the request for more "efficiency savings". There are margins to achieve real efficiency in MOD operations, and a few changes, reductions and adjustements in this sense are actually pretty obvious. But they are unlikely to generate the kind of savings the Chancellor is probably seeking, so that "efficiency" might well include more stealth cuts. Training, logistics and personnel costs are obvious areas where underwater measures can happen without it being too evident to the general public. But stealth cuts in these areas could be very damaging, no matter how well hidden they might be.
Even equipment programmes are at risk. Despite it being an area which has received particular assurances, the simple fact remains that we don't know what the famous equipment programme is about. We have rough indications about the amount of money assigned to macro-areas (aircraft, helicopters, ships, submarines, armored vehicles) but little to no detail about the programmes that are going to be funded, and less than ever any indication about how many vehicles or aircraft or other bits of kit will be purchased.

Warrior CSP numbers are not specified. We only have hints and guesses: the recent order for 515 CTA 40mm guns is split 245 - 245 - 25, in which 245 guns go to SCOUT SV, 245 to Warrior CSP and 25 to test, trials and development. 245 is thus to be assumed as the number of Warrior IFVs being upgraded. In addition, some 135 Warrior in artillery observation, recovery and repair variants are expected.
The number of turreted IFVs (245) appears absolutely insufficient for the 6 planned armored infantry battalions.
ABSV, the much needed programme for a "new" (actually likely to be just more Warriors adapted in new support variants) vehicle to use as replacement for the ancient FV432 series, is struggling to get off the ground and is described as an "aspiration" of the Army. This is very depressing, and a step back from earlier hopes to achieve initial gate this year.
Challenger 2 LEP, also seems to have been pushed to the right at least one year, even after having been dumbed down to a very modest "indispensable only" electronics modernisation.
Apache CSP, the target is know as being 50 helicopters, but there is no written, public committment to that number, leaving risks on the way.
F-35B final purchased number: it is unlikely that the SDSR will provide the final number. Main Gate 5 (bulk purchase) is planned for 2017, and the government might well wait until then before providing any indication of what, if anything, will come after the initial 48. The expectation is for an eventual purchase of between 70 and 96 (the latter being a programmatic number which surfaced briefly at the time of the switch to F-35C). But, again, it is little more than a guessed aspiration.
And so on. Every single programme which hasn't a contract signed yet, including Type 26, is completely wrapped up in uncertainty. We won't really know, in many cases, if there are cuts, because we are not being told what the requirement and planning numbers are.
There is ample margin to mess up the numbers and apply stealth cuts.

The one good bit of news in the budget announcement is a committment to increase defence spending in real terms, year on year, by a 0.5% margin above inflation (this being around 1%).
Originally, the MOD was asked to plan for Future Force 2020 on the basis of a flat in real terms (translated, adjusted for that 1% annual inflation, and nothing more) budget, with a 1% annual boost to equipment spending only.
A defence budget-wide 0.5% boost above inflation should be helpful.
Do not expect miracles, though, as defence inflation is tipically estimated at above 2%, with how costs for major programmes evolve year on year.
It is a budget for survival, not a budget for reconstruction.

In my opinion, considering the many caveats and risks still on the way, what we can hope for is a "steady as she goes" SDSR, with no dramatic cuts, but with some adjustements still. The government will be able to stick to its promise of maintaining current manpower figures (both regular and reserve) and Future Force 2020 is likely to be confirmed in more or less the same shape.
A few good news might arrive: after yesterday's announcement, we can be a little more hopeful regarding a purchase of P-8 Poseidon aircraft for maritime patrol duties.
Even then, though, the much needed entry into service of Poseidon will come with the loss of Sentinel and Shadow R1, which are on a time-limited life out to 2018. If we are lucky, by around 2019 they will be going out... but the Poseidon will be coming in. Hopefully. That would limit the loss of overland ISTAR, as well as reintroduce much needed at-sea ISTAR.


SDSR 2015: Air capabilities

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Having already written something about the Budget and my vision for fixing Army 2020, I decided to continue with more posts summarizing the situation ahead of the SDSR 2015 and exposing my thinking about what the priorities are. In this post, I’m going to cover the main areas of Air capability.


Built around and in function of ISTAR

I will start this piece by quoting a key document, presented recently by Group Captain Paul Godfrey, RAF. The subject technically is the F-35 and how its “combat-ISTAR” capability can be best exploited to ensure that the new aircraft isn’t just considered “the new jet in the stable”, but is exploited more widely, as a catalyst for change within the force. The passages that most interest us at the moment, however, are those which describe the general structure of the RAF come 2020. One slide in particular, showing the transition from 2010 to 2020, catches the eye, as the 2020 RAF includes the photo of a P-8 Poseidon.
The notes accompanying the slide make no mention of it, noting instead “lose MPA capability”. Yet, it is there, clearly recognizable. Curious, and hopefully a good signal.

The notes also say the Ground Moving Target Indicator capability currently provided by Sentinel R1 will be provided by “SCAVENGER”, the future MALE solution which is supposed to replace Reaper.
Sentinel R1 and Shadow R1 remain assumed to bow out of service in 2018. Reaper itself is currently funded out to 2019 only, and the way ahead seems littered with question marks.

My list of priorities for the SDSR 2015 is very much tied to the sorting out of problems directly and indirectly connected to ISTAR provision.



The Unmanned Side

One big problem in the assumption that SCAVENGER will take over the role of Sentinel is the fact that SCAVENGER is a (semi-?) dead project. The hope had been to develop a new MALE in collaboration with France, but the resulting Project TELEMOS has never progressed. It broke down soon after it started, and France moved on instead to sign a MOU with Germany and Italy for the design of a trinational, European MALE for the 2020s. The UK’s plans post-TELEMOS are a mystery, and it looks pretty certain that with all the time lost, in no way can a new uas be ready for 2019. It looks pretty likely to me that SCAVENGER will be, for the foreseenable future at least, a mere running on of Reaper.
Moreover, the Fr-It-Ge MALE 2020 project already seem to be encountering its share of issues, with France’s defence minister saying that it won’t be armed, with negotiations dragging on without contracts actually being signed and with Airbus already frustrated and saying that it will pull out of the project if governments continue rising issues. 
The road to a new MALE seems to be effectively blocked.

Unfortunately, even modest efforts to add capability to Reaper and prepare it for longer-term RAF service seem to be bogged down, for lack of money and/or lack of decisiveness. A long-term training solution has not yet been fleshed out; clearance for flying in UK civilian air space is not on the way and even basing is an issue. Operation Shader against ISIS in Iraq is practically a blessing for the Reaper squadrons, which have jumped at the chance of basing and flying the Reaper from the Middle East . The post-Afghanistan future of the Reaper, otherwise, was planned to be storage into its shipping container. Waddington is the base that hosts the Ground Control Stations, but no Reaper is allowed to actually fly from the base.

This is part of why I find the recent Prime Minister’s call “for more drones” somewhat irritating. The long term UAS plan seem in very urgent need of decisions and action, with clarity needed on several things before more money is splashed out on simply buying more Reapers. The RAF is heavily using all 10 it has, it is true. A written answer yesterday detailed that Reapers have fired 155 Hellfire and dropped 4 GBU-12 against Daesh in Iraq up to 30 June 2015. But before ordering more of them, a plan for training, basing, sustaining and evolving the UAS capability is needed. Reported discussions with France on a collaborative approach to the Reaper crews training problem are to be welcomed, hoping that they bring to something.

If Reaper has to make up for the loss of Sentinel’s GMTI capability, it will be necessary to fit the UAS with a larger and more capable radar. A Reaper was demonstratively fitted with a SEASPRAY 7500E surveillance radar already back in 2012, but while other countries now plan to pick this path, the UK does not seem to have given it further attention.
Trials have also successfully been carried out with Brimstone fitted to a Reaper, and Paveway IV trials were considered. But despite successful Brimstone firings back in 2014, even this development has not seen any significant progress since. For years, the UK has purchased and employed Hellfire missiles and GBU-12 bombs specifically for the Reaper. It is not efficient to continue with double stocks. Besides, Paveway IV and Brimstone 2 offer more capability. It was acceptable to arm Reapers with the same weapons used by American ones as long as Reaper was a UOR, a time-critical project. But if Reaper becomes a long term component of the RAF due to the failure in securing development of a new MALE, it will be fundamental to put british weapons on it, as well as better sensors to make up for the loss of Sentinel R1 and Shadow R1. A realistic training, basing and support solution is also needed. It might also be desirable to buy into the off-the-shelf modifications developed in recent years to expand range and endurance of the Reaper.  

The Brimstone has been successfully fired from the Reaper in trials. One of the many advantages it brings is the triple rack, which gives 6 Brimstone against the current load of 4 Hellfire.

Reaper has been demonstrated with Seaspray 7500E radar fitted. This configuration now interests both Italy and Netherlands, while the UK, which was at the forefront in the original demonstration, seems indecisive.

As far back as 2005, the UK also proved in trials with the US that the RAPTOR DB110 reconnaissance camera can be fitted and operated on Predator/Reaper. Again, the trials seem to have ended up as successess without consequences, since no further steps have been moved since.

New landing gear, new, longer wings with greater tanks and external fuel tanks are all modifications available Off The Shelt and already purchased by the USAF. They result in a massive increase in mission endurance.

It is important that the RAF, the MOD and the government finally take decisions, instead of going on and on with half-hearted trials and experiments which seem to never deliver, in the end. Decide what you want; see what is realistic; and then act to get the best of the realistic solutions. If getting a new MALE is not realistic, stop being indecisive and focus on Reaper to bring it up to the long-term task. There are ample margins to improve it and get more out of it. General Atomics is already working on adding sense and avoid sensors and safety enhancements that will allow the certification of Reaper for flying in civilian air space. This should start becoming available from 2017. 

Perhaps stop snubbing Italy, which happens to be flying Predators and Reapers routinely in corridors in its air space, flying them off the Amendola air base and employing them over the Mediterranean to watch out for immigrants. The Italian air force is seeking additions and improvements to its Reapers, which include fitting the Seaspray radar and the Reccelite pod. Italy is also working to stand up the first “UAV academy” in Europe, having already ordered simulators thought to train Reaper operators. It might be very advantageous to exploit such academy for the training of UK and French crews. If not, think about setting up an alternative training centre. But formulate a long term plan, and then stick to it. You’d be amazed by what can be achieved when a long term plan is made, and then actually followed.


Recommendations:

-          Join Italy’s UAV training academy, or set up an alternative one
-          Move to integrate of Brimstone 2 and Paveway IV
-          Focus SCAVENGER efforts on developing podded, portable sensors which can first be added to Reaper and then, eventually, migrated onto a new MALE when this will be available




Buy MPA, think ISTAR

Overall, the climate seems to be favorable to the purchase of a number of MPAs, and despite the talk of competition and competitors, it is widely accepted that the race is almost certainly restricted to two options: P-8 Poseidon, or nothing at all.

The need for a proper, ASW capable MPA is clear and I don’t think it needs to be detailed yet once more. One aspect that deserves to be covered in greater detail, however, is how I see a P-8 purchase fitting the wider ISTAR picture.
An MPA purchase is very, very likely to put the final nail in the coffin for Sentinel R1 and Shadow R1, as manpower for the new MPA will have to come from somewhere, and that somewhere won’t be a net manpower uplift for the RAF. To a degree, it’ll be a matter of robbing Peter to pay Paul. However, the capability brought to the table by Sentinel R1 is a real force multiplier, and one that sets the RAF apart from other medium power air forces. Even assuming Reaper gets equipped with a more capable GMTI radar, it will still not replace Sentinel in its entirety.

The P-8 Poseidon, however, has great potential to serve not just as MPA, but in wider sense as an ISTAR (and possibly Combat ISTAR) platform. The Poseidon comes with ample growth margins and multi-mission capability, as well as with 11 hardpoints for weaponry, 5 of which in the weapon bay, 4 under the wings and 2 fuselage stations.
India’s version, the P-8I Neptune, makes use of some of the growth potential: differently from US Navy Poseidons, the P-8I is fitted with a second radar, covering the aft sector, and the main radar has seen the addition of an air-to-air mode. The Indian P-8 is thus not just an MPA, but also, to a degree, an AWACS platform.
The US Navy itself is working on adding to the P-8’s arsenal a new, large, capable sensor, the APS-154 Advanced Airborne Sensor (AAS). This radar is the result of a highly classified development programme. It is thought to be particularly powerful in achieving mapping of surface targets in the littoral, and it has a formidable GMTI capability over land. The APS-154 might be the base of the radar the USAF wants on its JSTARS replacement aircraft, to be purchased in the next few years, but this is just a guess since the USAF hasn’t provided details yet.
The AAS is fitted in a canoe fairing which can be fitted under the front fuselage of the P-8 Poseidon, and the flight trials began last year, with the aim of putting AAS in service with the P-8 Capability Increment 3.
As of now, the AAS seems to have one major defect: looking at photos, it would appear that its carriage makes it impossible to lower and employ the MX-20HD EO/IR turret. Assuming that I’m correct in this observation, perhaps the problem will be fixed on the production line going into Increment 3. Currently, the P-8 is seeing the introduction of Increment 2 capabilities, while the Increment 3 roll-out is a 2021 affair.

 
This image shows the weapon bay open and the MX-20HD turret deployed.

The MX-20 turret out of its bay

The AAS radar "canoe" seem in conflict with the current positioning of the MX-20


From a UK perspective, purchase of the AAS would enable the Poseidon fleet to fully replace Sentinel R1, and indeed provide increased capability in all areas, over sea and land. There is a risk that being a classified, highly advanced development, the AAS might not be cleared for export so soon, but I’d recommend engaging with the US Navy from the very start to try and secure the inclusion of such capability in a british purchase.
If export clearance for the AAS cannot be obtained, it would be important to still exploit this P-8 possibility, by seeking to integrate another radar in a suitable pod. Even re-use of the Sentinel’s own radar, if at all possible, could be a good start.

Sentinel R1 proposed upgrades include tweaks to the radar to enable it to track surface targets at sea, and possibly the addition of the DB110 (better known as RAPTOR in RAF service) reconnaissance camera to add a long range optical capability as well. Weight and space growth margins in the Sentinel R1, however, are limited, and it will be financially challenging to both purchase a MPA and run on Sentinel. Although Sentinel is almost certainly considerably cheaper to run per hour, two fleets means two training and logistic lines to sustain, and more manpower needed. Moreover, it means there are two aircraft which will compete for investment going ahead in time, when both will need upgrades but the money won’t be there for both. I think that, although Sentinel is a good performing system and indeed better in some ways in its role, a single, larger fleet is a more realistic proposition for the MOD’s finances. Having a MPA fleet of Poseidons and keeping the Sentinel at the same time would be better from a capability point of view, but would quickly become a problem from the financial and manpower angles.

The P-8 has a lower service ceiling than Sentinel (41.000 feet versus 49.000), which is unfortunate as height allows radar sensors to look further away; but it comes with some SIGINT / ELINT capability, an MX-20HD EO/IR sensor, a powerful multi-mode radar (AN/APY-10) and a powerful communications suite, plus air to air refueling capability (although via receptacle only). Its unrefueled endurance all in all might not be quite as good as that of Sentinel, however.

Over time, the P-8 could become a Combat ISTAR platform thanks to its significant payload. The integration of weapons such as SPEAR 3, for example, would enable a P-8 AAS to survey a massive area, track moving and fixed targets from a great distance and even engage them directly as necessary. France, in recent times, has been using its Atlantic 2 MPAs in a Combat ISTAR role, integrating GBUs on them for use in operations in Africa and over Iraq. Something similar was envisaged as a Nimrod MRA4 capability, as well. The MRA4 was also seen as a potential Storm Shadow carrier, and the P-8 could one day carry cruise missiles as well.

Under a purely MPA point of view, the P-8 Poseidon purchase is desirable due to it including the very latest Multi-static Active Coherent sonobuoys, which are to massively increase wide-area ASW capability. Moreover, the P-8 means close partnership with the US Navy on development and integration of future updates. A support and upgrade arrangement similar to that adopted with Rivet Joint, which sees british aircraft integrated in the USAF rolling programme of bi-annual maintenance and upgrade, is highly desirable. This is a crucial factor: it is no use to purchase a cheaper MPA, if there is no clear path and reliable partner for future upgrades and support. The MOD no longer has the financial power to keep bespoke systems up to date without partners to share the cost with: we do not want, in a few years time, to see the new MPA start declining in capability because it is a unique, bespoke solution which no one else is interested in investing in. For that, there’s already the Challenger 2’s rifled gun.
In my opinion this is one major point in favor of the Poseidon: none of the other competitors can promise the same assured future as the main MPA platform of the US Navy. The USN is the partner you want, if you seek economies of scale and a plan that ensures the system stays up to date.

Notorious “issues” with the Poseidon include the fact that, to depart as little as possible from the USN’s own variant, the UK will have to adopt the High Altitude ASW approach. This means having to not only integrate Stingray Mod 1 torpedoes, but having to fit these with the same wing kit that will be added to the USN’s MK54 torpedo for launch from high altitude. This will add some to the cost.
High Altitude ASW also means no use for MAD: the MAD is not a silver bullet and its usefulness is kind of limited, but nonetheless its complete absence is not entirely desirable. The US Navy is considering adopting MAD sensors built into expendable drones which can be dropped at altitude from Poseidon. If purchased, these will add some to cost, as well. The promise is that such drones will be very cheap, of course, but the reality more often than not is not quite as rosy as the original targets.
It is true, however, that the MAD drone’s cost would be compensated, at least in part, by not having to fit a MAD to the aircraft itself. Moreover, High Altitude ASW is less stressing on the airframe, and this should give a longer operational life, and reduce maintenance needs. 



Stingray Mod 1 will need a wing kit, to work as a part of the High Altitude ASW construct


High Altitude ASW also improves survivability of the MPA and its efficiency in the hunt: it is much harder, if not impossible, for the submarine to hear the incoming aircraft (turboprop, low-altitude MPAs are tipically picked up easy on passive sonar) and the high altitude puts the aircraft out of the range of the submarine-launch SAMs which are beginning to appear and that might become a factor to consider, in the future.


Recommendations:

-          Purchase P-8 Poseidon, with the mindset of it being an ISTAR / Combat ISTAR platform, not just a MPA
-          Secure the addition of a side-scan, surface search, GMTI-capable radar, ideally the same AAS being integrated by the US Navy. AN/APY-10 offers good capability as it is, but the addition of a dedicate radar would make the withdrawal of Sentinel pretty much painless in capability terms.
-          Phase out of service Shadow and Sentinel progressively as P-8 enters service.
-          Adopt the High Altitude ASW method, and in general stick as much as possible to the USN’s own configuration, to ensure efficiencies in long-term maintenance and upgrades
-          Look at integrating weaponry beyond Stingray: anti-ship capability and ground attack.
-          Secure the higher possible number of aircraft. Rumors talk of an initial purchase of 6, with 6 options. At least 8 / 9 would be needed, especially considering the wider ISTAR role.



A Tactical Reconnaissance Wing

In early 2002, the RAF ended the practice of having dedicate reconnaissance squadrons of fast jets, each with its own Reconnaissance Intelligence Centre (RIC), to merge these together into the Tactical Imagery Wing, which today provides deployable teams specialized in exploitation of Full Motion Video (Crossbow Flight, Tactical Imagery Wing) and others specializing in evaluation of imagery collected by RAPTOR and Litening III pods flown on Tornado and Typhoon (Orion Flight).

With the plan for the future being the dissolution of the Sentinel R1 fleet and the spreading of wide-area GMTI across multiple platforms (SCAVENGER, P-8 [?] and the AESA radars of F-35s and Typhoons], it is probably wise to expect the formation of a third flight within the Tactical Imagery Wing, this specializing in exploitation of GMTI information. The concentration of GMTI specialists in the same unit should help preserve the maximum level of experience and efficiency, while building on the successful methods of the TIW. With the focus expanding beyond “imagery”, the Wing should be known for Reconnaissance, or for Tactical ISTAR. As the Sentinel goes out of service, its bespoke Ground Station should be replaced by a “General Purpose” ground station to allow real-time exploitation of GMTI coming from whatever platform is available, be it Reaper or F-35.

-          Preserve GMTI exploitation experience by forming a dedicate Flight within the current Tactical Imagery Wing. Specialist teams from the new Flight will deploy in support of the various platforms over which GMTI capability will be spread, including F-35 and, in the future, Typhoon Tranche 3A with AESA radar. The new Flight should operate in close liaison with the Royal Artillery, since Watchkeeper also introduces its own GMTI capability, although of course on a smaller search area.    



Restoring strategic air refueling sense

In a plan that puts such importance on P-8, the continued lack of boom air refueling capability is unacceptable. The lack of boom is one of the most disappointing facts about Voyager (aka: take the best tanker in the world and dumb it down to a civilian passenger aircraft with drogues). Airbus can fix booms to Voyager within six months, and the cost, while significant, is unlikely to be prohibitive. Any spare money the RAF might have, in my opinion, should go towards this particular requirement.
Fitting the boom is more desirable than trying to fit a probe to P-8: the boom already exists, while a probe for P-8 doesn’t; moreover, the boom makes Voyager capable to also refuel C-17, Rivet Joint and allied aircraft.
It would solve the ridiculous, absurd situation of being unable to refuel some of the most precious, strategic platforms in the whole air force.
A good start would be to fit the two “fitted for but not with” centrepoint tankers in the fleet. The RAF’s core fleet of 9 Voyagers includes a civilian registered transport-only aircraft and 8 tankers, 7 of which are KC3 with centerline station as well as the underwing ones. However, only 5 of the 7 are actually fitted with the centerline drogue. These two should be the easier to fit with boom.

It is unfortunate, and a failure of the wider policy of engagement with allies, that despite a recognized shortage of tanker capability in Europe, up to 5 Voyagers are going to be stripped of tanking equipment and chartered out to serve as civilian passenger aircraft. Currently, only one of the 5 “surge” aircraft is already contracted by a civilian air line, but four more are seeking a similar arrangement.
Meanwhile, Poland is leading a multinational effort to purchase a common fleet of new A-330 MRTT tankers. It is quite amazing that an arrangement hasn’t been fleshed out to cooperatively run the Voyager surge fleet in its intended tanker role, to help counter the shortage. The UK should engage with its NATO partners to seek an agreement in this sense, adding the boom to as many aircraft as possible.


Recommendations:

-          Fit boom to Voyager, beginning with the 2 “fitted for but not with” KC3s in the Core Fleet. Unfortunately, Sentry can be refueled both by drogue and by boom, but A400M only by centerline drogue. So, part of the fleet will have to retain the centerline drogue instead of moving over to a boom, to avoid moving from one problem to another. A400M can in theory be fitted with the receptacle for boom refueling, but this would add yet more cost.



Common Weapon Launcher and reduced number of weapon types

The announcement of a contract for the development of a Common Weapon Launcher for Typhoon is to be welcome. However, the news releases suggest that this is an early demonstration contract, and the plan seems, as way too often happens, somewhat vague and indecisive. The aim of the Common Weapon Launcher is to introduce a rack which, while preserving the same aerodynamic shape and weight, so to ease integration on fast jets, can carry different loads, including 2 Paveway IV bombs, or 3 Brimstone 2, or (possibly) 3 SPEAR 3. The Common Weapon Launcher concept, shown in computer graphics and in mock-up form at some recent air shows, is clearly a derivative of the Brimstone triple rack. Since integration of Brimstone 2 on Typhoon has been funded (finally!), the choice is particularly wise, as the launcher will be aerodynamically cleared for carriage as part of this activity, allowing for considerable savings.

The Common Weapon Launcher should definitely be developed for carrying all three the main weapon systems: PW IV, Brimstone 2 and Spear 3. It should not be a Typhoon-only affair, either, but be exploited on the F-35 external hardpoints, as well.  

On the weapons front, considerable uncertainty, unfortunately, persists regarding SPEAR 3: the considerable expense needed to develop the wholly new MBDA weapon has lead to the “US Option” of going Small Diameter Bomb II growing in strength.
A final decision is now not expected until 2018. SPEAR 3 and SDB 2 are externally and conceptually very similar, but SPEAR 3 has a key difference: it embodies a small turbojet engine which gives it a greater range and the ability to be launched in a far greater acceptable zone, irrespective of altitude, wind conditions etcetera. SDB 2 is currently an unpowered, gliding weapon.
The greater range and launch flexibility of SPEAR 3 would make it far more capable against highly defended targets, and indeed make it into a DEAD (Destruction of Enemy Air Defence) asset, much needed since the RAF has given up its main SEAD (Suppression) weapon, the ALARM anti-radar missile, to budget cuts.
Raytheon, aware of this key factor, has started promising the development of a powered Small Diameter Bomb 2: if this was to materialize, the MBDA SPEAR would lose its key advantage, and it might become just too financially attractive to go with the US weapon, which in its base form can count on tens of thousands of planned American purchases. SDB 2 is also already planned for F-35 integration, which would also save money.
The MBDA SPEAR, on the other hand, is meant to keep the national weapon industrial capability alive and in good health.
As long as the MBDA SPEAR is the only one powered, long-range choice, I think the RAF should stick with it, even if it costs more. But if a powered SBD 2 becomes reality, the MOD will be faced with a much more difficult choice.

 
Common Weapon Launcher mock-up, seen carrying two Paveway IV bombs

Another key programme is SPEAR Capability 1, which is actually the spiral development of Paveway IV capability. Apart from better, more jamming-resistant GPS module, the Paveway IV should soon gain a new warhead option, with bunker-busting capability. The smart aspect of Paveway IV developments is that the external shape and the general mass remain the same, so that there is no need to repeat the aerodynamics part of the integration process over and over again.
The Paveway IV anti-bunker seem destined to replace the older, 2000 lbs Paveway III, which will go out of service alongside Tornado GR4.
Other Paveway IV developments include a low collateral damage warhead option; the addition of a seeker (IR Imaging, it is thought) for greater capability against moving targets; and eventually the addition of a wing-kit for much improved stand-off range.
A recent briefing given by US officers about the F-35 Block 4 software seem to suggest that the RAF has decided that the first two Paveway IV developments entering service will be the anti-bunker and the seeker.

 
MBDA's SPEAR 3, without its quadruple rack, seen on a Typhoon ahead of the flying testing campaign

The same briefing also suggests that the RAF wants to soon get moving about a “new build” ASRAAM. We might be close to the launch of a Capability Sustainment Programme for the short range missile, which should build on what has been done with the CAMM / Sea Ceptor. The integration of a two-way datalink is highly likely, if the programme actually secures funding. The data-link would massively enhance the capabilities of ASRAAM to acquire its target after launch and achieve high off-boresight kills.


Recommendations:

-          Proceed with Paveway IV developments, in particular with the anti-bunker variant to avoid a gap in capability when the combination Tornado/Paveway III bows out.
-          Whatever weapon is selected for SPEAR  3 should be powered, long-range, and have a wide acceptable launch region, to make it a viable DEAD solution
-          The Common Weapon Launcher should be developed fully, and used to full effect with both Typhoon and F-35
-          The ASRAAM CSP is not as high a priority, but adding a two-way datalink is important to give it true High Off-Boresight capability, which is needed to make best use of the F-35’s DAS “bubble” and HMD.



F-35 plans and babbling

Much noise has followed the blog post of David Axe of War is Boring about the leaked test report about the basic combat maneuvering trials begun last January between an F-35A and an F-16. The usual crowd has started self-quoting itself and shouting from the rooftops about how the F-35 had lost the dogfight and, indeed, how it could never win one. The answer provided by the JPO was to eager to dismiss the issue altogether, and actually ended up being a own-goal, adding to the noise (you need better media relationship experts, JPO: that answer really does suck).
Much of what has been said since is garbage. My general sentiments about the whole thing are very similar to the thoughts expressed here, so I recommend following the link and reading what the experienced C.W. Lemoine, an F-16 and F-18 pilot, has to say about it. 

In more detail, although I do not want to spend too much time on this, also because my own understanding of the highly complex art of air combat is limited and I don’t want to pontificate past my pay grade, the dogfight wasn’t even a dogfight.
Axe has since graced us all with the report itself. And reading it, as was to be expected, has allowed thinking heads to arrive to different conclusions to those that Axe, a notorious F-35 hater, drew. The first thing to notice in the report is the title itself: it was a test to experiment F-35 combat manoeuvres at high angles of attack.
The F-35 has excellent controllability at very high angle of attack. At entry in service it is expected to be certified for + 50° and – 10°, values much higher than most other fighter. F-16 does + 25°, Typhoon a little bit less, Rafale +29°.
What the test tried to determine was whether this capability has a value in dogfighting. The F-35 deliberately tried to manoeuvre at high angle of attack to see if it can “nose-point” like a Super Hornet. The result of the test, reading the report, say that in most situations, no, staying controllable won’t bring advantages. High Angle of Attack means losing energy very, very quickly, and the F-35 has a too high drag factor to keep its energy high enough to nose-point in a meaningful way without losing all its energy.
The test pilot said he found only one kind of manoeuvre which offers a repeatable firing chance: this one can be expected to end up in the tactics manual of the F-35, while the rest will be in the “don’t do this” list.
Outside of a test event, you are not forced  to seek high AoA in combat: if it is not advantageous, simply, you do not do it. And the air combat manual for the F-35, once written, will say this (obviously, in a much better and more detailed way).

For the rest, the report notes that the F-35 fights best around the 26° AoA angle, which is not surprising as it is a common value and particularly is the F-16’s area. The F-35 has been developed trying to obtain F-16 comparable maneuverability, after all.
In this area of flight, the test pilot expresses his frustration at the Flight Control Laws interfering with his commands: basically, the computer has limited the F-35’s agility to prevent a loss of control which was actually very far away. The test pilot at one point specifically mentions “fantastic yaw rate”, truncated by the unnecessary, unwanted, early intrusion of the computer.
The pilot’s recommendations, in the end, are to relax the control laws in the software, to let the aircraft pitch, yaw and roll faster.

There is a reason why the F-35 hasn’t had its full flying envelope opened up yet: the software control laws are still being tweaked and developed. The full flying envelope (Mach 1.6, 50.000 feet altitude, 50° AoA, max G) will only become available with Block 3F.
Block 2B, with which the USMC is about to hit IOC, is limited at Mach 1.2, 40.000 feet and 5.5 G, for example.
While the F-35 will never be a fighter defined by super-maneuverability, it will not be as limited as AF-2 was in the test. And it will not fight in the same way either, once the tactics will have been written down.
Read the report: the dogfight was a control laws test, at high AoA, with none of the aircraft involved being armed; none carrying a weapon simulation pod (needed for an actual dogfight) and with the F-35’s HMD having only a fixed reticle, absolutely not representative of the operational HMD.
There has been some rather wild jumping to conclusions going on.

I will close the “babbling” part with one question only: even assuming energy management in a dogfight is not on the F-35’s side, if you were a pilot given a choice, would you want to be on the jet which has to rush through the F-35’s BVR area to force a dogfight, or would you rather be in the F-35?
I will be in the F-35, thank you very much.

Back to the plans. The SDSR 2015 is, I fear, unlikely to provide the information we’d all like to have about how many aircraft the UK will ultimately buy. Main Gate 5, the decision point for the bulk order, has been set for 2017, and I think the government will be too tempted to leave the final decision for then. The SDSR will most likely carry on just with the plan for 48 aircraft for OEU, OCU and for the first two squadrons.

The plan is as follows:

17 Sqn (Operational Evaluation Unit)– Edwards AFB, USA

BK-1
BK-2
BK-4 (not yet delivered)

BK-1, 2 and 4 are instrumented aircraft, which will be used for development and trials and evaluation. BK-1 and 2 were among the first to undergo a retrofit, which might have brought them all the way up to Block 2B standard. 1 and 2 came in the LRIP 3, so were very early jets indeed, with quite a few limitations to overcome.


Training Unit– Embedded in the USMC 501 Sqn, Beaufort, USA, until July 2019.

BK-3
BK-5 (ordered)
BK-6 (ordered)
BK-7 (ordered)
BK-8 (ordered)

Currently, only BK-3 is available, but the training fleet will grow to 5 over the coming months and years. BK-3 was produced in LRIP 4, and will receive a retrofit later on.
The next aircraft assigned to training will be BK-5, 6, 7, 8, all coming out of LRIP 8. The LRIP 8 is much closer to the final, block 3F standard. It will be delivered with the TR2 computer processors and Block 3I software. The TR2 processor, introduced from LRIP6 onwards, means that passage to 3F will be a software change only.
The third generation HMD, which solves the well known issues of the Gen II helmet, should also come along.

Come July 2019, training of british crews in the US is expected to end, with the OCU moving into RAF Marham, where an Integrated Training Centre will have been built. It seems likely that the UK will seek to attract other European users of the F-35, beginning with Norway, hoping to get them to train their personnel in Marham.

617 Squadron – Stand up in Beaufort next year, transfers to the UK in April 2018, Deployable Land IOC by 31 December 2018

BK-9
BK-10
BK-11
BK-12
BK-13
BK-14

BK-9 to BK-14 will come from LRIP 9. A production contract will come soon, with Long Lead contracts having been already signed. LRIP 9 is expected to introduce the redesigned bulkhead 496 on the assembly line, which is the one which cracked during durability tests. The jets from the earlier lots will be retrofitted at the first Major Maintenance occasion.
If the current schedule is respected, the first frontline F-35s should thus be delivered already in their final shape, more or less, reducing to the minimum the number of retrofits which will be needed later. 

The following 4 aircraft:

BK-15
BK-16
BK-17
BK-18

are included in LRIP 10, for which the first Long Lead contracts have been signed. All should be in british hands by the end of 2018. Further aircraft will be needed to bring 617 up to strength and to stand up 809.
The following batches however haven’t been detailed yet, and the stand-up date for 809 is also not yet known. Both squadrons should be fully operational by the end of 2023, however. The OCU will probably initially be a Flight within 617 Squadron, but might be given its own identity later on.

Trials at sea on HMS Queen Elizabeth are expected to begin around the end of 2018 and last to May 2019. They will take place in US waters, and will see the involvement of 17 Sqn and, most likely, USMC units. The trials should allow for Carrier IOC in 2020.

The UK is engaged in talks promoted by the US to place a “Block Buy” big order covering the years 2018 to 2020. Placing a bulk order is expected to result in significant savings.

Regarding final numbers, it is a shot in the dark. It has been reported that, back in 2010, the RAF fought a bitter campaign to ensure recognition that the needed force level is some 9 squadrons, which could mean 4 F-35 units. However, 9 would mean one more squadron than the RAF has now, and 3 more than it will have in 2020 if the Tornado GR4 OSD isn’t pushed to the right again. Extending the service life of Tornado might become desirable not just because of its combat capability, but because keeping up the number of squadrons would help a lot in securing greater purchases of F-35S. If the number of squadrons is allowed to fall all the way down to 6, rebuild it up to 9 becomes a rather unlikely proposition.
A four squadron force with 70 to 90 F-35B is a good target to pursue, but in no way a given. 

In terms of evolution and capability growth, the F-35B will enter service capable to employ up to 4 internal AMRAAM, 2 external ASRAAM and up to 6 Paveway IV (2+4). It will also have the gunpod (operational as part of Block 3F).
The next big thing in the history of the F-35 is Block 4. This new software load will be delivered in four increments between 2019 and 2025. The list of things to add is being formalized, and should become definitive by the end of the year.
Improvements to the EOTS, video downlink and a new "big SAR" radar mode are pretty much certain additions. In terms of weapons, the UK is looking at integrating, in the order, Paveway IV bunker-buster, Paveway IV with seeker, ASRAAM CSP, Meteor and SPEAR 3. However, only by year end we will know (hopefully) what will be actually funded and included. 

The non-definitive list of weapons to be integrated in Block IV, as shown earlier this year by US officials

Pratt & Whitney is considering a plan of upgrades and improvements to the engine, with Block 1 in 2018 and a Block 2 with advanced adaptive technology “in the early 2020s”. Targets include substantial reduction of fuel burn rate, improved cooling (with benefits extending to engine service life), possibly thrust increase by up to 10%, and range improvements between 20 and 35%.
The engine is obviously a key part of any aircraft, so the evolution of the F-135 is something to watch very closely indeed. The P&W Block update plan is currently not part of the F-35 plan proper, but it would be important for the UK to join the initiative if it progresses. General Electric is also shaping its own plan for improvements, with both companies building on the work done as part of the US Adaptive Engine Technology Development (AETD) research and development programme.



Typhoon

Apart from the AESA radar, which hopefully will start serving on Tranche 3A aircraft in the early 2020s, the RAF might want to consider the integration of a reconnaissance pod, especially if Tornado GR4 OSD is confirmed for 2019, and RAPTOR is left without a platform. 

Much lower priority goes to the Conformal Fuel Tanks, which however remain interesting, since the carriage of Storm Shadow means no underwing tanks, and the targeting pod is only integrated for carriage on the central, wet pylon under the fuselage. 
Conformal fuel tanks would keep the available fuel up, while leaving the pylons available for weapons and pods. 
The Conformal Fuel Tanks however require also an aerodynamic modification kit, it seems, which makes their addition more challenging in terms of expense and downtime. The aerodynamic modification kit has just completed flying trials on IPA7 in Germany, and brings significant agility improvements as well, including bringing Angle of Attack value up to 36°.  



Conformal Fuel Tanks wind gallery tests


It would be nice to put Conformals on Tranche 3A at some point, but it definitely is the last voice on the list of priorities. Money is still tight, and it must be used on the urgent things first. 



Sentry

Budget shortages have left the RAF’s Sentry fleet lagging badly behind the rest of NATO. While the other AWACS across the alliance are getting significant upgrades based on the Block 40/45 (E-3G Sentry) entering service with the USAF, the RAF is literally out of the picture. This situation badly needs to be corrected as soon as possible, otherwise the interoperability will suffer, and the operational value of the british Sentry will continue to decline.



Airlift

Several improvements are on the way, and others could be made. The C-17 is receiving satellite communications, for example. On the other hand, the RAF continues to make no use at all of the tactical capability of the C-17, which is only used as a strategic cargo flying from A to B. This is, in my opinion, an unjustifiable waste, and opening up some of the latent capability is something I will keep recommending.
A Boeing C-17 International Training Centre is standing up in Farnborough, with a full flight simulator and engine ground running courses. Parachuting and aidrop training could follow, if the capability is finally pursued.

The non-exploitation of the C-17’s airdrop capability is made worse by the fact that the C-130J itself is currently partially handicapped in this role: the withdrawal of the old C-130K has left the RAF with no capability to employ Medium Stressed Platforms for the airdropping of vehicles, L118 Light Guns and other key, large equipment for the air assault task force.
A replacement platform will be put in service for use on the A400M, but we are talking of a gap that will stay open for a few more years, as it’ll be 2017 or 2018 before the Atlas is ready for the task.
The RAF seem to have attempted to close the gap by putting out a request for a modified Medium Stressed Platform compatible with the C-130J’s cargo floor system. Delivery was planned for June 2015, but it is not clear what the status of the programme is.
The new airdrop platform should come with greater capability. The American Type V platform is one option. A clear requirement includes the ability to airdrop a Jackal, which is now part of the Air Assault Task Force’s equipment.

Investment in airdrop is to be supported. Modern precision airdrop equipment can ease immensely the resupply of troops from the air, and large kits allow the dropping of bulky, heavy loads, reducing the need for a small, tactical cargo capable of intra-theatre lift.
The RAF, for this role, is only going to have the 2 BAe 146 QC MK3 procured under UOR. So it’ll be Atlas, or 146 MK3. Expanding airdrop capability will compensate.

Another gap left by the withdrawal of C-130K is the Special Forces support. Unfortunately, the internationally developed software upgrades needed as base of Project HERMES, the fitting of SF equipment to the J, have suffered monstrous delays. Block 7.0 has run so late that it has been actually incorporated into Block 8.1, causing a much longer gap than once anticipated.
Block 7.0 is the biggest upgrade to the C-130J since entry in service, introducing tactical data capability, a new flight management system, new processors and 26 other changes, and it has proven challenging, to say the least. While not much has been said about it, Block 7 work has kept ZH866 in the US for over two years, returning only in December 2014 to then begin flight testing at Boscombe Down, ahead of further modification into Block 8.1.
It seems that Block 7.0 (and later) aircraft are to be known as C6, such is the extent of the changes.
In the meanwhile, at least, 9 of the C-130Js have been fitted with external fuel tanks giving a significant increase in range.

The now combined Block 7.0 / Block 8.1 modification deliver software upgrades; new Communications, Navigation, and Identification System Processor (CNI-SP); Link-16; new control wheel; new Civil Global Positioning System (GPS); new mission computer; upgraded Data Transfer and Diagnostic System (DTADS); new Identification Friend or Foe (IFF) Transponder Mode 5; Automatic Dependent Surveillance Broadcast (ADS-B); enhanced internal-communication system (ICS); Communications, Navigation, and Surveillance/Air Traffic Management (CNS/ATM) Data Link; improved public address (PA) system; and covert light aft of the cargo ramp.
However, flight testing of Block 8.1 is expected to wrap up in 2019, quite a while away still, and the risk is that the Special Forces support gap will only be closed right before the C-130J leaves service, in 2022!

 
The welcome addition of external fuel tanks on a C-130J C4 (long fuselage)

The rumors suggest that there is a strong current within the Special Forces and the RAF calling for the running-on of 7 to 9 long-fuselage C-130Js beyond 2022 (the ones fitted with external tanks?), specifically for the Special Forces mission.
The official line for now remains that the A400M will absorb the special forces mission by 2022, but if there’s someone who might get what it wants, that is the Special Forces Director.
The A400M is expected to equip 70 Sqn and 30 Sqn (the first for sure, the second sqn has yet to stand up), while 47 Sqn, unless C-130Js are indeed kept for SF work, will be disbanded.

The A400M has had its IOC delayed from March to September this year. 7 aircraft are required for IOC, and so far the RAF has received 3 (ZM400, ZM402, ZM403). A fourth A400 has flown to Brize (the future ZM401) but is still marked with an Airbus code while it undergoes work for the integration of the DAS defensive system. At least 3 more A400M are approaching their delivery date, and will fly to Brize over the next weeks.


Recommendations:

-          Procure modified airdrop platforms for the C-130J in order to close the gap. The lack of Medium Stressed Platform is a major problem for the air assault task force, and makes it a lot less credible.
-          Invest in platforms for heavy airdrops in the longer term, with payloads including Jackal in mind, and in precision airdrop kits. Some have been procured as UOR for Afghanistan, but they should become a more common capability.
-          Ideally, run on 47 squadron on C-130Js for the Special Forces operations beyond 2022
-          Gradually bring online tactical capabilities for the C-17



Training

Contract signatures for the purchase of the new fleets of fixed wing training aircraft are expected soon. The Grob G115, the Tucano and the Beechcraft King Air 200, used respectively for Elementary, Basic and Multi-Engine training are due to be replaced by G120TP, T-6C and Phenom 100.

If the recent NAO report on the Military Flying Training System has the right figures, the renewal will be accompanied by rather dramatic reductions in the number of aircraft and instructors, and by a growth of synthetic training on simulators. The NAO expects that the Elementary Flying Training fleet will go down from 40 to 23 aircraft, with military instructors falling from 44 to 35, but with civilian instructors growing from 17 to 23.
Simulators will grow sharply in relevance, with synthetic training hours growing from 0 to 35% of the training programme.

The most evident reduction, however, is expected in Basic Training, where the NAO expects only 10 aircraft, down from 40, with military instructors going from 48 to 15 and civilians from 1 to 5. Simulation will grown from 33 to 46% of the training programme.
The Basic Flying Training will leave RAF Linton-on-Ouse (which I guess is then very likely to close down) and move into RAF Valley, probably at the same time as 208 Sqn, on Hawk T1, disbands. More on this later.

Multi-engine training will see the fleet reduced from 7 to 5 aircraft and from 25 to 16 military instructors, with civilians going from 0 to 6.

There will be little to no excess capacity to train foreign students. This dramatic reduction ties in with the planned sundown of the Hawk T1’s role in training: the plan is that flying training of british personnel on the T1 of 208 Sqn will end in early 2016. 208 Sqn will continue to train foreign students until December 2017.
208 Sqn was once planned to disband in 2012. It was saved by the signature of contracts to train crews coming from the Middle East. But it seems that its time in the sun is limited, and that by end 2017, early 2018, disbandment will again be on the cards.
The guess is that the “naval 8”, as 208 Sqn is known, might become the new Basic Flying Training squadron, taking up the role from 72 Sqn as the Tucano goes out of service and training moves to Valley.

A major question mark remains on what will happen to the Hawk T1s used in “aggressor” role in support of training by 100 Sqn RAF and 736 NAS. A replacement for the Hawk T1 has not yet been identified.

Simulation will continue to grow in importance. Recently, the RAF has acquired simulators even of the gliders of the Air Experience Flights and University Air Squadrons. An Immersive Close Air Support Simulator has been purchased to contribute to the formation of JTACs.  

The renewal of the rotary wing training fleet is expected to follow in 2018.

 

Any chance to keep up fast jet numbers?

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It is SDSR time, and it is evident in the news. Suddenly, something that we have know since at least 2011 is making the headlines as newspapers and publications grasp the fact that the UK is running down a steep slope that could bring the total number of fast jets all the way down to a paltry 127 or so by 2020, in as few as 6 squadrons, one of which probably not even fully operational and built up by that date.
The totals are easy made: 107 Tranche 2 and 3 Typhoons in 5 frontline squadrons, plus around 20 F-35Bs in 617 Sqn (plus OCU and OEU). The exact number of F-35Bs by 2020 is not known because government has yet to detail how many british aircraft will be purchased in LRIP 11 and in the Full Rate Production Lot 1. LRIP 11 aircraft would be delivered over the year 2019, with Full Rate 1 jets following during 2020, assuming that the F-35 production ramp-up is successful and there are no delivery delays.
18 F-35Bs should be in british hands by end 2018, according to JPO documents. LRIP 11 will add a yet unknown number. By 2023, some 48 F-35s should be in british hands, which, if confirmed in these terms, would mean spreading the purchase of 30 aircraft over LRIP 11 and Full Rate Lots 1, 2, 3 and 4. An average of 6 aircraft per year.

Anyway, by 2020 the fast jet fleet will indeed count a mere 127 or 130 or 131 aircraft, whatever it might be. The difference is marginal, and would still equate to just 6 squadrons, with a seventh (809 NAS) to follow by 2023. Longer term figures entirely depend on the number of F-35s to be purchased beyond 2023, but there is every reason to be fearful that if the number of jets is allowed to fall so low, it will then be very complex to rebuild.
The fall to such a low number of jets (and squadrons) will be determined by the loss, by 2019, of the 52 surviving Tranche 1 Typhoons (one written off in 2008) and the withdrawal of the remaining Tornado GR4 fleet, planned for March 2019.
Is there any way to put a limit to this dismantling process? 

The Tranche 1 Typhoons are far from out of useful airframe life, but they are extremely limited in their multi-role capability, and increasinly less comparable to Tranche 2s and 3As. The aircraft cannot be upgraded to current standards unless they are vastly rebuilt, in a process which would cost billions.
The Typhoon Tranche 1 is effectively stuck to AMRAAM and Paveway II, and both weapons are on the way out. The latter is being replaced by the lighter, more modern and capable Paveway IV. The AMRAAM will be replaced by the Meteor.
None of the two new weapons can be employed on Tranche 1, nor can the old Typhoons be upgraded to accept them at an acceptable cost.

An indirect help to Tranche 1 comes from the Meteor's and F-35's delays, however. It is to be assumed that the RAF will once more life-extend its (limited) stock of AMRAAM missiles to ensure that the F-35 has an air to air capability at entry in service and into the first five years of 2020. Meteor is expected to be integrated with the F-35 Block IV software (it should be confirmed later this year, hopefully), but it could take out to 2026 before it is operational. It is to be hoped that the RAF will not accept years of gap with the F-35 capable to employ only 2 external ASRAAM missiles.
Indirectly, a life-extension to the AMRAAM stock would benefit the Tranche 1 Typhoons, ensuring that they have at least one operational weapon (again, in addition to ASRAAM).

Thanks to an AMRAAM extension, it is theorically possible to talk about delaying the Tranche 1 OSD, putting the aircraft into one or two "air to air only" squadrons, with the other five employing Tranche 2 and 3 machines in a multi-role fashion, with special focus on air to ground due to Tornado GR4 leaving service in 2019 as currently planned.

The advantages of a Tranche 1 run-on, potentially, are:

- Confirmed elimination of one logistic and training line (Tornado GR4)
- Up to two extra squadrons going into the 2020s, albeit only good for air to air and at a progressively declining level of combat capability due to the rest of the Typhoon fleet moving on to Meteor
- It will be somewhat easier to argue for more F-35s if the number of squadrons is kept up. Replacing the equipment of existing squadrons is one thing. Rebuilding squadrons after losing them entirely is a different story, especially in the Treasury's eye.


The alternative is, of course, delaying the OSD of Tornado GR4. This is likely to be what the RAF actually hopes to obtain. The GR4 is useless in air to air, but has a complete air to ground capability which is in far higher demand.
It is already deployed on operations against ISIS.
And it has RAPTOR. This point is particularly relevant since the RAF is so far still refusing to seek integration of RAPTOR, or of another recce pod, on Typhoon. The RAPTOR is used constantly, and its contribution is appreciated and praised: with the Prime Minister and top brass voicing their support for ISTAR spending, surely the risk of losing RAPTOR without an immediate replacement in 2019 will add weight to the RAF's calls for a Tornado run-on.


The Tornado GR4 is more immediately useful and better responds to what the UK currently needs and is likely to continue needing in the near future: air to ground capability, including excellent tactical imagery reconnaissance with the RAPTOR system.
The Tranche 1's help would instead consist only of providing an (increasingly sub-standard, but arguably good enough) air defence capability, enabling the rest of the Typhoon fleet to be more swing-role, and to take up the job from the outgoing Tornado.
The Tornado run-on means facing all the costs of a separate fleet with its own logistic and training needs. The availability of a very large sustainment fleet can help somewhat in covering logistic costs, but the financial impact is still likely to be important.
The Tranche 1 eurofighters, albeit increasinly different from later aircraft of the same name, would still fit within the Typhoon pipeline, instead.

In other words: capability wise, the running on of Tornado is more desirable than the running on of Tranche 1. The problem is the added complexity (and cost, presumably) or running a third fleet with a different logistic and training pipeline. The Tornado GR4, unlike Typhoon and F-35, also requires a specific training pipeline for the rear crew.

The signs that the RAF hopes for a longer life for Tornado, in my opinion, are:

- The refusal, voiced by RAF officers at RIAT, to commit to a reconnaissance pod for Typhoon, saying that integrating RAPTOR for now is not on the cards and "leaving the decision for the SDSR"



- The seeking of an Helmet Mounted Cueing Display system for the Tornado GR4. Helmet mounted cueing was already introduced back in 2012 as an Op Herrick UOR, but now the RAF is asking for a fleet-wide installation of a system which must be compatible with all weapons employed by Tornado, including the ASRAAM. It is true that these devices greatly help the crews in conducting their missions, and that if deemed essential they should be made available to the crews even in the imminence of the OSD, since they are engaged in real combat. But the requirement seems a bit excessive, if the assumption is for less than three years of use before the aircraft goes out of service.

- Recent, consistent investment in upgrades for the Radar Frequency self-protection capability, by means of rebuilt Skyshadow pods which also introduce modern Towed Radar Decoys.

- Rumors of a renewed RAF focus on rear-crew training, via exploitation of the Royal Navy's Observers training pipeline at 750 NAS (althouth the entry in service of Rivet Joint, the running-on of Sentinel and the expected purchase of an MPA might be enough of an explanation, admittedly)

It seems pretty certain that the Tornado force will get another temporary boost, with the further extension of the service life of the third squadron, originally planned to disband this year but then extended out to 2016. But another one-year extension will not be enough to alter the long term figures. More will be needed.

As always, the outcome depends on money, and despite some (way excessive, i fear) optimism shown by service chiefs themselves, the 2% of GDP committment has been officially exposed as being made up at least in part by financial gimmicks and inclusion of voices of expenditure which used to be separated.

As with other NATO allies, from time to time we update our approach to ensure we are categorising defence spending fully in accordance with NATO guidelines, seeking to capture all spending contributing to delivering the defence of the United Kingdom. Our 2011-12 NATO return was £36.6 billion. This included the Ministry of Defence budget, the cost of operations, and the Armed Forces Pension Scheme but did not reflect all UK defence spending. Our 2015-16 NATO return of £39 billion also included Ministry of Defence-generated income which directly funds defence activity, elements of the Government's cyber security spending, parts of the Conflict, Stability and Security Fund relating to peacekeeping, war pensions and pension payments to retired MOD civil servants.
House of Lords written answer, 20 July 2015, exposes the new expenditure voices included to secure the 2% target is formally met. 


Lets be clear once more: to even achieve 2% without gimmicks, it would still mean decline in percentual terms. We are forced to take the 2% as a good news only because the alternative was even worse, and by far.
The pressure on the forces' budget is not going away, and expecting miracles will only result in disappointment and tears. However, if we believe to the words of Howard Wheeldon, FRAeS

We had entered into the intense bargaining that surrounded SDSR 2010 with a request for twelve squadron. It was believed that we would in the end get nine and yet that belief ended up being just seven on an accepted basis that this would grow to nine.

Nine squadrons would cohincide with the up to 96 aicraft, 4-squadron F-35 force which was aired as long term target at the time of the switch to the F-35C.
Around 80 F-35Bs in four squadrons would be a good force, and they would be numbers which would give value to the investment made in the aircraft carriers. A fast jet count of some 187 would be nothing extraordinary: keep in mind that France is aiming for 225 in the long run, with quite a few more than that in service in 2020 (247, according to the documents). Even the Italian air force is planning for some 165 aircraft in the long term (with some 75 Typhoons after much of the Tranche 1s are withdrawn, and 90 F-35s). 127 is quite dramatically low.

Nine squadrons should be the magic number to aim to. But there are currently only 8 squadrons, so that adding one would already count as "neat growth", hard to fit into the budget, into the manpower, into the Treasury's vision.
If the number of squadrons is allowed to fall even further, arguining for additional F-35 squadrons will become harder and harder. Don't destroy with the hope of rebuilding later: "ham tomorrow" too often ends in tears.
It is important, for many reasons, that the number of fast jets is kept at decent levels. 127 is not a decent level. And assuming that there will be a recovery after such a sharp fall risks being terribly naive.

Immediate operational needs and long term considerations both impose that the number of aircraft and squadrons is kept up. Temporary running on of Typhoon Tranche 1, or better still of Tornado GR4, as a ramp leading to an acceptable number of F-35s, is something that should feature prominently in the SDSR.
The news we see in these days, even the (rather obscene, if you ask me) comparisons of the current anti-ISIS efforts to the battle of Britain, are hopefully part of the RAF's attempts to obtain a better settlement.



SDSR 2015 - Army projects and requirements

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SDSR 2015 – Issues, analysis and recommendations going towards the review

Budget

Army 
Army projects and requirements

Royal Air Force 

Royal Navy 
- will follow



NOTE: the MOD classifies its project by value, as follows:

Category A
£400 million and above
Category A1
£250 million to £400 million
Category B1
£100 million to £250 million
Category C
£20 million to £100 million
Category D
£10 million to £20 million
Category E1
£4.5 million to £10 million
Category F1c
£869,716 to £4.5 million
Category F1d
£347,868 to £869,716
Category G1
£113,057 to £347,868
Category H1b
£10,000 to £113.057



I’ve already written a long post about the Army on the eve of the SDSR 2015, but since that was a rather radical proposal of reorganization meant to make better use (in my opinion) of the 82.000 regulars available, I’ve written this other post to make a summary of the main requirements and projects the army is grappling with. These are the main issues on the table.



Operational Support Vehicles Programme (OSVP)


Over late 2013 and into 2014, the Army has renewed efforts to define the solution to four major requirements belonging to the Operational Support Vehicle Programme (OSVP), part of the wider Operational Support Programme which is the Army’s office for Combat Service Support work, including infrastructure and vehicles.
These requirements unfortunately come from a long story of false starts, cancellations and dreaded changes of acronyms, which have, as always, meant that years have passed with the problem only getting worse and harder to ignore. There is no telling if this new try will finally bring results, or if we are just staring at yet another false start.
The four projects are:

Multi Role Vehicle – Protected (MRV-P) is a Cat A project intended to meet the requirement for a protected deployable platform employed by all Force Elements, at all scales of effort, in a wide range of environments, and on all parts of the battlefield except for the direct fire zone. The MRV-P should bring commonality to the fleet and reduce the logistic footprint for utility vehicles by 2020.

The MRV (P) programme is a new attempt which follows the failure of the operational utility vehicle system (OUVS). The vision is for one vehicle solution for many roles, using plug-and-play communications and flexible seating layouts. Variants expected include:

— Command and communications post vehicle,
— Command and liaison vehicle,
— General purpose vehicle – cargo,
— General purpose vehicle – pax,
— Light gun towing vehicle.

A crew of 2 or 3 is expected, with the back area organized depending on role. In the pax role, there is a desire for six dismounts in the back.
The programme was, according to this 2014 MOD document, expected to reach Initial Gate during 2017 and Main Gate in 2017. There are many off the shelf vehicles which could and will be offered, but cost (at one point, 250.000 pounds per vehicle was envisaged) will be an issue, since the hoped for price seems too low.

As of 2014, a first purchase of MRV(P) vehicles was envisaged in the 800 units range, but the actual requirements are much higher, with the MOD envisaging long-term purchases of some 4000 more vehicles in the various variants. The Army does not seem to dare formulating a precise plan for how to move from the current wide range of vehicles to a full MRV(P) solution or at least, more realistically, a future fleet consisting of less vehicle types. 

Fleets and OSDs. The OSD of Foxhound is absurd, there is no other way to describe it. Either it is a mistake, or it is a financial planning figure as valid as the 2030 OSD for Typhoon: no one believes in it. Dragging on Panther until 2037 is quite on the crazy side as well, since it has notoriously been pretty poorly received.

The current fleet includes some 400 Foxhound in frontline troop carrier role, with much higher protection and cost (and mobility?) than expected for MRV(P). They seem ill suited for direct replacement; as do the Jackals and, to a lesser degree, the WMIK Land Rovers. The 2014 graphic shown by the MOD has an absurd 2024 Out of Service Date for Foxhound which can’t possibly be taken seriously, especially when seen near 2030 for the RWMIK and 2037 (!) for the Panther.

The table puts MRV(P) in semi-direct relationship with a number of vehicles which, for various reasons, really shouldn’t be compared, as I think they are too different. The Wolfhound, for example, is a massive machine, very well protected: the MRV(P) aims to have a similar payload (but much less protection). It is a trade off which could well be acceptable, as having a lighter, smaller, more agile vehicle could be advantageous, and anyway acceptable.

The MRV(P) requirements leave the door open to unladen weights approaching the 14 tons, which is twice the weight of Jackal and Foxhound. The base protection level, and probably the base agility, are inferior. Turning circle performance is also going to be worse, unless a “combat” derivative of MRV(P) comes with a lot of difference from other variants, and focus placed on mobility and protection.
It looks likely that an MRV(P) platform will have to be the same base vehicle but coming in Long and Short wheelbase variants: this would preserve much of the logistical commonality, but still enable the production of variants better suited to specific roles.

The approximate requirements for MRV(P). The MOD hopes for a cheap vehicle: one early RFI mentions a price of 250.000 pounds per unit.

 
Same vehicle, in long and short wheelbase, seem to be the only way the MRV(P) could ever achieve the single-type vehicle objective.

Even so, I suggest that Foxhound should be the very last vehicle on the list of those to replace. Replacing Foxhound and Jackal, two frontline combat machines, with an adapted MRV(P), might be stretching too far the differences with the “cheap” Combat Service Support variants which represent the bulk of the programme.
The MRV(P) should ideally replace Panther (2037, seriously…?), Husky and eventually Wolfhound. For these roles, it is reasonably well placed. Replacing Foxhound seems to me to be a long shot: I could actually see Foxhound replacing Jackal and WMIKs in its open-top, weapon carrier variant, while MRV(P)s replace the rest. Envisaging such an early end of service date for Foxhound is flat out ridiculous, with what the machine can do and with how much it cost, too.
At the moment, there is nothing in sight which delivers greater performances in the same size and weight class, so that my recommendation would be to think about Foxhound as the base for replacing Jackal and WMIKs, with MRV(P) replacing the rest. I suspect that keeping the two things separate will help in ensuring that MRV(P) doesn’t get too expensive trying to be too many and too different things at once; and also ensure that, when the time comes to replace Foxhound, a new vehicle thought for its specific combat role is sought.
Going down to two fleets (plus Land Rovers and Pinzgauers) for where protection is not strictly necessary would already be be a major, major improvement over the fragmented, multi-type fleet of today.


Non-Articulated Vehicle – Protected (NAV-P) is a Cat B project to meet the requirement for a protectable Palletised Load System (PLS). This would replace the ageing and unprotected DROPS fleet, enabling logistic support by a protected fleet to concurrent operations from 2020.

NAV-P is a major component in the renewal of the fleets of trucks which are the backbone of the British Army's logistics. 

The truck fleets and the way ahead. Two main projects will be key in the next few years.
 

The already seen May 2014 MOD document shows how up in the air the replacement for DROPS still was:

 
The DROPS Out of Service Date is... partially false, because DROPS simply doesn't have a numerically adequate replacement at the moment, and several still remain. The road to a replacement is visibly torturous, and desired numbers are likely to never be truly reached. What is clear is that NAV-P is becoming increasingly urgent.

The DROPS hit its Out Of Service date in 2014, as planned and mentioned in the document. At the same time, not all DROPS are gone. An unknown number of DROPS continues to serve and will remain for some more time. Some DROPS can still be seen in use with the reserve, but also with other units, including Falcon squadron in the CBRN role, where the DROPS is still used to carry the decontamination system, and will stay in the role out to 2017, when EPLS should replace it. It is not known how many DROPS are being run-on: in late 2014, the running-on of up to 825 trucks beyond 2014 was envisaged, but there is no telling how the programme has evolved since.

In addition, the EPLS is used. The Enhanced Palletized Load System, based on the MAN SV 15 Ton truck, has been procured as UOR for operations in Afghanistan. Two orders were placed, for 87 new build EPLS trucks and 90 conversions from HX77 trucks already MOD owned respectively. The 2014 document shows “170 EPLS going into core”: that is 7 vehicles less than originally procured, indicating that some must have been written off due to damage. 3 or 4 EPLS were also handed over to New Zealand, which urgently needed them as platforms for the REBS bridging system.
The 2014 document shows a plan to convert a further 175 MAN SV trucks to the EPLS role. I don’t know if a contract has been signed for this, but the indication that Falcon Sqn will receive EPLS in 2017 might be related to this second batch. 

Up-armoured EPLS in Afghanistan, doing its thing

The NAV-P, according to the May 2014 plans, would begin coming online in 2017, and 350 would be procured by 2020/21, giving a combined fleet of some 1045 trucks which would still include at least 350 old DROPS, evidence of the funding difficulties stretching out the replacement process.
Note that the requirement, all-in, is estimated in as many as 1349 vehicles, a number that the Army might simply never achieve.
There once were 1612 Leyland DROPS Medium Mobility Load Carrier (MMLC) and 404 Foden DROPS Improved Medium Mobility Load Carrier(IMMLC).



Light Weight (Air Portable) Recover (LW(AP)RC) is a Cat D project to meet the requirement for a recovery capability that is air portable and that can wade ashore with Commando Forces to provide intimate support to Very High Readiness (VHR) forces by 2016.

This Light Recovery Vehicle is an interesting requirement, which I think actually extends beyond the Paras and Commando: the Light Protected Mobility infantry battalions, mounted on Foxhound, and the Light Cavalry regiments on Jackal could all use a better, lightweight recovery vehicle instead of the 32-tons MAN Wrecker monster. In Afghanistan, a number of Husky vehicles were converted by the REME into recovery vehicles better suited to operate on the line of fire and, crucially, able to follow the Foxhound and other “light” vehicles into narrow urban areas and other challenging places, but a more definitive solution is needed.



Future Protected Battle Field Ambulance (FPBFA) is a Cat C project to meet the requirement for a Protected Mobility (PM) battlefield multi role ambulance. This will enable in-theatre protected movement of casualties, whilst delivering expected clinical care by 2020.


Not mentioned as part of the RFI for the Operational Support Programme, is the nonetheless vital Common Articulated Vehicle – Protected, which is meant to eventually deliver the Future Common Articulated Bulk Capability. A CAV vehicle should begin appearing in 2018 (according to the 2014 document already seen, but not much at all has been heard since) as a much needed replacement for the 99 old Seddon Atkinson Light Equipment Transporters (LET), which have gone out of service by end 2012, without adequate replacement. 99 new 3-axle semi trailers for the LET role have been purchased between 2005 and 2006, but no coherent replacement for the tractor itself was funded. Low cost interim solutions have had to be rolled into service instead: the RAF’s 2 Mechanical Transport Squadron has procured some 20 Iveco Stralis trucks in August 2013, while the army has converted a small number of Oshkosh movers, originally procured as part of the tactical tankers fleet, to use them as Interim LET on operations.
The CAV should also help make up for the 54 Seddon Atkingson 32.000 liters General Support Tankers leaving service.

The CAV will become even more important in the first half of the 2020s, when the Heavy Equipment Transporters PFI contract will end, and the tactical tankers will hit Out of Service Date. Achieving fleet commonality, finally, would be greatly beneficial, logistically speaking.
The HET contract expiry date is 1st July 2024, currently, while the tankers have a 2025 OSD.

The HET fleet comprises 92 Oshkosh Truck Corporation 1070F 8 x 8 tractor units, 3 Tru-Hitch recovery systems, 89 King Trailer GTS 110/7 seven-axle semi-trailers and 20 Broshuis Heavy Duty 45 tons trailers procured as UORs in late 2005.  The Private Financing Initiative sees Fasttrax Ltd supplies the trucks, provides training for drivers and REME maintainers, as well as procure spare parts and support. The company provides drivers and maintainers as Sponsored Reserves, which can be called up for service for periods as long as 9 months. When not deployed on operations or completing peacetime taskings for the MoD, the SRs, who are salaried employees of FTX Logistics Ltd (who operate the HET service on behalf of Fasttrax) are employed on third party work. This work enables them to maintain their driver/operator skills, which, together with the fact that they must pass Military Annual Training Tests (MATTs), ensure that they deploy current and fully prepared for their operational role.
The HET fleet is now assigned to a the sole 19 Tank Transporter Squadron RLC, with 16 Tank Transporter Sqn having disbanded in Germany on July 25, 2014, as part of Army 2020 reductions.

The tankers are instead MOD owned. 357 Oshkosh MTVR tractors are used to tow 200 Close Support Tankers, each with a 20.000 liters capacity; 82 Tactical Aircraft Refuellers, each capable to hold 15.000 liters of fuel and pump it into 2 Chinooks at once, the helicopters on the ground with rotors turning; and 57 18.000 liters Close Support Tankers (Water).
It would be very beneficial, logistically, if these three fleets were replaced with a high commonality solution, if not with the very same tractor unit for all three roles.
As there does not seem to be any revolution in sight in the trucks world, it would probably make perfect sense to carry on with Oshkosh products. In 2009, the MOD almost concluded a deal for additional Oshkosh MTVR tractors for the LET role: that would have been a brilliant solution for the problem, but unfortunately did not obtain funding.

MAN offers heavy tractors which could take on the HET, tanker and LET roles as well. The MAN products are expensive, but would offer even greater commonality by being closely related to the SV fleet already in service. There is the possibility to use MAN trucks for the NAV-P as well, drastically reducing the number of logistic lines that need to be kept going.

The general Support Vehicle truck fleet is not expected to need replacement at least out to 2034, and will probably last beyond that. The MAN SV fleet, as already seen in older posts, consists of:

HX60 4x4 vehicles, of which:

107 FALCON communication system prime movers (not originally part of SV requirement, added later)
3934 General Service Cargo Truck
958 Flatbed
84 General Service with Crane
28 General Service with Tail Lift (for RAF use)

HX58 6x6, 9-ton payload, Medium Mobility Vehicles, of which:

264 General Service
63 Flatbed
8 General Service, Crane
46 Flatbed, Crane
Unit Support Tanker 230 

SX44 9-tonne 6x6 Improved Medium Mobility, of which:

41 General Service
54 Flatbed
5 Flatbed, crane
81 Unit Support Tanker

HX77, 8x8, 15-tonne Medium Mobility

464 General Service
328 Flatbed
12 General Service, Crane
119 Flatbed, crane
87 EPLS (UOR, new build not originally part of SV but added later)

NOTE: 90 of the original 923 HX77 trucks have since been converted to Enhanced Palletized Load Systems, to complement and then replace the similar but older DROPS trucks, which cannot be fitted with armor for use in theatre. I don’t know if the trucks were taken from the General Service pot or from the Flatbed pot or a bit from both, but I personally suspect they might have converted some of the Flatbeds: I think it would be the easiest to change.

As a UOR connected to EPLS, the MOD also procured 25 Fuel Tank Container systems from WEW of Germany. These are 20 foot container-footprint tanks fitted with the
KPA400B autarkic diesel-driven pump: thanks to it, after unloading the container the system can be operated completely independent of the DROPS/EPLS vehicle using its .

Finally, the Support Vehicle Fleet includes 288 SX45 8x8 Recovery trucks (“Wreckers”) plus 69 Recovery trailers: they replaced the Foden Heavy Recovery vehicle.

The Unit Support Tanker is a field refueling system that replaces the previous Unit Bulk Refueling Equipment. Each UST carries 7000 liters of fuel.

The original contract also included 1098 appliquè armor kits, which can readily be fitted to all trucks but the 161 employed in the Training Fleet. 
For operations in Afghanistan, such armor kits have been improved with further additions on some 324 vehicles, in two different initiatives, the first known as Project Fortress.

The MAN SV trucks can be fitted with the Roush's ROPS (Roll-Over Protection System): this is a system that comes with two frames (one with 8 seats, the other with 6 seats) accommodating a series of two-part vacuum formed ABS seats, plus a 4-point quick release harness. Clearances have been designed in to accommodate a soldier in body armour, a webbing kit and battle helmet. Stowage is provided for a standard Bergen and a clamping arrangement is fitted to secure a weapon.

At least 1100 sets were ordered in August 2008 in a 5 million pounds contract and delivered by 2009 as "Enhanced Seating Kit". The system provides full protection in case of Roll Over of the truck, improving safety. The system apparently receive some kind of modification because the variant now in service is named MK2.



Project TYRO

The increased weight of the army’s vehicles means that the BR90 bridging kit needs an upgrade. Since 2014 the Army is working to define the way forwards for upgrading, or potentially replacing, the BR90 bridging equipment. The main aim of the programme is to put in service new bridging elements in 2022, which will have to last out to 2040 thanks to a greater Military Load Class (Tracked) capability. The minimum MLC(T) required is 100.

The Army wants 33 new sets of Close Support Bridging equipment for the Titan bridgelayer. Each Titan is currently supported by a BR90 Tank Brigde Transporter truck, which means that each system comes with 2x 13.5 meters bridges and 1x 26 m scissor bridge. Trestles enable the combination of bridge sets to overcome gaps of over 60 meters.

The Army also wants 16 General Support Bridge sets. Each GSB is currently composed by a single Automotive Bridge Launch Equipment (ABLE) vehicle capable to lay 32 meters single span bridges. The ABLE is supported by two BR90 Bridging Vehicles carrying bridge elements. With span reinforcements, the bridge can grow to 44 meters, while and span doubling over piers or pontoons enables the bridging of 62-meter gaps. 

Project TYRO recognizes the obsolescente of the carrier vehicles, as well as the by now insufficient MLC class of the bridging elements themselves. It is hoped that the old Alvis Unipower 8x8 Improved Medium Mobility Trucks will be replaced, and if this happens, there might be room to pursue commonality with other truck fleets.

33 CSB sets would confirm the current number of systems. 16 GSB sets are instead quite a few less than the 29 ABLE systems once available.




Warrior Capability Sustainment Programme

Uncertainty continues regarding the exact numbers planned for the Warrior capability sustainment programme. It seems that we are now talking about a total of 380 vehicles, of which only 245 will be IFVs armed with the new turret and the 40mm gun. The other 135 vehicles seem destined to be recovery and repair vehicles, plus artillery observation post vehicles.

The 245 guns figure is indirectly obtained thanks to the recently announced contract for the purchase of 515 CTA 40 guns: we know that 245 are destined to the SCOUT SV, and Jane’s reports that 25 more guns are for trials, tests and development. That leaves only 245 for the Warrior CSP.

This number is highly disappointing, I find, because it appears insufficient for properly equipping and sustaining the 6 armoured infantry battalions which are the core of Army 2020.

Even with the army hoping to mount battalion HQ and Anti-Tank platoon into ABSV vehicles instead of Warrior proper, the number remains insufficient. 14 Warrior IFVs per rifle company, alone, sum up to a requirement for 252 vehicles.
We are already beyond the expected number of upgraded vehicles, and we haven’t even considered the need for a training fleet in BATUS, and a margin of reserve machines to cover for unavailability. Talk about whole fleet management: if these are the numbers, a couple of the six battalions will be “virtual”, because even come the third world war there will not be Warrior vehicles to assign to them.
All battalions will have access to small training fleets, and there will be enough vehicles in storage to fully equip perhaps 4 battalions, in case the army ever needs to deploy two armoured infantry brigades as part of its one-shot, three-brigade, Divisional effort. 

The Warrior upgraded with the CSP will be a powerful and excellent IFV, but the number of vehicles to be up-gunned is a source of concerns, as is the ABSV programme, the other key element of the modernization of armoured infantry battalions.
 
It makes little sense, however, to have purchased the right number of FRES Scout vehicles to fully equip the units mounted on them: if the armoured infantry, which is the core of the brigade, is without vehicles, what use can the recce vehicles on their own have?
If it must be a Whole Fleet Management exercise which enables the fielding of a maximum of two brigades at once, then Scout numbers should have followed the same philosophy, and the saved money used to fund a proper missile-launching Overwatch vehicle variant. Or ABSV. Because things about ABSV remain far from clear, as we’ll see later.

Another mystery yet to be cleared is that of the Artillery Observation Post variant (FV-514). The WCSP does not include mission-specific upgrades for the Joint Fires Control mission that the FV-514 is devoted to. The Royal Artillery is responsible for developing and funding a new, up to date mission package of sensors and communications that will enable the direction of artillery fire and air support from under armour.
The RA has been experimenting at least since 2010 / 11, but it is not at all clear if it has the money to fund the upgrade.
If the upgrade can’t be embodied into the WCSP, it will have to follow it, and this means, at best, that it would happen in the 2020s, and it would come into service near 2030, way too late.
Worse, if the RA package of upgrades can’t be funded, the FV-514 risks being nothing short of useless.
Moreover, since one of the FRES Scout variants is equipped for Joint Fires Control, I’m left to wonder on the whole sense of trying to develop a Joint Fires variant of Warrior, too. Why not just purchase more Scout Joint Fires? 

The WCSP is not the end, for the Artillery Observation variant. The CSP will add the electronics changes and the modular armor package common to all variants, but the key to getting any value out of FV514 will be a further role-specific upgrade. The Royal Artillery has long been working on it, but its current status is not clear.

The organization of the Armoured Infantry Battalion of Army 2020 is a bit of a mystery, due to the shortage of Warriors-with-gun. It seems that the Army hopes to compensate using ABSV, but until that becomes available (if it does become available, I sadly have to remark) the battalions are making do with the old FV432 Bulldog. 
 We also know that the armoured infantry section is going down from 10 to 9 men, which actually means from 7 to 6 dismounts, since the others are the Warrior IFV’s crew.
The Warrior loses a dismount seat in the upgrade, as new blast-protected seating and situational awareness troop compartment screen take away precious space.

Armoured Infantry Battalions apparently won’t employ the L129A1 sharpshooter, either: it seems that the Army will assign the L86 LSW as sharpshooter weapon instead. The justification is that 7.62x51 range is less needed in Armoured Infantry role due to the Warrior’s own cannon and 7.62mm coax.



Armoured Battlegroup Support Vehicle

Much needed, desperately sought by the army, still in search of security. We don’t yet know if and when the ABSV programme will actually start. The army hoped to hit Initial Gate this year, but the latest MOD major projects summary, up to date to around middle 2014, talks of ABSV as “an aspiration”.
Awful word which does not provide any kind of certainty.

The ABSV, most likely to be obtained by removing the turret from surplus Warriors and rebuilding them into support variants, is a key programme, but one which struggles horribly in getting out of the mud. It is meant to provide new C2, ambulance, APC, Mortar and ATGW variants. BAE has showcased a Warrior configured as 81 mm mortar carrier as an example of what ABSV could and should be, but the way forwards is uncertain.
The Army’s hope for a proper ATGW vehicle might also be frustrated once more, even if the ABSV programme goes ahead. There are high chances of it being just an APC with internal arrangements for the carriage of dismounted Javelin missile teams. 

BAE showcased a mortar carrier Warrior variant as a demonstrator for ABSV
 
The army has been working on ABSV for years, trying to getting it funded. Alvis, when it still existed produced a few prototypes under an earlier contract. We were in the early 2000. ABSV eventually became a part of Warrior CSP under the Labour government, and now has been split away from it once more, to become its own programme. What matters, however, is that it finally progresses into acquisition.

The army at one point hoped to start introducing ABSV in 2018. It is desperately needed to replace ancient FV432s which, despite the MK3 upgrade in the early 2000s, really do need to retire.
The insufficient number of Warriors receiving the IFV fit adds urgency to the development of ABSV to better complement them, and fill the holes in the ranks.



Challenger 2 Life Extension Programme

The CR2 LEP appears to be another victim of stealth cuts. At one point expected to hit Initial Gate this year, it has more recently been described as “in concept phase”. This suggests that initial gate has been quietly pushed to the right by at least another year.

Complete uncertainty reigns about whether the 227 tanks remaining in active service will all be upgraded or if there will be further reductions. The extent of the upgrades is also not clear, but they will be mostly about electronic, sights and communications. Unfortunately, replacement of the rifled gun is absolutely out of the question, and a new engine also seems out of reach.



Apache Capability Sustainment Programme

The Apache CSP is intended to deliver a fleet of 50 helicopters, renewed and uplifted to the latest equipment standard, the Block III, known by the US Army as AH-64E “Guardian”.
The Army’s favored option for obtaining the final result is to have its existing Apaches torn apart and rebuilt into brand new airframes, complete with new and updated systems where applicable. This is the same thing that is happening to hundreds of US Army Apache helicopters, which get dismantled and reassembled into new airframes built in South Korea and shipped to the US for assembly.
The remanufacturing approach allows the re-use of components still valid, considerably reducing costs.

The Army is said to have recommended going with Boeing as it can offer the lowest price, but the MOD and government are not going to take a final decision before March 2016, as AgustaWestland is lobbying to obtain a contract which allows it to do the work in Yeovilton.

The US Army is remanufacturing 634 of its Apaches, and will also purchase 56 wholly new helicopters, but not before 2019/2020. The production line, was the UK to decide to buy wholly new machines, will be open at least out to 2026.

An area for uncertainty is represented by the unique british bits in the Apache AH1, and how some of those might or might not find their way into remanufactured or new helicopters assembled by Boeing. Communications, such as the Bowman radio, will certainly be required, but the MOD might also want to carry on with the british HIDAS self-protection system, and this would already pose a greater challenge.
All Apache helicopters are now manufactured with folding rotors, which were unique to the british AH1, years ago. But the british army would like to include a series of naval features which, despite the US Army’s increasingly frequent deployments shipboard in the Pacific, aren’t at all standard on the Apache.
At the end of 2013, the UK MOD signed a contract with AgustaWestland to develop and fit an emergency floatation gear to the AH1, which also received a degree of corrosion protection and wet-sealing to better resist the aggression of the marine environment.
These features, as well as others which are very desirable but not yet available, such as a naval-rate rotor brake and an I-band transponder, might not be easy to incorporate.
Uk and US are at least working together on a new cockpit escape system which, unlike the original one, will work safely even in the event of a crash into the water.

Another question mark is the engine: the british Apache AH1 uses the RTM 322, but its original power advantage over the American engines is no more, and Rolls Royce has also now sold its participation in this specific engine, which is now effectively French owned. On the other hand, the RTM 322 is still used on the Merlins.

An AW deal would cost more, but would keep the work in the UK. In itself, it is not an undesirable proposition, but it depends on what the higher price means: if it means having less helicopters, or having to cut something else, then the contract should definitely go to Boeing.



Special Forces Light Helicopter, and others  

The little known 657 Sqn AAC operates Lynx AH9A in support of the Special Forces. The Lynx AH9A is expected to remain in service out to 2018, but the future of the unit beyond that date is far from clear. At one point, the MOD almost signed a contract modification deal with AgustaWestland which would have converted 4 of the army helicopters already on order into SF Light Assault Helicopters, and added 4 more on the production line. The deal, however, eventually silently died and failed to materialize. 

The 9A uses the same engines as the Wildcat. It is lighter and somewhat roomier, which makes it more effective in light utility role. It is fitted with an MX-10 EO turret, and an M3M heavy machine gun.
 
There is a clear requirement for 8 – 10 light or medium machines for Special Forces support. Already before the publication of the SDSR 2010 there were rumors of 10 special forces helicopters being included: I think a Telegraph article at one point said that 10 NH-90 helicopters would be ordered.
That was not to be, but the problem remains to be solved. At a minimum, a last minute addition of 8 Wildcat in LAH configuration will be needed.

Some 21 Lynx AH9A remain, also used by 9 AAC Regiment. The Lynx AH7 will be entirely gone by the end of July, truly closing an era: only six remain in use, for assistance in Wildcat training.

The last few Gazelles are also planned to bow out of service by 2018, and a replacement is not in sight. Homeland work in Northern Ireland, though, might require a little investment. In May 2014, the army has added an MX-10 EO/IR turret to a Squirrel helicopter, currently used for training but destined to be replaced by the new Rotary Wing UKMFTS solution in 2018: this might provide a hint of what could be used in home security role after Gazelle.

Joint Helicopter Command has also voiced its interest in “surrogate training helicopters”, cheap-to-fly machines that, if procured, would be equipped with cockpits able to “simulate” Apache (and maybe Wildcat too), to enable low-cost, effective training of crews. This is intended to generate savings by reducing actual flying hours of the very expensive Apache.
It is not clear if and how this idea will be funded, however.



Watchkeeper

Full Operational Capability is expected in 2017, when de-icing and operations from austere, unpaved airstrips are to become available, with the release of Equipment Standard 2 (ES 2). Further development of the type is not yet mapped out, but already in 2011 there was interest in the Royal Artillery about the possibility of making Watchkeeper a shooter, adding a couple of pylons capable to employ weapons such as the LMM Martlet missile. This might be one of the future additions.

It will be interesting to see if the British Army and Royal Navy will ever get around to try and put Watchkeeper onto the Queen Elizabeth aircraft carrier. The launch should not be a problem: Watchkeeper is not overly heavy and can be launched from a trailer-mounted catapult which wouldn’t be much more challenging to embark than a Scan Eagle catapult. The problem is the landing, but there might be ways around the issue.



Air Defence

A contract for the CAMM missile batteries in Future Local Area Air Defence System – Land (FLAADS(L)) configuration was reportedly signed in December 2014, but there are no details about what exactly it funds. Replacement of Rapier remains expected “by the end of the decade”. 4 to 5 batteries are expected, one of which is effectively permanently based in the Falklands islands.

The Falklands should see a contract signed next year for the installation of a complete battle management and C4I system which will provide a full, detailed radar air picture to enhance the efficiency of the air defence system.
The british army, for the same task, has the deployable Land Environment Air Picture Provision (LEAPP) system, which achieved full operational capability in December 2014. 

The LEAPP Skykeeper system includes 5 Giraffe ABM radars especially purchased to serve as powerful eyes for the system, and shelter-based elements, deployable also under slung by Chinook. LEAPP however fuses together data coming from other radars and systems, from AWACS in the air to ships at sea. 

The LEAPP shelter, produced by Marshal, mounted on HX60 truck

Inside LEAPP
LEAPP is employed by 49 (Inkerman) independent Royal Artillery battery, as part of Joing Ground Based Air Defence. LEAPP networks together various external sources, receiving data in real time with Link 16. A Link 11 access node is also available, operated by Royal Marines of 29 Commando Royal Artillery: it enables LEAPP to receive the air picture coming from the sensors of RN warships. 
4 control nodes and 3 "air picture" trailers have been purchased. Networked with radars on the ground, in the air and on ships, LEAPP can control virtually everything moving in the air. Integrated with MAMBA and other radar and sensors, it provides a Sense and Warn capability against C-RAM threats as well.

In 2012, the MOD launched the Network Enabled Airspace Defence and Surveillance(NEADS)project, funding the first Workstream, which should eventually fully integrate LEAPP, FLAADS(L) and Starstreak vShorad systems, as well as starting the evaluation of C-RAM effectors. This later requirement might be related to the MOD’s research on laser.
The SDSR should give the go ahead to NEADS Increment 2, which is expected to include “sustainment of the Falklands air defence beyond 2020”, and as we saw, this is progressing. Specific anti-UAV capability is to be assessed (and the MOD is funding some research in this field), and a new C-RAM system was expected to be selected and procured for 2017. It will be interesting to see if NEADS goes ahead, and how, with specific attention to be paid on anti-UAV and C-RAM capability.



Fire Shadow

Who knows if the SDSR can provide an answer about what is going on with the Royal Artillery’s loitering ammunition programme. Silent and unadvertised death, it would look like.



Protected Mobility, UORs and the Utility Vehicle

The Protected Mobility needs of the Army, at the very least out to the middle 2020s, will be covered with the vehicles procured as UOR for Afghanistan and now brought into Core.
These include:

305 Mastiff Troop Carrier vehicles;
127 Mastiff specialist variants (Enhanced Communications, Interim ECM, Interim EOD, Ambulance and Protected Eyes with mast-mounted ROTAS EO/IR sensor, with its Praetorian variant for the RAF Regiment.

An unknown number of Troop Carrier variants of the Mastiff is being converted into additional Enhanced Communications variant as the army adjusts the fleet to its long-term needs. 

118 Ridgback Troop Carrier Vehicles;
51 Ridgback Specialist variants (Command and Ambulance)

Some Troop Carriers are being converted into additional command vehicles.

116 - 125 Wolfhound, including EOD and Military Working Dog variants. Somewhat surprisingly, a number of EOD Wolfhounds are being converted with the Military Working Dog pod.

441 Jackal 1/2/2A
71 Coyote

325 Husky (in Utility, Command, Heavy Weapon and Light Recovery variants)

45 to 60 Warthog will remain in use. They were originally procured in Troop Carrier, Command, Ambulance and Recovery variants, but are now expected to be used as carriers for Desert Hawk III UAV detachments and for the MAMBA artillery locating radars.

The Army continues to crave a 8x8 armoured “Utility Vehicle” as a replacement for Mastiff and Ridgback in Heavy Protected Mobility infantry battalions by the middle of the 2020s. The programme is expected to formally restart in 2018, and between September 2014 and may 2015, a whole rifle coy from 4 RIFLES has been in France to train on and experience the French VBCI.
The VBCI was dropped from the original FRES UV competition in 2008 because back then it was not certified for above 30 tons weight and had not a quick-change, battlefield removable powerpack. The latest development of VBCI, however, has corrected both defects, and is now seen as a very serious candidate.

I remain quite skeptic on money being available for such a programme, however, and if I were in the Army I would first focus on ABSV and Warrior CSP, to fix armoured infantry before getting caught into another major project.



Virtus and other soldier systems  

Deliveries of the new helmet, vest and load carrying equipment have now begun, but greater purchases will be necessary to re-equip the army. Crucially, in order for VIRTUS to truly be beneficial, it is important that the MOD goes ahead with Pulse 2, which is the development and adoption of new, lighter and more effective armour plates to replace the ones now in use, which are strong but also very heavy. 

The new VIRTUS equipment. The mask is especially meant for use by crews of open-top vehicles such as Jackal.

Even greater potential lays in Pulse 3, with the development of a centralized power infrastructure for the soldier, which will be fundamental to allow adoption of new weapon sights and Situational Awareness computer systems for the soldier.

New Tactical Hearing Protection devices are entering service.

Replacement of the L85A2 weapon is now not expected before 2025 at the earliest. New upgrades and additions are however possible: the army has been experimenting suppressors, for example. The most welcome recent addition has been the Laser Light Module MK3, however, which is very light yet very capable.

Contrary to earlier reports, the 60 mm handheld light mortal is still observed on exercise, so it seems that, at least for now, it remains part of the infantry battalions. It delivers a key array of long-range capabilities to the infantry platoon.

Sharpshooter rifles are a combination of L129A1 in 7.62 mm and L86A2 LSW in 5.56. The latter seem destined, in particular, to armoured infantry units. The LSW is an accurate and effective weapon, but of course employs the lighter round. L129A1 with 12x optics are employed as Sniper No 2 Weapons.

The biggest revolution is anyway expected to eventually come via communications and Dismounted Situational Awareness developments. Key to this will be the sustainment / further evolution / replacement of the Bowman data radio, via Project MORPHEUS, part of the LaTacCis (Land Environment Tactical Communications and Information Systems) effort to renew and develop communication solutions. For now, there is not much to be said, other than the latest iteration of the Bowman system is in use, alongside UOR radio sets which have been brought into core to provide a more complete capability. MORPHEUS is a potentially huge programme, with a potential value of 3 billions or more, and with profound implications for all three services, as the Bowman data radio is employed by troops, vehicles, aircraft, helicopters and ships.   

OPVs that come with lots of questions - UPDATED

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Finally, the first steel has been cut for the first of three new Offshore (Oceanic?) Patrol Vessels for the Royal Navy. Ships which came quite out of the blue, and about which we began to know something only on the day of the ceremony for the start of building. But now work is ongoing and HMS Forth, HMS Medway and HMS Trent are the chosen names. The design selected, unsurprisingly, is a very mildly changed BAE 90 meters standard OPV already built. 


 
Of these OPVs we know that they are being built to "bridge a gap in workload" for the shipyards between the end of Block building for the aircraft carriers and the beginning of the construction of the Type 26 frigates. The MOD is locked into the financial terms of an agreement with BAE, BVT and VT groups, the infamous TOBA (Terms Of Business Agreement) which is (or better, we should probably say "was") about ensuring that the rationalized (read: reduced) shipyards left in the country are guarranteed a minimum amount of work each year, to enable their sustainment and the preservation of know how. The yearly workload to be sustained is quantified in around 230 million pounds worth of activities, and the MOD is bound to pay the shipyards to be idle, if activity falls beneath the baseline. The agreement was signed in 2009 by the Labour government with an expected validity of 15 years, renewable by 5 years intervals in absence of formal termination issued from one of the two sides.

The TOBA agrement(s) set out a way forwards for the preservation of shipbuilding capability, measured with the KIC (Key Industrial Capability) indicators, and set targets for cost cutting while having the MOD committed to ensure that appropriate work was always available across the yards. 
However, the Royal Navy has been cut back again and again in the meanwhile, and the deal has become unworkable as there are not enough orders anywhere to be seen to keep the yards going. The 2009 TOBA document for example contained open mention of what was to be the C1 combat ship, to enter service in 2019: the separated 10 C1 "high end" combat vessels and the 8 C2 "lower end" general purpose frigates have been cancelled and reabsorded into the Type 26 programme, hopefully for 13 hulls in total, and with entry in service moved back to no earlier than 2021 or 2022, with an obvious impact on the plans. MARS, the programme to renew the RFA, also ended up being far smaller and far different than what had been imagined back then. 

In November 2013, the conservative government renegotiated costs for the Queen Elizabeth class and shaped out a deal on the way forwards that effectively "suspends" the TOBA agreement thanks to the OPV order, and eventually leads to the end of the TOBA. Shipbuilding in Portsmouth ends, with only a partial compensation coming thanks to renewed investment in the support, maintenance and refit infrastructure, including renovation of dock 15, a planned revamping of dock 14 and the bonification of 3 Basin to enable underwater maintenance. Even so, it is increasingly looking evident that Govan shipbuilding will cease as well, with 200 million pounds invested in improving Scotstoun to make it a one-location "frigate factory" hopefully able to build ships at far more competitive prices. 

Faced with some 230 million pounds of payments to make to BAE in absence of work between 2014 and 2016 (end of Block building for the Prince of Wales aircraft carrier and planned first steel cut for the first Type 26), the MOD correctly decided to instead order the building of some vessels, to actually preserve skills and to get something tangible out of the sizeable payment. 


Weird cost figures



There is, therefore, a challenge in sustaining a skilled shipbuilding work force in the United Kingdom between the completion of construction of the blocks for the second carrier and the beginning of construction of the Type 26 in 2016. Under the terms of the TOBA, without a shipbuilding order to fill that gap, the MOD would be required to pay BAE Systems for shipyards and workers to stand idle, producing nothing while their skill levels faded. Such a course would add significant risk to the effective delivery of the T26 programme, which assumes a skilled work force and a working shipyard to deliver it.

To make best use of the labour force, therefore, and the dockyard assets, for which we would anyway be paying, I can announce today that we have signed an agreement in principle with BAE Systems to order three new offshore patrol vessels for the Royal Navy, based on a more capable variant of the River class and including a landing deck able to take a Merlin helicopter. Subject to main-gate approval in the coming months, these vessels will be constructed on the Clyde from late 2014, with the first vessel expected to come into service in 2017.
The marginal cost of these ships, over and above the payments the MOD would anyway have had to make to keep the yards idle, is less than £100 million, which will be funded from budget held within the equipment plan to support industrial restructuring.

Secretary of State for Defence, Philip Hammond; statement to the House of Commons, 6 Nov 2013 : Column 253


230 millions however, turned out not being enough. The order for three OPVs required some 100 additional millions, bringing the total to 348, as from the contract signed in August 2014, inclusive of 20 million expended in March 2014 for long lead items. 

This is where the first question arises. 348 million is quite a lot of money for three vessels which are as basic as they could be, and only come with 29 secondary design adjustements compared to the BAE 90 meter OPV design already built in three examples in the UK and in one example in Thailand, on BAE licence. 

The three 90 meter OPVs built in the UK were constructed under a 2009 contract, worth 155 million pounds, signed by the government of Trinidad and Tobago with then VT Group. The OPV order came in the two years (2007 - 2009) over which BAE negotiated and then concluded a joint venture with VT which actually saw BAE buy the VT Group's shipbuilding activities. 

The Trinidad and Tobago deal fell apart in 2010, even with the first two ships being already ready for delivery. The then Port of Spain class was suddenly without a buyer, and the vessels were left in Britain while BAE and Trinidad sought a settlement. Eventually, Trinidad and Tobago agreed to allow BAE to seek a new customer for the ships, and in 2011 Brazil stepped in, eventually purchasing the whole trio as the Amazonas class with a 133 million pounds order placed in 2012, which also included some support and the licence to build up to five more vessels in its own yards.
2012 also saw the legal settlement between BAE and Trinidad. Trinidad and Tobago officially claims to have won the legal battle on the basis of delays in the construction of the ships and in "defects" they reportedly had, and the Trinidad government says it got almost 1,5 billion Trinidad dollars in payments. That means BAE paid Trinidad some 125 to 130 million pounds. With the money it got from Brazil, BAE avoided the loss, but made nothing out of the three ships. 


Today’s settlement is likely to be for £125m-£130m. There should be a net nil result in the working capital for the year as we understand Brazil has already paid for the ships

Financial Times report


The fourth vessel of this type was built abroad under licence: the HTMS Krabi of the Royal Thai Navy was built by theMahidol Adulyadej Naval Dockyard, in Bangkok. Laid down in August 2010, it was launched 15 months later, on 6 December 2011. 
The vessel is built with some significant enhancements: the main armament is an Oto Melara 76 mm gun, with two DS30 30mm guns as secondary armament, combared to the Amazonas which have a 30 mm and two 25 mm guns. The Krabi has its flight deck thought for AW-139 helicopter operations.
The combat systems are different, but the main sensors are pretty much the same. 
The cost of the Krabi was 2.8 billion Baht, equating to some 54 million pounds, more or less. 


The four OPVs in the class built so far have had a cost ranging from 44 million pounds (Brazil deal) to 52 million (original Trinidad and Tobago price) to 54 million (Thai example). 
The three to be built for the UK come with a 348 million pricetag: 116 million each. 

Looking abroad, the cost comparison continues to be painful: the british OPVs cost far more than those, of similar size and comparable performances, being built for Ireland by Babcock (some 50 million euro each, around 40 or so million pounds); they cost far more than the Otago for New Zealand (90 million NZ dollars, or 45 million pounds, with hangar and work area in the stern) and they don't stand any comparison with the Holland class built on the other side of the Channel, which in my opinion, for their price, represent the best deal possible.  


Why the cost difference?

The cost difference is pretty much certainly not coming from the vessels themselves. The Royal Navy examples come with some 29 changes in the design, but none of these can quite justify such a cost difference
The Royal Navy ships will have the same hull and propulsion as the earlier BAE 90 meter OPVs. Range is a bit uncertain as Navy News at one time was quoting 6300 nautical miles, but generally the figure given is 5000 to 5500 nautical miles, the same as the other vessels in the class. Speed is again the same, and indeed the engines are pretty much certainly going to be the axact same as on Amazonas. 
The main radar is a SCANTER 4103, and all vessels in the class have a 4100 series. The Royal Navy example will have a Kelvin Hughes SharpEye navigation radar, reinforcing the feeling that the SharpEye is the RN's pick for the incoming renewal of the fleet's range of navigation radars (replacement of Type 1007 I-band radar;of the Northrop Grumman Sperry Marine Radar Type 1008 E/F-band radar, and of the Raytheon Radar Type 1047 I-band and Radar Type 1048 E/F-band radars, from 2016. Programme known as Navigation Radar Portfolio, ex NASAR project (NAvigation and Situational Awareness Radar), which had aimed for a 2012 ISD but was delayed). SharpEye had earlier been selected for the Tide class tankers (three such radars will be on each tanker), and has been installed on RFA Argus to control helicopter operations, while on Fort Rosalie it has been experimented in detecting and tracking FIAC threats at sea.

The main design changes include a reinforced flight deck capable to take a Merlin helicopter (the Amazonas have a flight deck capped at 7-ton class helicopters) and an improved Helicopter In Flight Refueling equipment, to support helicopter operations. 


HMS Clyde during HIFR operation with one of the two Sea King SAR based in the Falklands

According to Jane's, the other differences are:
an International Maritime Organization-compliant sewage waste treatment plant; additional accommodation for embarked military detachments; and improved watertight integrity and firefighting provisions to meet Naval Authority standards.

Jane's report 

The additional accommodation is tricky, because it is hard to see where they could put it, since the ship has exactly the same sizes, but a larger and reinforced flight deck and larger HIFR fit, i'm guessing with more fuel for helicopters, as well. Space is not going to magically augment. In fact, the BAE and MOD accommodation data suggests that there is no increase at all from the Amazonas: actually, possibly a reduction of 10, from a maximum of 70 to a maximum of 60, of which 34 / 36 base crew and some 24 EMF / helicopter flight. Almost certainly, the "additional accomodation" is said with reference to the River Batch 1 in current Royal Navy service.



The ships have two Pacific 24 RHIBs and the 90 meter BAE design offers the possibility to embark up to 6 20' containers, two of which should be carried behind the RHIBs, while to carry the other four it is necessary to use the flight deck, and so negate helicopter operations

A scheme of the flight deck, with 4 TEU containers arranged on deck within crane reach. Another seems visible in the bottom left corner, meaning behind the RHIB, and another might be on the other side, again behind the RHIB.
 
Armament on the RN variant is one DS30M 30 mm remotely operated gun turret and two MK44 7.62mm miniguns on the sides of the bridge, making it the lightest armed variation of the 90 meters family. Not surprising, but still worth of notice. 


A written answer given to the House of Commons details the 29 changes, one of which has been dropped from the requirements:

1 Watertight Integrity Modifications
2 Fire Safety Modifications
3 Enhanced firefighting facilities
4 Automatic Emergency Lights
5 Flight Deck Officer Position
6 Domestic refrigeration Modifications
7 Sewage Treatment Plant Modifications
8 Exhaust System Modifications – (No longer required)
9 Ballast Water Modifications
10 Merlin helicopter operation
11 Helicopter In-Flight Refuelling
12 Helicopter refuelling modifications
13 Changes to ship’s minimum operating temperature
14 Davit Modifications
15 Force Protection Weapon Modifications (lose two 25mm gun turrets, replace with MK44 7.62mm gatling)
16 Install WECDIS/WAIS
17 Install Combat Management System      (better expressed by saying they are to replace the existing combat system with the OPV version of the BAE Surface Common Combat System infrastructure which has been installed on HMS Ocean and is due to appear on all other ships in the RN fleet)
18 Military communications modifications
19 Magazine Protection
20 Radio Equipment Room Modifications
21 Change lighting and domestic power voltage from 115v to 230v
22 Codification of equipment
23 Provision of life saving equipment
24 Replace navigation radars      (The River Batch 2 gets the Kelvin Hughes Sharpeye, which seems set to become in 2016 the fleet-wide replacement for the Type 1007 after being also selected for MARS FT and fitted to Argus and Fort Rosalie)
25 Install Military GPS
26 Install flight deck landing grid
27 Fuel efficiency monitoring
28 Provide emergency communication equipment
29 Machinery Space Walkway


The 2017 handover date to the Royal Navy does make me think that part of the higher cost is due to the work being done with the brake pulled. These ships can be built in some 15 months, normally, and this would mean launching the first, HMS Forth, by the end of 2015. More than a year for fitting out and delivering such a basic OPV really seems too long a time, so we might be in for a stretched out build. 
The question then becomes one of ripple effects on the Type 26 programme: the first steel cut for the first new frigate is expected in 2016, with block integration beginning in 2017. Even at 15 months per ship, there should be a significant overlap, depending on how much of the OPV work goes on at the same time. 
It would be nice to have greater details on the expected building schedule. And in the meanwhile, we are left to hope that we aren't staring at an hidded schedule slip for Type 26. 




A skills and jobs saving measure? 

Avoiding a short (at least if Type 26 isn't delayed) gap in shipyard work with an expenside order, paying three ships more than due in order to keep the yards alive might not be a bad investment IF there is a clear way ahead after this gap-filler. The 2009 plan, fixed with the TOBA, fell apart incredibly quickly, and big questions remain to be answered about this new course.

Observing the MOD plans (even bearing in mind that changes and cuts are a constant...) we have:
 

- Main Gate for Type 26 frigate expected at the end of this year with building of the first vessel expected to start in 2016. 13 vessels to be built, with the first entering service in 2021 and the last not before 2036;
 

- MARS Solid Support Ship: while the MARS Fleet Tanker requirement has been met ordering hulls in South Korea on the ground that tanker hulls are simple and are best built by yards which build commercial tankers all the time, the assumption is (was?) that MARS Solid Support Ship, being more complex and technologically sensitive, would be built in british yards. The Fort class supply vessels are due out of service in 2023 (Fort Austin) and 2024 (Fort Rosalie) and undoubtedly Fort Victoria is also planned to bow out roughly in the same timeframe (2025, possibly?), so the replacement vessels have to enter service in the early 2020s. If they are to be built in Britain, and now doubting of it is licit, they will overlap with the work for the Type 26 frigates.
 

- MHPC: in late 2012 a DSTL document said that the MCM, Hydrographic and Patrol Capability programme should deliver the first new vessel in 2028. MHPC will replace the Hunt and Sandown minesweepers and, possibly, the hydrographic ships HMS Enterprise and HMS Echo. HMS Scott and her oversized equipment are unlikely to be replaceable by the relatively small multipurpose vessel (some 3000 tons, according to most sources) envisaged for MHPC. Delivery of the first vessel in 2028 implies an overlap with the activities on the late Type 26 ships, which will continue to be built into the 2030s.

One day, RFA Argus and RFA Diligence will have to be replaced, as well. They have been hard worked ever since they were picked up from trade in 1982 for the Falklands war, and in the 2020s it'll become increasinly necessary to find solutions for their replacement. A Maritime Role 3 Medical Capability vessel (MR3MC) is a requirement and a wish ever since the Labour defence review in 1998, but progress has actually been null. Studies for the Future Repair Capability have also lead nowhere so far. 


Very rough recent concept vessels, apparently based on the hull of the MARS Solid Support Ship variant, itself still in concept phase. In 2008, the OMAR concept by BMT was presented as an interesting solution to replacing Diligence. Who knows how many more years will have to pass before anything is built. If anything gets built at all, of course.

In theory, there is plenty of work on the horizon. In theory. It will be interesting, but probably, looking at recent history, also very unpleasant, to see how things will evolve, how many ships will actually be built, and where.

The boat building activity in Portsmouth is expected to survive the closure of the major surface warship activity. Of interest in this field we have the Royal Marines requirements for a Fast Landing Craft, which has however been put on hold and won't resurface before 2020, when the slow LCU Mk10 is supposed to finally retire; and the requirement for a Force Protection Craft. The fate of this second Royal Marines requirement is not clear at the moment. During DSEI 2013, CTrunk, while unveiling its THOR catamaran solution for riverine, force protection and inshore mission, said that they were in contact with the MOD, which hoped to reveal its final requirements for the boat during 2014, but so far there is no evidence of progress.
The Force Protection Craft programme, at least until 2011 or early 2012, hoped to deliver 12 crafts, which would partially replace the current fleet of 21 LCVP MK5s, from 2016.


Perhaps the most important measure of success or failure of the OPV stop-gap order will be the Type 26 programme: keeping the line hot and the skills intact absolutely has to ensure a smooth programme for the new frigate, with ships launched on time and on budget, because otherwise both the industry and the navy will be in serious, serious trouble. 



Have ships, will sail?

In the short term, while still wondering exactly why these three OPVs are costing so much, i believe there is one imperative: getting the greatest return possible out of a combined 387 million expenditure in OPVs. 

The unpleasant bit of news about the River Batch 2 is that they are expected, at least for now, to replace the River Batch 1 OPVs. These cheap and effective vessels have only been purchased outright from BAE in 2012, for 39 million pounds. Initially, in fact, the three ships were not owned by the Royal Navy, but they had instead been built under an arrangement with the shipbuilder, Vosper Thornycroft (VT), under which the Royal Navy leased the vessels from the shipbuilder for a period of ten years. VT were responsible for all maintenance and support for the ships during the charter period. At the end of this, the Navy could then either return the ships, renew the lease or purchase them outright. The first lease period was renewed in 2007, out to 2013. In September 2012 the outright purchase was announced.
The oldest one was only launched in 2002, so in 2017, if replaced, would bow out after a mere 15 years of life and just 14 years of service, having been commissioned in 2003. In my opinion, this is shameful and can't be allowed to happen, especially not in a Royal Navy already struggling to cover its basic, daily committments.


The new ships will be extremely welcome and useful if they are kept in addition to the Rivers, so that they can fully exploit their increased capability and potential by being employed away from home waters, to offload some constabulary tasks from the high end part of the fleet.
The Rivers will be barely around 14 years old when the first new ship is delivered, in 2017, and the Royal Navy has a clear need for deployable hulls. The new OPVs, with their greater sizes and capability (including helicopter) can and should be used away from home, to relieve the frigates of some of their tasks (Caribbean, but also counter-piracy, for example), while the River continue to do what they have done well for years.

Not long ago, the government published its Maritime Security strategy. The document, while being of some interest, hardly deserves the praise it received from several commenters. Moreover, the supposed "strategy" is written out in a deliberately ambivalent, vague way, especially when it comes to the new OPVs: mentioned several times in the document, they are described as a "further improvement" to the UK's maritime security capability, but not once there is a clear statement of their fate, and that of the Rivers. The official line is that the decision is left for the next SDSR. Of course.
The document has been written in such a way to allow the government to bin the Rivers and still describe the situation as an "improvement" because of the greater capabilities of the new vessels, regardless of the fact that, observing historical trends in the use of the Rivers, it is safe to say that such additional capabilities would be hardly be needed, and will only sparsely be exploited.




HMS Tyne, HMS Severn, HMS Mersey

There is no real operational reason why the Rivers need to be urgently replaced by larger OPVs with aviation landing facilities. While additional capability is always welcome, it should not come at the cost of the Rivers. The Rivers are not combat vessels: they patrol the economic zone of the UK and control that fishery respects the rules. They are very busy ships and they are very precious in forming the officers that will then transfer to the large warships. But they have little to no combat use, they are tied to home waters and they do not really need aviation facilities that would be seldom used at best. A flight deck could be handy to operate small rotary wing UAVs, perhaps, but a Camcopter does not take a Merlin flight deck, and i'm pretty sure that enough space could be arranged in the stern of the current Rivers, if that was the idea.
The new OPVs announcement, in other words, as it has been made, smells of back-door capability slashing. The Merlin-capable flight deck immediately made me imagine an horrible scenario in which know-nothing MPs with little understanding of the military are made to think that the ability to refuel a land-based Merlin helicopter away from the shore using the OPVs is a replacement for the missing Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability, for example. Most obviously, for a tons of very good reasons, this wouldn't even rank as mitigation of the gap, and never could it be "a replacement".

The Rivers are very busy in their intended role, besides, and the replacement vessels would be just as busy, meaning that they would actually have very little chance to even try and use their greater capabilities, which in home waters are useful, at best, but not essential.



The Fishery Protection Badge, approved recently by the Navy

The Fishery Protection Squadron is constantly out at sea around the UK, and has very little, if any time to wander far away from home. A 42 strong crew is embarked to work to a three watches mechanism. Each ship has an additional allocation of personnel used to rotate members of the crew to meet harmony rules. Personnel on the Rivers could be indicatively expected to spend four weeks at sea and two weeks on land, pretty much all year long. The River batch 1 ships each spend a minimum of 275 days out at sea, with maintenance to the vessels intended to ensure the capability of spending up to 320 days at sea. Normally there is a 9 days maintenance period and a longer one of 16 days, each year.
Combined, the three ships have to deliver at least 700 days of activity at sea, and Hunt minesweepers are used to complement the Rivers in fishery protection patrol task, but with no fixed target. Back in 2004, some three Hunt vessels could be routinely expected to be involved in supporting Fishery Protection. 
The only way in which the new OPVs could go "tackle piracy" as has been suggested, while replacing the Rivers, is reducing the fishery protection coverage in home waters. There really is no excess availability.

And having a Merlin-flight deck is of little use when the availability of spare Merlin helicopters is going to be next to none, with just 30 of them being retained (although recently news reports told of the Navy's battle in the background to get funding to upgrade to HM2 up to 8 more, as once had been planned) and all of them already overtasked, especially with the AEW role falling on them as well, under CROWSNEST. 
One thing for which the large flight decks could be useful is for landing the S-92 and AW-189 helicopters of the civilian SAR service coming up, to refuel them and enable them to expand their reach out at sea, but even this might be an illusion as it is unclear if the PFI-supplied crews will even have any deck-landing certification.




Cooperationg between the River batch 1 and the military SAR helicopters is pretty common, but despite my research, i haven't been able to verify if HIFR is an option available as of now. Another question without a certain answer is whether the incoming civilian SAR crews will be able to make any use of HIFR and even of helicopter decks on ships at sea.

MP Bob Stewart has, admiradly, thought of the same thing, but still we have no precise answer on whether that would be possible. The helicopter could surely use the deck, but would the crews be qualified for it? That's the real question. Besides, the Rivers do have a large cargo deck in the stern, which might be at least fitted with HIFR equipment to refuel helicopters without having them landing (i've been unable to verify if the Rivers already have such a capability). 
The cargo deck of the Rivers adds flexibility of its own as it can be used to carry containers, an LCVP, or pollution containment equipment, or other cargo, but it might be also adaptable to take helicopters, since HMS Clyde can, and isn't much different in design, nor much longer. 
The fear is that the new OPVs will not just take away the Rivers early, but be used to unrealistically run down other capabilities as well: 
 
Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con): Most people suggest that our biggest defence capability is not in maritime patrol aircraft. I am no expert—although I can see that there are many naval experts in the Chamber—but could this new River class OPV, with its enhanced length and helicopter deck, also be used to cover the gap between 240 nautical miles, the distance a land-based helicopter can go out from our shores into the Atlantic, and the 1,200 nautical miles for which we are treaty responsible? Could it perhaps play some sort of MPA role in that area?

Mr Hammond: I have not looked at the specification in detail, but I do not envisage that the thing will be able to take off and fly. I understand the point that my hon. Friend is making, however, and we are conscious of the gap in maritime patrol aircraft capability. It is one issue that will be addressed in SDSR 2015 and we will manage the gap in the meantime through close collaboration with our allies. We are considering all the options, including, potentially, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in a maritime patrol role in the future.


Note how, as i feared, irrealistic mentions of MPA capability are made. Back-door capability cutting, camouflaged as new capability being delivered. Disasterous, and tipically suited to politicians. Better to keep one hunded eyes open on this matter. 

In other words, there is no real need to replace the Rivers with these new vessels. Losing the current River vessels would be a waste, and the greater capabilities of the replacements could also end up largely wasted.
In fact, these new vessels would be perfectly suited for interdiction of smuggling, for protection of oversea territories (And the Caribbean standing task springs to mind) and counter-piracy work as well, as noted by Hammond himself in answer to a question by Peter Luff:  



Peter Luff (Mid Worcestershire) (Con): I commend the Secretary of State, the Minister for defence equipment—the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne)—the Chief of Defence Matériel and all those involved for making the best of a very difficult situation. Will my right hon. Friend clarify the purpose and capabilities of the three new very welcome offshore patrol vessels?

Mr Hammond: They will be more capable than the existing River class, as they will be able to take a larger helicopter and will be 10 metres longer. They will be able to undertake a full range of duties, including not only fishery protection but the interdiction of smuggling, counter-piracy operations and the protection of our overseas territories.

To do all that, though, the new vessels would have to sail far away from home and, most likely for it to have any sense, they would have to be forward based, like HMS Clyde in the Falklands. While the OPV is suited for ocean navigation, it has a short logistic endurance in terms of stores (little more than one month for the new vessels) and, in part, in terms of fuel, so that sailing it back and forth from the UK would not be particularly effective. The BAE 90 meter OPV can be refueled and restored at sea, but the less this is needed, the better, as it keeps pressure off the RFA.
The new OPV would be a perfect solution for the West Indies committment, if it was forward based there. If the ships end up home-based, and tied to the River's current role, they won't be able to do anything of what they could and should do. 

In my opinion, the Royal Navy can obtain an excellent boost in capability if it manages to retain the Rivers for fishery protection and home waters, using the new vessels in addition, forward-basing them overseas. I can think of three locations:

Caribbean, removing a committment that has been a source of problems and embarrassment for the Royal Navy which has long struggled to find a way to send a warship, having to resort extensively to RFA vessels which would also be very much needed elsewhere, for their actual role. 




Gibraltar, because from the base the OPV would be able to engage with allies, with North and West African countries while also providing much needed reassurance to the Gibraltarians, which are loudly calling for a more tangible sign of UK support

Bahrain, because the OPV would be able to provide additional anti-FAC protection to the minesweeper squadron there and/or deploy to piracy-infested waters, restoring more enduring british presence in the wider area and relieving the warships from another role which has been hard to cover with a sheet which is, at the moment, just too short.




UPDATE: several comments have underlined the limitations that come with the lack of a hangar, and with a ship with limited space and accommodation for Hurricane season support. They are both valid points, and very real issues. I've decided to add a short section here to say a little bit more about how these problems impact the use of an OPV in the Caribbean
The lack of a hangar is the most evident sore point of this design. And it is a major limitation for long missions abroad. However, there might be the possibility to remedy to the problem later on, with the addition of a telescopic hangar, which would come forwards over the flight deck, covering and protecting the helicopter when not in use. Notable examples are the italian navy OPVs of the Comandanti class, although their telescopic hangar is relatively complex and well integrated in the superstructure, while the design of the 90 meters OPV, with a low and small read superstructure block surmounted by a crane is more problematic.

A telescopic hangar could help solve the major issue of these OPVs, although the shape of the superstructure is not very friendly
 
In this line drawing my MConrads and Enrr, the italian navy OPVs can be seen with their telescopic hangar deployed and retracted. It is the only way to obtain hangar protection in ships which don't have enough space to have a flight deck and a hangar at the same time. 


Unless the superstructure is more widely modified and the crane relocated higher, the addition of a telescopic crane will have some impact on the ability of the crane to turn all the way back to load and unload large payloads onto the flight deck. 

Side plan from the BAE video. Note the crane extended. The addition of a telescopic hangar would put a bulky frame in the way, and impact the freedom of movement of the crane and, at least in part, the ability to embark TEU containers on the flight deck. Still worth it, i'd think.
 
Regarding the typical missions in the Caribbean, the OPV would be well suited to patrol and counter-smuggling. For the Counted Narcotics and Terrorism (CNT) mission, Royal Navy ships embark a ship flight and a US Coast Guard LEDET (Law Enforcement Detachment) of some 10 men. Greater accommodation wouldn't hurt at all, but the OPV should be up for it. 

Hurricane season relief is more of a problem. A normal Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief (HADR) package on a "Hurricane Season"these days is an RFA vessel with a 20 men (or larger) RN HADR team, supplemented by 30 or so men taken from the RFA crew. An helicopter flight is also desirable, obviously, and space for stores is also needed. An OPV this small can't do very well in this mission. However, an enduring OPV presence in the area would still be able to remove some pressure on the RN core fleet, and a more suitable HADR platform, undoubtedly a large RFA vessel, could still visit during the crucial hurricane months (August, September and October) and be made available to some degree over the lenght of the whole hurricane season, which officially goes from June 1st to November 30. 



Despite the limitations of the design, the new OPVs could still be very useful. 
The challenge of retaining them is, of course, in budget and manpower. The Royal Navy is exceptionally lean-manned, following the latest cuts. The insufficient manpower is possibly the biggest problem that must be overcome to bring the second aircraft carrier into service alongside the first, and trying to man three new patrol vessels as well, even with the crews being pretty small, is not going to be straightforward at all.
In terms of cost, the River class costs annually just about 20 millions per year. More correctly, it did in 2010: the current value is probably different. The outright purchase of the vessels has been made in the assumption (hopefully supported by facts) that removing the lease costs would reduce the annual expenditure, while further differences are likely because of inflation and other factors. Anyway, we are talking of a very small amount for three very useful vessels with plenty of life left in them. The new OPVs will also be hopefully quite cost-effective, so the Royal Navy should make every effort to secure all six in the longer term.

The door for such a decision, at least in the words, is left open:


Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con): I, too, pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Penny Mordaunt) for her doughty struggle to get a good city deal for her constituents and for the vision for the OPVs that to my knowledge she has been outlining for at least two years. Will the Secretary of State confirm that the OPVs will to some extent provide a force multiplier for our frigate fleet? Some of the roles carried out by frigates do not require full frigate capability, so the OPVs could be a way of partially expanding that capability.

Mr Hammond: At the risk of causing her to blush, I am happy once again to praise my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North. I should say to my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier) that no decision has yet been taken about whether the old River class vessels will be retired after the new OPVs are brought into service. That decision will have to be made in SDSR 2015 based on the ongoing budget challenges of maintaining additional vessels at sea. That will be a decision for the Royal Navy.

This is somewhat reassuring, as well as the admission that there has not been a decision on where to base the new OPVs. If they were already certainly meant as a replacement for the Rivers, the basing answer would be pretty simple.
Of course, the door is not locked, but this does not make it easy to push it wide open and squeeze the new ships and the old ships through. I can only hope that the Royal Navy realizes how decisive the next SDSR is going to be for its future, and i hope people is hard at work, already now, to make sure to fight the incoming battle with the utmost determination.

Any possible solution should be actively considered. To overcome the manpower issues, it might be attractive to use RFA manpower, but we must not forget that the SDSR took away 400 men from it as well, leaving it far from being overmanned.

Another chance, which has the favor of government, is the use of reserve personnel. This is the only area that is seeing a manpower increase, and it is also low-cost manpower compared to regulars, so it might be very helpful to find ways to fill as many posts as possible on board of the OPVs with reservists, even though it is challenging: normally, a crew member on a River stays onboard for four weeks and then rotates ashore for two weeks, while the ship is at sea for most of the year. Finding a way to make good use of reserves in this cycle could be challenging. 


These new OPVs are an option for having a little bit of a two-tier fleet. It is a concept that has long made First Sea Lords nervous, as they seen the constabulary ships as a threat, in the funding battle, to the high end part of the fleet. Most recently, first sea lord Zambellas, speaking in the US, went on record reinforcing that mantra:

“You aim for high end and you accept the risk your footprint’s reduced globally… I absolutely reject the idea of an ostensibly [larger] number of smaller platforms that might have a wider footprint.”

Yes, the Sea Lord said, the UK could invest in what’s called a high-low mix, buying many cheap ships suited to “constabulary” operations off Somalia and a few expensive ships in case of major war. “The danger with that is when you are needed to perform a high end — and therefore a strategically valuable — task alongside a partner, you find that your low-end capability doesn’t get through the gate,” Zambellas said. “You lose out on the flexibility and authority associated with credible platforms.”
Breaking Defense report 

However, these ships are coming. If it was about starting a programme out of the blue to purchase "constabulary" small vessels in addition to frigates, the First Sea Lord would have every reason to be worried, and hold back on such a project, as a budgetary battle would undoubtedly follow, with the Treasury questioning expenditure on high end warships, with negative effects.
But there three OPVs by now are on the way, and the Rivers are already in service. To preserve shipbuilding in general, the Batch 2 is being built, and once they arrive, they must be used to best effect. I understand the worries of the First Sea Lord, but at the same time i must underline that in recent times the "all high end" policy of the navy just isn't working. There are too few high end platforms to respond to any unforeseen event. When an operation starts somewhere, or even just when the navy fields its most important asset, the Response Force Task Group for the yearly training deployment, the high end warships simply aren't there, because they are all tied down into standing tasks duties. Either some standing tasks are removed, or the navy needs more hulls.
Libya in 2011 was an example: it took ships that were coming back home to be decommissioned and a temporary gapping of the presence in the South Atlantic to put ships in the area of operation. This, to me, does not look like a good result. 
The Cougar deployments and Joint Warrior exercises should be the Navy's apex in peacetime, and should see the presence of all relevant capabilities, and of as many high end warships as possible so that said vessels and crews can be tested and prepared for the operations that actually require their capability. Instead, this is not possible. Cougar 14 represents rock bottom, with no british escorts to be seen. Cougar 13 managed to snag some frigate support by exploiting the fact that Type 23 in the Gulf needed replacement, and so one frigate sailed with the task group while heading there. 
Type 45s haven't yet been able to attend a single Cougar deployment. 

These three OPVs, built not for a real requirement but for helping industry, do represent a huge potential help for the fleet. They might be simple and uninpressive "cheap" (not really, as we saw) vessels, but if assigned to the right areas and constabulary tasks, they could allow some more high end warships to serve as warships and actually prepare for the high end, complex ops they were built for. They have a potential that goes far, far beyond their size and their own weapon fit. Even without a hangar (the limitation, by the way, that i find most displeasing, although it was known all along) and with just a 30mm, they can increase british presence in some areas where the full might of a frigate or destroyer isn't necessary, thus enabling these to deploy elsewhere, on more challenging tasks.

In conclusion, while giving work to the yards is the right thing to do, i urge the government of the day, whatever it wll be, and the Royal Navy and industry, to take a very, very careful look at things. A long term plan is needed. Funding is needed. And industry must get better at what it does. I'm a huge supporter of british shipbuilding, but i am not a supporter of wasting money. It isn't even my money, but i'm still against it all the same. The pricetag of these vessels is a shame, period. I do assume that the pricetag includes plenty of expenditure non related to the OPVs itself. I'm assuming it is money needed to get out of the TOBA agreement, but i sincerely hope we will be explained why and how this cost figure came together. It is a lot of money for these particular three ships. 
If there are good reasons, and this is a fundation for a better, stabler shipbuilding in the future, it will still be money well spent. Otherwise, frankly, if it turns out that british shipbuilding doubles the cost of even the simplest of OPVs, perhaps it is indeed time it dies, so the navy can be equipped at half the price, and what is saved can be invested to create jobs in other industry sectors where the same hundreds of millions are likely to put into employment a higher number of people. I will sound like a bastard, but it must be said. It is a simplification of the concept, but the general idea is that shipbuilding capability is precious and is worth overpaying for, but only to a point. When it becomes damaging for the Navy that can afford less vessels, and for jobs which require too much money to stay around, and in ever decreasing number no less, it is time to stay stop. 



Air Assault Task Force in ARMY 2020

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16 Air Assault brigade has been losing several pieces over the past months, and some others will be formally lost by year's end, completing an impressive exodus of units from the brigade, which is restructuring on a smaller ORBAT laser focused on the high readiness intervention role. Some press reports have denounced the big reductions, but they did not make a real good job of detailing how the brigade is actually restructuring. To be fair, as always, the MOD and the Army aren't really helpful in keeping the public informed in a timely and complete way. Information, as often happens in these cases, has to be pieced together from separate mentions in different publications.



16 Air Assault brigade has been losing:

- 5 SCOTS battalion, disbanded with the exception of the sole Balaclava Company, on public duty in Edinburgh from July 2014
- 9 Regiment Army Air Corps, left the brigade in December 2013 to prepare for the merge with 1st Regiment AAC and the transfer to Yeovilton to become Aviation Reconnaissance Force with the new Wildcat helicopter.
- 1st and 2nd battalion Royal Irish, to formally leave the brigade by the end of the year to assume their role in the Adaptable Force
- Household Cavalry Regiment, and in particular D Sqn, have lost their affiliation to the brigade as the regiment focuses on the pure Armoured Cavalry role

The reduction in the number of infantry battalions is connected to the return to contingency: 16 Air Assault brigade is meant to be removed from the normal deployment cycle and to be instead used to constantly provide the Air Assault Task Force at high readiness for independent action and/or for Air Manoeuvre support to ground brigades withing larger operations.
As a consequence of the reduction in the number of infantry battalions, cuts have been imposed on the support elements within the brigade:

- 7 Royal Horse Artillery has lost V Bty (disbanded) and H (Ramsay's Troop) Bty (transferred to 1st Royal Horse Artillery and transformed into a Precision Fires Battery with M270B1 GMLRS). The artillery regiment has restructured on two gun batteries completed with air control teams and Fire Support Teams, plus HQ Battery:



i Parachute Bty (Bull’s Tp) HQ Bty
F(Sphinx) Bty
G (Mercer’s Troop) Bty


- 13 Air Assault Support Regiment Royal Logistic Corps has grown from around 500 to 650 men, but in large part due to taking under command 47 Air Despatch Squadron in Brize Norton.
The regiment lost one Air Assault Squadron (15 Sqn, disbanded) but took command of 65 Sqn. The final structure is:



24 HQ Sqn
63 Air Assault Sqn   [supported 2 PARA in high readiness up to May 2014]
82 Air Assault Sqn   [took up readiness role alongside 3 PARA in May 2014]
47 Air Despatch Sqn (Brize Norton)
65 Air Assault Support Sqn 

63 and 82 Air Assault squadrons rotate together with the two regular PARA battalions to form the High Readiness battlegroup. 

- 23 Air Assault Regiment Royal Engineers lost its HQ squadron (12 (Nova Scotia) Sqn), and concentrated command and command support elements directly into the two remaining deployable squadrons, which rotate into readiness for one year at a time. 


9 Parachute Squadron
51 Parachute Squadron
299 Parachute Squadron (Reserve) [initially thought to pass under command of 21 Regiment Royal Engineers while continuing to support the PARA, it should now stay under direct command of 23 Regt] 

Indicatively, a squadron of some 135 men, plus reserves and attachments, is rotated constantly into readiness as part of the Air Assault Task Force. 

- 156 Provost Company Royal Military Police is being restructured as part of the wider reorganization of the military police. As explained in an earlier article, the company will remain as part of 16 Air Assault brigade but will be taken into 4 Regiment RMP. Once organized on two platoons, with No 2 parachute trained, it is now formed into three platoons which alternate in training, policing and high readiness PARA role. The platoon is some 28 strong. 

- 16 Close Support Medical Regiment is formed by two Air Manoeuvre Medical Squadrons, each providing a ROLE 2 Medical Surgical Group. Each Squadron has around 60 men, and a Surgical Group indicatively provides a 4-table resuscitation facility, a 2-table field surgical team, a 2-bed intensive care ward and 2 high dependency beds plus supporting elements and personnel (X Ray and CT scanners etcetera). Air and truck mobile, these surgical groups are also employed in support to Special Forces. 

An Air Assault Medical Support Squadron with around 90 men provides

Quartermaster's dept, Motor Transport, REME Light Aid Detachment, communications troop, Chefs and catering, the AGC(SPS) RAO det (clerks), the Regimental Training Wing and the administration of Regimental Headquarters.

The regiment also has 144 Parachute Squadron (Reserve) in support. 

19 Air Manoeuvre Medical Squadron
23 Air Manoeuvre Medical Squadron
181 Air Assault Medical Support Squadron 
144 Parachute Medical Squadron (Reserve)  

19 and 23 Squadrons, with the support of 181 and 144, rotate into readiness to supply the Air Manoeuvre Medical Group within the Air Assault Task Force. 

- 216 (Parachute) Squadron Royal Signals with an Army 2020 establishment of 166 All Ranks, the squadron has reorganized on 3 Troops during 2013, reforming the previously cadreised CharlieTroop. 216 is the only Brigade Signal Squadron left after the Army 2020 restructuring which centralized all other signal squadrons into regiments. It is also the only signal squadron left in the army with a direct Life Support role for the brigade HQ.

Alpha and Bravo troops supply communications and set up the HQs and provide them life support. Charlie Troop provides Out Dets and Rebroadcasting Detachments, mobile thanks to parachutable quad-bikes and other light vehicles. The Squadron deploys Tactical Network Gateways which enable Bowman to SICF (France's own system) communications and deliver Share Point, Chat, Email and share situational awareness via Bowman's ComBAT application. 

Alpha and Bravo, with Charlie elements plus supports (Motor Transport, REME LAD detachment etcetera) alternate into high readiness within the Air Assault Task Force, some 75 men at a time. 


Alpha Troop
Bravo Troop
A and B Troops alternate in the Ops and Mission Specific Training (MST) roles.
Charlie Troop – Reformed in 2013
Delivers Out Dets and Rebroadcasting Dets
Support Troop
MT/LAD Troop 

- Joint Helicopter Force (Contingency) is the main aviation element in the Air Assault Task Force, and basically is one of the two Attack Helicopter Regiments. 
3rd AAC and 4th AAC regiments rotate into readiness one year at a time. The regimental HQ provides a field-deployable tactical aviation command, while one Apache squadron delivers the firepower.

Each of the two AAC regiments is reorganizing on two deployable Apache squadrons (down from 3), one of which will be at readiness in connection with the AATF, and the other with the Royal Navy's Response Force Task Group, to support the amphibious battlegroup of the Royal Marines Commando.  

654 Squadron AAC has disbanded in July, leaving 4th Regiment with the sole 656 and 664 Squadrons. 
3rd Regiment is covering the last Afghan deployment while beginning to restructure for Army 2020: next year it will be down to 2 deployable squadrons itself. However, the third squadron will not be disbanded, but instead re-roled to Operational Training Squadron, delivering Conversion To Role training and support to exercises. 

Apache FARP operations simulation

Waiting to see the exact impact in terms of manpower and, in the future, the impact in terms of Apache numbers, since there's a Capability Sustainment Programme incoming and normally this is funded reducing numbers (from 66 to 50 pretty much for sure, hopefully not further down), note that in terms of deployable squadrons this is a reduction of only one, since, effectively, one squadron has been tied down with CTR training already for years. 

Apache Conversion To Role training to achieve Limited Combat Ready status for the crews is a complex and lenghty business. Conversion To Type training lasts some 6 months in Middle Wallop, with simulators and flights with 673 Sqn, but CTR lasts 7,5 months and includes a series of demanding exercises which have always required the selection of a "framework" squadron supplying the machines and tools for the activities. 
In late 2009 a review of training methods decided to permanently attach the Air Manoeuvre Training and Advisory Team (AMTAT) to 656 Squadron and remove it from the deployable rotation to use it for training. 

The CTR phase includes patrol drills, a period of theatre specific tactics training, an Electronic Warfare phase called Lightning Force, flown at RAF Spadeadam, and the final 8-weeks test, in the US ranges, under the banner of exercise Crimson Eagle. 
Lightning Force comprises a minimum of 3 sorties on the electronic range of Spadeadam: on the first sortie, crews are faced by the MALINA IR missile simulator, which gives them a taste of war by "exciting" the Apache's IR defensive system and giving them smoke plumes simulating a SAM launch, so that evasion manoeuvres can be trialed. 
The second sortie exposes the crews to radar threats, and the third is a complex scenario including both. 
Crimson Eagle is the final big test, which sees the squadron basing in austere field conditions normally on Gila Bend Auxiliary Field, an USAF emergency landing strip for aircraft using the nearby massive Barry M. Goldwater range, Arizona. This hot area of desert sees the Apache put to the test for weeks of complex, all out training. 
It is obvious that the CTR phase requires very substantial resources to be available, so an Operational Training Squadron focusing on this part of the job makes sense. 
656 Sqn has been in the role since 2009, and it also took up the role of shipboard operations authority for the Apache, as well as the role for providing a handful of helicopters at readiness for contingency operations while the rest of the Apache community tackled the enduring committment to Afghanistan. This is why 656 deployed with 4 and later 5 Apache helicopters on HMS Ocean in 2011 for operations over Libya. 

653 Squadron, from 3rd Regiment AAC, will take up the role of Operational Training Squadron during 2015. 
Other changes in the Apache Force include the decentralization of REME and Aircraft resources. In recent times, again to sustain the strain of constant operations in Afghanistan, the Apache force, like the Chinook and Lynx forces, had ended up pooling the helicopters and giving up the squadron's own REME sections to form centralized pools of resources from which the various squadrons would draw to cover the needs of the day. 

Over 2015, however, the Apache squadrons will take back ownership of their own Apache helicopters, and will reform their own Close Support Sections REME as the force transitions to the new cycle of readiness of Army 2020. 
A Close Support Section will have over 30 REME technicians plus some RLC personnel from 132 Aviation Support Sqn RLC, and other supporting personnel, including from the RAF and/or from the Navy, typically from the Fleet Air Arm's 1710 Squadron (earlier known as Mobile Aircraft Support Unit, MASU) which is specialized in helicopter combat damage repair, modification and forensic support for all three services.
7 Battalion REME supplies a further 10 men, forming a Forward Repair Group with specialist in 2nd Line Equipment Support and Maintenance (more details later). 
The Close Support Section REME deploys with a number of trucks carrying a Deployable Spares Package for the squadron, plus one truck carrying tooling and another with an "office" module with secure, ruggedised computers containing all aircraft's manuals and technical documentations.  

3rd Regiment AAC
662 Sqn
663 Sqn

4th Regiment AAC
656 Sqn
664 Sqn 

Training 
673 Sqn (Middle Wallop) CTT training
653 Sqn (Wattisham) Operational Training Squadron (CTR) 

More details and information on the Apache regiments and on the whole of the Army Air Corps is available in this earlier article.

 - Other aviation support will come from the RAF's Support Helicopter Force, comprising Puma HC2 and Chinook squadrons. The Support Helicopter Force can also express its own field deployable tactical HQ when needed. The force comprises 33 and 230 Sqns with the Puma HC2 with a forward fleet of 22 helicopters, and the squadrons 7, 18 and 27 with the Chinook. 

The Chinook squadrons are organized on three flights each (A, B, C) wiht C Flight, 18 Sqn being the Operational Conversion Flight doing the crew training for the type. However, with the fleet expanding as the 14 new HC6 helicopters enter service, there is an ambition to stand up a fourth squadron in RAF Benson, and move the training there. Benson already has the simulators and classrooms, and with the Merlin HC3 to progressively leave for Yeovilton to serve in the Navy, Benson has free infrastructure that in Odiham simply isn't available to properly support the HC6 arrival. 
Unconfirmed reports suggest Chinooks will move into Benson in mid 2015 and over 2016. One of the two Merlin HC3 squadrons (78, already disbanded and 28 expected to disband next year), which are disbanding, might resurrect as a Chinook unit. 




Even at the peak of activity in Afghanistan (11 helicopters constantly in theatre), 1 Chinook was always maintained on very high readiness for emergency tasking within the UK, while 4 more are ready to deploy at 2 days notice to move. With the end of the Afghan marathon, the readiness cycle can expect to be restructured to better align with 16 Air Assault Brigade and 3rd Commando brigades' own cycles. 

When the HC6 are all active, the RAF will have around 60 operational Chinooks and 86 crews. Good thing, because the Chinook is always high in demand, and at least 20 Chinook loads equivalents are needed to move even a single airmobile battalion.

Maintenance, differently from what happens with the Apache, seems set to remain centralized in what is known as Expeditionary Chinook Engineering Squadron (ExCES). This formation, some 300 strong and formed into 3 Maintenance Flights of 70 men, has been obtained by merging together the maintenance sections of the frontline squadrons. 

The Army Air Corps Aviation Reconnaissance Force, made up by 1st and 5th Regiments, will provide Wildcat helicopters and Defender fixed-wing aircraft task lines. One Defender task-line is kept at readiness to deploy around the world where necessary, and these aircraft are also used extensively in support to training. 

The 1st Regiment, once the merge of 1st and 9th regts is completed (by October 2015, barring delays) and the Wildcat operational (IOC declared in August 2014 but work up still ongoing), is supposed to have four deployable squadrons, plus one training squadron. Closely connected to the regiment there will also be the Royal Marines's own Wildcat AH1 squadron, 847 NAS. 

1st Regiment is expected to maintain all of the squadrons of the current 1st and 9th regiments. If there aren't changes to the plan, the result would so be: 

652 Sqn - the first AAC unit to field Wildcat, will be the training squadron 

661 Sqn
659 Sqn
669 Sqn
672 Sqn  

The Wildcat might also be used by 671 Sqn in Middle Wallop depending on how training will be organized. 671 currently delivers Conversion To Type training for the Lynx, Bell 212 and Gazelle. The Wildcat replaces the Lynx AH7 next year (the Lynx AH9A will stay in service at least out to 2018), but it is not clear if 652 will deliver all the training in Yeovilton or if there will be an enduring separation, with 652 deliver Operational training (Conversion To Role) and 671 delivering Conversion To Type. This is not yet know, at least not outside the Army's circles. 

Reserve groundcrew of 6 Regiment AAC training with 652 Sqn's Wildcat

The squadrons, including 847 NAS, will draw their helicopters from a central pool comprising all of the 34 Army Wildcat AH1 machines. 
Maintenance Resources will also be centralized in the Regiments's Manoeuvre Support Squadron, comprising a Forward (deployable) line of maintenance and support teams, and an Echelon line for 2nd line equipment support. 
847 NAS will have its own team of technicians embedded into the Manoeuvre Support Squadron, but being navy qualified and trained specifically for shipboard operations, will remain connected to 847 for deployments. All other personnel will be more loosely assigned to deploying squadrons as necessary. 

This builds on the experience made with the Lynx AH9A in support of Afghanistan needs. In the last few years, the squadrons have been flying the legacy Lynx AH7 when outside of the Afghanistan deployment cycle. Only the AH9A, with its more powerful engines and upgrades, has been used by Afghan-deployed squadrons. 
Squadrons have been moving onto the AH9A for pre-deployment training and for deployment, and they have then passed the 9A to the following squadrons, going back to the AH7s. The helicopters have all been pooled together, and so have maintenance resources. 

In particular, the 22 AH9A have been shared in two separate pools, actually. 12 machines have been assigned to the "green" squadrons (including 847 NAS) (4-5 deployed in Afghanistan; 4 in the UK for pre-deployment training with the remaining three undergoing maintenance at any one time), while the remaining ten helicopters have been assigned to use by "another unit", which is widely expected to be the secretive 657 Sqn, Joint Special Forces Support Wing, RAF Odiham.  
One AH9A of 657 Sqn has been lost to a tragic crash in Afghanistan earlier this year, with the loss of five lives

The Lynx AH9A is expected to continue serving at least out to 2018 with 657 Sqn as the other units convert completely to the Wildcat, with the Lynx AH7 withdrawn from service already next year. 
In 2011, the Wildcat contract was about to be modified to include four additional and four re-purposed helicopters, to generate a small fleet of 8 "Light Assault Helicopters" believed to have been meant to re-equip 657 Sqn. The contract modification was announced by ministers and costed by the NAO, but it soon vanished from the radars and has never been mentioned again, with the 4 additional helicopters removed as quickly as they were added (the MOD, in all recent Wildcat articles, always talks of 62 machines, not of 66). 

Speculation abunds on why this happened, but solid information is next to non existant. Reportedly, the director Special Forces did not appreciate what the Wildcat LAH had to offer. However, as a consequence of the Wildcat rejection, the requirement for between 8 and 10 helicopters for 657 Sqn for special forces support, which has been mentioned already when the SDSR 2010 was in the works, remains without a clear long term solution. The Lynx AH9A, which employs the same engines of the Wildcat, could be further extended to 2022, it has been suggested, but some kind of solution for an actual replacement will have to be found, or 657 Sqn might just vanish and get nothing, with the well known budgetary climate the forces have to contend with.

   
- 7 Battalion REME delivers specialist second line equipment support to the Army's aviation, including UAVs. The battalion also controls the 132 Squadron Royal Logistic Corps, which delivers aviation logistics. Finally, the battalion includes the 8 Field Company, 16 Air Assault's very own REME unit. 

The battalion has three Aviation Companies in Wattisham, but one of them (73 Avn Coy) is due to transfer to Yeovilton to directly support 1st Regiment AAC and its Wildcats. The move was to be already ongoing, but it has been slowed down with a new target of autumn 2015. 
71 and 72 Avn companies will alternate yearly into readiness alongside the Apache regiments, being kept at R2 (5 days notice to move). Each company has two platoons, and each platoon will be responsible for 6 months of readiness, during which it will have to generate two Forward Repair Groups of 10 specialists each. This means one FRG for each of the Apache squadron's Close Support Sections REME in the at-readiness regiment. 

8 Field Company had an establishment of some 150 men in 2012. Based in Colchester with 16 Air Assault brigade, it will re-ORBAT to support the cycle of readiness, probably by mixing its Forward and Support Platoons together and splitting the Airborne Forward Repair Team (the first technicians to parachute into an area of operations to support Drop Zone activities and early brigade movements) to form a couple of identical, full-spectrum platoons to rotate into readiness alongsides the other pieces of the puzzle. 

132 Aviation Supply Squadron RLC will also probably reorganize to fit into the readiness cycle. 


- Other aviation supports the deployment of attack and battlefield support helicopters will be supported by Signallers from 244 Signal Squadron, part of 30 Regiment Royal Signal. 244 will provide tactical communications at the landing zones and resupply points. 
Before Army 2020, 244 Sqn was part of 21 Signal Regiment, which was tasked as a whole with aviation support. Army 2020 converted 21 Regiment to a Multi Role Signal Regiment for the manoeuvre brigades, and concentrated the aviation support role into the sole 244 Sqn, transferring it to 30 Signal Regiment. 




Battlefield helicopters are refueled in the field by the RAF Tactical Supply Wing based at RAF Stafford. The Wing has up to 58 teams each equipped with a 15.000 liters Oshkosh Tactical Aircraft Refueler and one 20.000 Close Support Tanker. 


Finally, the Joint Helicopter Support Squadron, based at RAF Odiham, provides specialists in under slung cargo transport and landing site management. The unit was obtained merging the RAF Mobile Air Operations Teams with the Joint Helicopter Support Unit RLC. The MAOTS used to be 13, and included a RAF officer, a master aircrew, an SNCO and 2 signallers from 21 Regiment Air Support.


Reserve support on the ground for helicopter operations arrives from 6 Regiment Army Air Corps and from 606 (Chiltern) Squadron Royal Auxiliary Air Force, based at RAF Benson. 6 Regiment AAC has been expanded considerably under Army 2020 and now includes the squadrons 675 (The Rifles) based around Yeovilton and twinned with the regular Wildcat squadrons; 677 (Suffolk and Norfolk Yeomanry) paired with 3 Regiment AAC; 678 (The Rifles) paired with 4 Regiment AAC and 679 (The duke of Connaught's) Sqn paired with the Army Aviation Centre at Middle Wallop.

- Surveillance and Target Acquisition. 16 Air Assault Brigade has lost the cavalry squadron it used to have, but has been given a STA battery from 5 Regiment Royal Artillery in exchange. 53 (Louisburg) Battery has taken up the Air Assault title and has been given the maroon beret of the PARAs with a ceremony on 20 June 2014. It would be of immense interest to learn about the battery's structure and equipment and methods, but unfortunately, so far at least, no information has been released. Almost certainly, the battery will be able to employ the man portable Lightweight Counter Mortar Radar (LCMR) and probably the HALO acousic artillery locating system as well, but there is probably more of a reconnaissance role to them to compensante for the loss of D Sqn, Household Cavalry. 
- UAVs.21 (Gibraltar 1779 – 83) Air Assault Bty, 47 Regiment RA has been wearing the maroon beret for years, serving first as the brigade's own Air Defence unit, equipped with Starstreak, and then as a mini-UAV formation, employing mainly Desert Hawk III, but possibly including a Watchkeeper flight (exact battery structure unknown as of now). They remain part of the brigade in this second, more recent role. 

- Air Defence. The role which was of 21 Bty has now been assumed by 12 (Minden) Air Assault Battery, 12 Regiment RA. The battery has two missile Troops with Starstreak, which presumably alternate into high readiness. The battery employs the Lightweight triple launcher and Pinzgauer 6x6 vehicles for mobility and transport of the launcher and of reloads. The Pinzgauer 4x4 can be para-dropped on the Medium Stressed Platform alongside a trailer; it is possible that the 6x6 is parachutable as well, and anyway the Army is hoping to procure a more capable replacement platform for use on the A400, which shall be able to support a Jackal, so with a capacity of 7.5 to 10 tons. 

 
In this photo by Plain Military, the ADAD sensor can be seen in foreground, and a LML triple launcher in the background

One Pinzgauer 718 6x6 can carry 4 men, one ADAD search sensor, one LML launcher and 10 reloads. 

 
Pinzgauer 4x4 and trailer on a Medium Stressed Platform for air dropping

- Electronic Warfare. 14 Signal Regiment (EW) supplies PARA-trained Light Electronic Warfare Teams (LEWTs). 

- EOD support. Under Army 2020, early entry EOD capability is ensured by 821 Squadron, 33 Regiment EOD. The squadron has two PARA trained composite teams of Royal Engineers, RLC and military working dog specialists. Another two teams have Commando training to support the amphibious task group.  


- PATHFINDER Platoon. The secretive elitè scouts of the brigade remain as an important part of the unit. Little detail is available about their exact number and organisation, and even their equipment is non standard, seen using Diemaco C8 rifles, PARACLETE armour and other kit. 
In June 2013 the unit reportedly had 3 officers and 48 ORs organised on an HQ, a Communications and Information Systems section and six recce teams of 6 men each.

Finally, of course, the Air Assault Task Force is formed around one battalion of paratroopers. Under Army 2020, the PARA battalions have an enhanced establishment of 660 men, all-ranks, all-trades. 
2 and 3 PARA battalions, supported by 4 PARA (Reserve), alternate yearly into high readiness, to serve as the Air Manoeuvre Battlegroup (AMBG), the fighting core of the AATF. 

The two PARA battalions have been particularly busy during 2013 to adopt the new Army 2020 structures and to reform companies which had been cadreized for lack of manpower and Afghan-related ORBATing since 2012. 
Both battalions re-developed their D Companies as organic ISTAR formations and reformed missing companies during 2013: 2 PARA had been without A Coy since 2012, while 3 PARA had cadreized its C Coy as well as the Guards platoon, which is formed by parachute trained soldiers coming from the Guards regiment. 
All of those missing pieces were re-instated during 2013. The (Guards) title and role has gone to 6 Platoon, B Company, 3 PARA battalion. 

An amazing photo of 3 PARA at the end of training in Kenya last year
 
The PARA battalions have not lost any platoon, differently from Light Role infantry battalions as seen in earlier articles. The PARAs are also expected to continue to employ the light 60 mm mortar at platoon level. 
Only one Company in the battalion is normally trained up for parachute entry, with the remaining companies meant for helicopter air manoeuvre and/or for air landing. Rapid Air Landing and Follow On Air Landing (RAL and FAL) are operations which see cargo aircraft landing tactically directly inside an airfield or on Minimum Operating Strips (MOS), stretches of clear ground assed by recce teams inserted earlier and validated for the purpose. A C-130 MOS for training purpose is 1400 meters long and 18 meters wide (plus there has to be nothing in the way of the aircraft's wingspan, of course!), but during operations greater risks will be taken in some circumstances, and less space will be used. 
The incoming A400 Atlas, which the PARAs are anxiously waiting for, is able to land on 830 meters strips of soft ground with a 27 tons payload. Tactical Air Landing loads could include a Scimitar plus WMIK with trailer and 60 PARAs, which would quickly disgorge out of the aircraft and form a perimeter while the cargo itself would turn around and take off as quickly as possible. 

Both battalions line three Rifle companies, one ISTAR company, a Support Company and an HQ Company: 


A Coy


B Coy

C Coy

-          

D Coy - ISTAR

-          Patrols Platoon

-          Sniper Platoon

-          Signals Platoon


Support Coy

-          Mortar Platoon – use Pinzgauers for mobility

-          AT Platoon – Javelin, HMG, GMG they are re-equiping with Jackal 1 for mobility replacing RWMIK

-          Machine Gun Platoon – GPMG, HMG, probably to use Jackal as well 


HQ Coy

-          MT Transport and REME LAD 

-          Regimental Aid Post RAP

-          Catering Dep

-          Quartermaster

-          RAO det

Remember that 2 PARA's C Company is (Bruneval) Coy; it is very important for the Regiment to remember that.


- Reserves support. The AATF is reinforced by one Platoon of reservists from 4 PARA battalion and one Section of reserve engineers from 299 Sqn. The reservists sign an agreement with their employers so they can be quickly released for an operation popping up while they are at High Readiness. 
A wider role for formed reserve sub-units is still being formulated. 

The resulting standard Air Assault Task Force numbers some 1698 men all ranks, all trades. It comprises an Air Manoeuvre Battle Group at its core, supported by a Joint Helicopter Force including at least one Apache squadron plus Chinook, Wildcat and Puma; an Air Manoeuvre Medical Group formed on a squadron from 16 Medical Regiment plus reserves from 144 Sqn, plus an artillery group formed around a battery from 7 RHA, an air defence Troop from 12 Regiment RA, an engineer squadron reinforced by a section of reservists and an EOD team, pathfinders, a STA Battery, a UAV battery, a LEWT and other elements as needed.    
It is a capable, full spectrum battlegroup, if not very large in numbers. It makes good use of the limited resources available, and represent a potent, highly mobile mix available at 5 days notice to move. 

The one most immediate "problem" that can be seen is the loss of an armoured cavalry squadron. The Scimitar of D Sqn HCR was an excellent tool, even with all its limits in sensors, weaponry and protection. It added an armoured punch with an incredible strategic and tactical mobility. 

A Scimitar and WIMIK roll out of an A400 during a Tactical Air Landing trial. In a moment, the 60 soldiers will run out as well.
 
If it was possible to find the money and manpower for it, resurrecting the glorious, if quite short-lived, 6th Airborne Armoured Reconnaissance name for a squadron of CVR(T) vehicles for the AATF, would be a major improvement, adding interesting options for a range of special and semi-special operations which require something more than a Jackal but that aren't quite suited for something as big and heavy as a FRES Scout.




Not part of 16 Air Assault Brigade, but worth mentioning as a part of the Parachute Regiment, 1 PARA, UK Special Forces Support Group continues to serve as a ranger unit in support of Special Forces operations. 
Manned by PARA and Royal Marines, the battalion has four Strike Companies (A, B, C, F coy), one HQ Company (D Coy); a fire support company with sniper platoon and with four Heavy Weapons Fire Support Groups, one for each Strike Coy. 
Support Company comprises the Mortar Platoon, a Joint Fires Cell capable to direct artillery and air attacks, and a Signals Platoon. 



Experimenting to shape the future?

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Interesting news from the Royal Navy today: for the first time ever, a River OPV of the Fishery Protection Squadron is about to sail across the Atlantic to take up the Caribbean standing task role from the Type 23 frigate HMS Argyll.
HMS Severn is preparing to sail from Portsmouth later this autumn to make the long transit to the North Atlantic station, Navy News reports. It came as a total surprise when i read of it, and while it smells of overstretch from far, far away, it also comes with a seed of opportunity for the future in itself, because the optimistic way to read this news is that the Navy might very much be starting to warm up seriously to the idea of making wider use of OPVs in constabulary tasks. With three new OPVs being built, and a decision to be made next year on whether it is worth (and possible) to keep them in addition to the current Rivers or not, this deployment takes on a whole new level of meaning.
As my regular readers know, i'm a big fan of the idea of keeping the River batch 2s in addition to the current ones, to help plug the gaps. Indeed, i'm quite a believer in the two-tier fleet, to a degree, as i think it is the only realistic option to keep filling standing tasks while having a true capability to respond to a crisis popping up, which is what the Navy is there for.
My earlier discussion on the River Batch 2 and its possible uses ishere. I'll warn you, it is long. But i think it is genuinely worth reading, if you have an interest in this matter. 

Navy News photo of HMS Severn and HMS Tyne training together


Before anyone says it in the comments, yes, i am very much aware that, in the worst case, the Royal Navy will have to replace the current Rivers and eventually try to cover both Fishery Protection in home waters and some standing tasks abroad with the same 3 batch 2 hulls. It is a possibility, and in a way the most disappointing one, as, like a too short blanked, it can be pulled to cover the feet or the face, but not both at once, and would effectively be a cut to Home Waters coverage, pure and simple. 

It is worth noticing, about this very considerations, that barely months ago the government published its National Strategy for Maritime Security document which repeatedly quotes a joint RUSI/DSTL study (Future Coastal and Offshore Maritime Enforcement, Surveillance and Interdiction Study, RUSI & DSTL, 26 July 2013) which evidenced that the law enforcement in UK waters is already being done with fewer assets than elsewhere, and that no further reduction should take place. Release dated May 2014.
Now the same assets are being asked to cross the Atlantic as well, and it is clear that, when one of three ships is on the other side of the ocean, capability in home waters is reduced.
The Strategy also notes that the relevance of shipping is growing steadily, and implies that, as the demand for security increases, capability will have to be reviewed in light of the greater task. No, of course they won't say it has to catch up, that would be a too clear call for action.  But the meaning is, in the end, the same.

It is government policy.

So it basically has little actual value, yes, since they will of course do the opposite of what they say, as always.
But still, one has to try and hope that the SDSR 2015 will have some room for common sense.


In the meanwhile, fair winds and following seas to ship and crew for this unusually long deployment!

Type 26 and credibility - update

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Type 26, cost, delays, shipbuilding


There was a nasty stink in the air, with the River Batch 2 contract being ridiculously expensive and inclusive of a not better specified "suspension" of the TOBA agreements; with ministerial statements in the last while going in the wrong directions, and finally with the First Sea Lord being more than evasive on the subject. I had warned it was on the way, and as inexorable as taxes and death, here it comes: the Type 26 programme is struggling with costs and the Main Gate approval won't be within the planned timeline, but months late. Possibly, late enough that, in the meanwhile, the elections on May 7 and the 2015 SDSR could step in with full force and mess up the programme even worse, and slow it down further. 

It is frankly depressing to see that there isn't the confidence of being able to deliver these ships on acceptable cost figures, because, it is worth remembering, the Type 26 is a triumph of "design to cost" approach. In the sense that innovation in the design will be very, very limited, and there is planned to be a recycling strategy of second-hand equipment like i've never before seen in a warship programme.
Type 26 is going to be built as little more than a hull with engines, to inherit straight from retiring Type 23s:

- The CAMM / Sea Ceptor missile system whole;
- The Artisan 3D
- The navigation radars, if the 2016 installation for the fleet-wide replacement is confirmed.
- The light gun turrets
- The torpedo system
- Countermeasures, since it seems that to contain cost they are still going for the old school fixed tubes (a huge disappointment, as pretty much everyone is moving on to adjustable, trainable decoy launchers, more flexible and capable)
- The sonars. Surely the towed one, and according to some sources even the bow one.
- Possibly more other internal systems, from waste treatment to WEDCIS.

- Possibly the Communications Electronic Support Measures due to be added on the Type 23

I don't remember a single warship in the world being built as a new hull for such a high quantity of re-used stuff. The combat equipment's only new parts will be the main gun and, if they are indeed fitted, something which isn't even certain yet, the Strike VLS. There's also a huge, huge question mark over whether there will be an anti-ship missile on board, and what it might be. The Phalanx i'm not even counting since it smells of Fitted For But Not With from a ligh year of distance.
 

To contain costs further, the project settled for a CODELOG propulsion solution (nothing wrong on this per se, but a little more ambition could have brought to a CODELAG solution giving the ship more sprint when necessary); a medium-class radar (as good as it might be, that's what Artisan is) and a simplified, lower-than-Aster 15 performance SAM (very smart; i love how CAMM works, but again, it is a cheaper and less ambitious system with somewhat reduced performances), and still BAE can't stick to a reasonable cost...? 

Arguably all that could possibly be done to contain the cost in terms of role fit and high end equipment has been done, by pre-adopting everything via the Type 23 Capability Sustainment Programme, derisking the various pieces and literally acquiring them before the ship itself, to move them across later. 

In a further internal effort, the Royal Navy is building up a common computer infrastructure for the combat system of all its vessels, under the SC4S (Surface Combatant Common Core Combat System); it is due to standardize navigation radars on a new, common type (apparently the Kelvin Hughes Sharpeye) fleet-wide and is proceeding with the Future Maritime Radar Electronic Surveillance (FMRES) with the adoption of the the digital radar ESM (RESM) on all surface warships. 
Most, if not all of these systems will not only have been developed and de-risked and adopted by the time the first Type 26 is ready for fitting out, but will have actually already been in service for a while on the Type 23s and will be physically transfered from old to new hull. Since the passage from Type 23 to Type 26 is going to last for more than a decade (2022 to 2036, according to the plans seen so far), the equipment will be upgraded, no doubt, to some degree along the way, but in a quite common way over the two different hulls. No big revolution is expected, other than what could be afforded by the strike VLS and the new main gun. 

Even so, BAE was given a generous 127 million pounds for 4-years of design and development work in the contract signed 25 March 2010. The amount of money and time is fully compatible with the task: indeed, it is about the amount of money it cost to design three FREMM variants (the french one and the two italian versions!), so it is arguably even too generous. 

EDIT: 
The reported unexpected weight growth had apparently prompted BAE to revise the Global Combat Ship webpage to signal a speed reduced by at least two knots, from 28+ to 26+. 
And the MOD, in front of the uncertainties on the costs, has awarded a 19 million (!!!) contract with McKinsey to provide an external audit about Type 26 between October 2014 and March 2015 (thanks to Tim Fisher, Shephard News, for the heads up). 
Taking a pause to evaluate things is probably the right thing to do as the Navy does not need cost escalations later on, but i'm increasinly frustrated by the horrendous amount of money that the MOD spends in external audits, assessments, counter-assessments, and assorted power point slides. I wish someone looked into these expenses very very closely, because i don't think there's another ministry spending so much for these things, in the whole wide world. 
The March 2015 date for the results of the external audit, anyway, looks like a tombstone on any hope to achieve a contract award before the elections. 
End edit

Sincerely, there isn't much left to be attempted to contain the cost of building these warships, other than changing the design and making them smaller and less capable by straight out deleting some parts. Something which is not desirable at all, since the ship really hasn't any evident gold plating that can be done without.  Quite the opposite: as it is now, the design really could do with some touch ups here and there, such as resurrecting the sunk elements of MIDAS (Maritime Integrated Defensive Aids Suite, the project for the modernisation of the Navy's decoys and countermeasures fit) to finally achieve parity with contemporary warship designs not just in terms of decoy rounds (thankfully, the Royal Navy is not lagging on these ones, and is working with France on new payloads such as ACCOLADE), but in terms of their deployment, via a modernized launcher.  
Besides, it must be noted that big changes to what is an almost frozen design at this point are likely to cost quite a lot of money and time.

In front of the unexpected cost issues in a programme which uniquely separates the ship from most of its expensive combat system and high end equipment, it becomes unsurprising to see potential partners basically vanishing away. Australia, which for a short while looked like the most realistic possible partner on the Global Combat Ship, has already packed up and
awarded a study contract for its next generation frigates to Navantia. 

Again, i must ask the painful question of whether, and for how much longer, this destructive game can be continued. If BAE shipyards can't deliver to acceptable, at least somewhat competitive prices when compared to other european yards, something must be done. Is BAE the problem? Bring someone else in at the head of the yards. Deliver a shock to the system. Introduce actual competition. Do something radical. Building hulls abroad might be unpopular and hit shipyard's workforce and even have a political bomb in it due to the awkwardness of the Scotland situation, but not doing it if things don't change is just a way to delay the end by another short while, at the cost of the Navy. 
Something has to change, period. If things continue to go south this way, both the navy and the shipyards will be destroyed, as the navy will get less and less warships year on year due to the high costs, and the yards will become even more unsustainable due to buidling less vessels, in a self-destructive circle in which things only get worse. 
The Type 26 programme has been conceived and structured as a "rebirth" project, in which as much of the risk as possible is removed, in which the rate of innovation is "20% new to 80% old, compared to Type 45 which was the exact opposite", in which there is, at least in the words, a complete focus on affordability and even on exportability. If even this fails, it is likely to be game over, or close to it. The navy has no more hulls to lose, and the shipyard consolidation is going to leave a single building line in a few years time. One. After that, only the zero remains. 

In the coming months, and ideally before the election, the Navy and BAE will have to make it work, in a way or another, because other big-ticket projects are being rushed to contract signature (Project Marshal signed reportedly 12 months early; FRES SV signed with the demonstration phase far from completed, and more expected to follow) and not having a signed piece of paper when the budget axe will be swinging is likely to be a very big issue. 



Credibility


The First Sea Lord in recent months has talked a few times, and he always delivered some quite interesting speeches, even though i feel he did maintain a very vague line when asked about the obvious vulnerabilities and issues on the horizon. I understand he has serious limits to what he can say, but hiding the problems under the carpet is not going to solve them, and one day there will have to be a far more open and honest discussion about what the United Kingdom intends to do going ahead. 

For now, i'm going to focus on the concept of credibility, and its direct application to the Navy's escorts situation. 
In his interview with Vago Muradianat DefenseNews.com, the First Sea Lord reinstated his vision of the navy's credibility, to which he has stuck with admirable coherence ever since he got in charge: 


Q. What are the priorities you want to come out of the upcoming strategic defense and security review for the Navy?
A. The Navy has to be both credible and [have] balance. If you lose either of those qualities, you’re not in the first division and a very large-potted investment doesn’t make sense. The credibility is not judged by some pundit in a newspaper or magazine on warships. It’s judged by those who operate on those ships, and it’s judged by our potential enemies. So the quality of build, the quality of war-fighting equipment, the quality of the output effect from those platforms — subsurface, surface and air — has to be critical and the balanced force to keep part of that. If you have got the enabling elements of the construct as a whole, then you’re going to have a machine that works and gets respected. So my job is very simple: Stay credible and stay balanced, and that’s a very expensive bill for the nation to pay. But for a nation that has that ambition, and if you have ambition, you have to pay for it.


The general concept is hardly questionable. You can only agree with it. But, even being a pundit, and not even a newspaper one, but a blog one, i must ask how the concept translates into reality. The following question goes into Type 26 range, and the answer is the one which caused the FREMM speculation, since admiral Zambellas does not restrict the solution to one delivered by british yards. 


Q. Tell us how you’re maintaining affordability for the Type 26 frigate program?
A. It has to be a credible platform. We’ve set that condition, as the people who operate them, by setting a requirement we think is appropriate for these platforms. When you have a limited number of frigates to deploy worldwide, you have to be certain that you get huge utility out of them. You’ve got to be able to get the range. You have a flexibility. So if, for example, a brand new Type 26 is off the Somali coast doing counterpiracy, a relatively modest policing capability. The next thing is required to move to a hotter, more dangerous environment, you’re not in the position to say, “Oh, hang on; I’ll just change the crew. I’ll reconfigure this or that.”
You’ve got to be there. You’ve got to be able to do the job properly. So our starting point in this requirement is about credible platforms. We then place that requirement into the machine, and the acquisition process looks for a solution with the proper support to be able to give us what we need. The affordability question that comes from that depends on the best that industry can deliver. You’ll notice, I haven’t necessarily said that that’s the British industry, because the decision has not been made as to exactly what that solution to the requirement will be, and we wait to see what comes of it. But the Navy knows what it wants. It wants a credible platform with global reach and the sort of quality, particularly in ASW [anti-submarine warfare], to keep us right up there for the bigger and more important platforms.




I absolutely agree on the fact that Type 26 has got to be credible. And the design that we have seen so far has much good about it, and on paper is more than credible. The evolutionary rather than revolutionary approach is appreciable as well, as it contains risks and, supposedly, costs.
However, closer examination brings questions still searching for answers. On the equipment front, one big question is the Type 26's capability against enemy surface combatants, and its usefulness in influencing events ashore, even many miles inland. In equipment terms: is the strike VLS system going in, this time around, or will it be descoped, as it already happened with the Type 45? And what, if anything, will replace the old Harpoon, which itself hangs in the balance of things between a capability sustainment investment to stretch its life, or a speedy demise in 2018, potentially leaving the Royal Navy completely without a heavy anti-ship missile? 



These are two huge questions which directly affect the credibility of the Type 26. What will the ship actually be able to do to be credible and, moreover, to be useful in a "hotter, more dangerous area"? She can't do air area defence due to the limits of CAMM. Can she confidently engage enemy ships without depending solely by the light Sea Venom (FASGW(H)) missile carried by its embarked helicopter, or is it without an ASM weapon? Can it deliver usefulness against targets inshore by delivering some sort of deep strike? 
The ship is expected to have a 127 mm main gun which will deliver greater effect in Naval Gunfire Support, but we don't know if and when it will have modern guided, long range ammunition to deliver precision effect beyond the very coastal area. Will it have missiles on board to provide effects ashore? Again, no one knows. 

Much of the capability available to the ship will also depend on what helicopter it has on board when it gets the call to action. Merlin HM2 delivers excellent ASW capability, but only four helicopters at a time have an EO/IR turret and a DAS fit enabling them to venture in dangerous skies and survey surface targets. 
To this day, none of the Merlins has the ability to employ Sea Skua, nor is planned to receive the Sea Venom and / or LMM capability. So, a Type 26 embarking a Merlin HM2, without future improvements to the helicopter, would be severely limited in ASuW and in any use of the helicopter ashore, unless the embarked helicopter was, luckily, one of the four fitted with the DAS and EO/IR turret. 
If it had Wildcat, it could be well placed for ASuW (even though i don't think Sea Venom is a replacement for an heavy, hard-hitting ship-mounted ASM missile which is available for launch without depending from the helicopter being available and ready for take off), but the Wildcat is not going to have sonar and sonobuoys, so if the need of the moment was ASW, the ship would not really achieve credibility without doing some changes to what is on board. 

Notably, the Type 26, like the Type 23, is planned to be an ASW hunter first and foremost. That is what is driving the design: the need for an acoustically quiet, long-endurance ASW vessel. 
Even so, only 8 of a planned 13 ships are due to have the 2087 towed sonar which is the most important detection tool. So, if the mission was ASW but the closest frigate was one of the "tail-less" ones, credibility would once more be seriously reduced.
Maximum ASW credibility could only be achieved by a frigate with the 2087 and a Merlin HM2 on board.

Considering all these factors, what is credibility about, at the end of the day? And how can it ever be realistically expected that a ship deployed on a standing task will have all it needs, in equipment and training, to be able to respond to a "hot" crisis popping up, without having to properly prepare? 

Again, i might be a pundit, but to me, here is the problem. I don't consider this a realistic approach, at least not for the Royal Navy that is taking shape, because too many of the capabilities are held by one specific platform alone. There is no Arleigh Burke here.
The complete dualism between Wildcat HMA2 and Merlin HM2 is, to me, foolish, and is an image of the problems in the force structure.
I can see why Wildcat would not have a dipping sonar and sonobuoys, which are expensive, complex, would take up all the space in the cabin and cost a lot in money and human resources to fill a role which, while all-important, is relatively less likely to be exercised out of the blue. A major crisis against an enemy with a credible submarine force, in other words, should only happen with a reasonable warning time, one would expect, and it would anyway require an answer much better thought out than the movement of a lone frigate from a standing task to the frontline. 
Much less acceptable is the fact that even after the HM2 upgrade, Merlin is so limited in anything other than chasing subs, save for the UOR-fitted 4 Merlins used in the Gulf. 

Credibility is achieved by the fleet as a whole construct, more than by a single ship. Being classed a frigate and weighting several thousand tons does not equate to credibility if the actual pieces of the puzzle are missing. 
Especially if the few frigates available are scattered far and wide, forever taken up by standing tasks which often could be covered just as well by lower end ships. 
I don't believe in the credibility of the ship just because it is classed a "frigate" just like i do not believe in the credibility of defence diplomacy only if done by brigadiers, admirals and air marshals (one justification often heard when the huge number of top brass is questioned). I don't think the countries the UK engages with are actually so dumb and primitive to be enchanted by the mere rank on the uniform without looking beyond it to take a look at the actual capability output that the officer represents. 

It is not so much the the lone ship, it is the task force that the Royal Navy could deploy and sustain far from home that gives the Navy its rank and its credibility.

Before Type 26 became the programme it now is, the Royal Navy had been following a different path which had, in my opinion, a lot of merit. While unaffordable in the numbers it had been conceived with, i believe the concept recognized some base truths. 
That concept was one of a two-tiered fleet, supported by a third tier, of patrol-capable MCM and hydrographic vessels. It was about building 10 "C1" high end combat ships, with ASW focus; supported by 8 "C2" ships, capable but oriented to more "general purpose" tasking, and then C3, the multi-mission replacement for current MCM, survey and patrol ships, which kind of survives still under the MHPC name. 

Type 26 is born out of the fusion of C1 and C2 into a single class of 13 hulls, 8 of which fully kitted, and 5 of which missing, basically, the towed sonar. A repeat of the current Type 23 fleet, in other words. 
This approach has a few advantages: it avoids the costs of two separate designs and programmes, and builds on the fact that, the late ships in a series build are always less expensive than the first, giving a bit of a downward slope in costs. Crucially, having a single programme removes the challenges of having a second one approved and funded, and removes the risk of the two programmes entering in direct conflict in the budgetary battle. 
The problem with this approach is that there will only be 8 Type 26 fully equipped, too few to meet the requirement, while the five others (if they ever get built, which is far from a certainty...) will have all the cost and complexity of an ASW high end frigate but an handicapped equipment. They will still require a "large" (Type 26 is actually expected to be very lean manned, but a less ambitious ship could do with less personnel and, critically, with less highly technical rates) crew with the expense that this entail, and their credibility will always be only partial. 
Modern wars, in fact, tend to be "come as you are" situations, and it is quite complex to envisage a scenario which requires the additional ASW hulls but gives you the time to procure, fit and commission the mission sonars and pieces. 

We have to ask ourselves if this is actually helpful. 

The First Sea Lord has substantially said he opposes the idea of building a second tier flottilla. In August this year, while speaking in the US, he said: 

“You aim for high end and you accept the risk your footprint’s reduced globally… I absolutely reject the idea of an ostensibly [larger] number of smaller platforms that might have a wider footprint.”
Yes, the Sea Lord said, the UK could invest in what’s called a high-low mix, buying many cheap ships suited to “constabulary” operations off Somalia and a few expensive ships in case of major war. “The danger with that is when you are needed to perform a high end — and therefore a strategically valuable — task alongside a partner, you find that your low-end capability doesn’t get through the gate,” Zambellas said. “You lose out on the flexibility and authority associated with credible platforms.”

Quote from BreakingDefense.com  article on the conference

It is, again, a concept with merit. But, when looking at the details, many questions pop up. Several questions we have already covered. Another key question is how credible it is to have a navy which has its precious, high end warships spread all over the world on standing tasks which are fundamental to the country but techinically not suited for the high end combat vessels. My opinion is that the credibility of the platform might be good, but the credibility of the navy is badly hurt, because it has to respond to Libya by using ships about to be decommissioned, and because in years it hasn't been able to exercise a proper complete task group for lack of escorts, all busy elsewhere. 
When you can't attach a frigate, an air defence destroyer and the proper logistic ships to your primary war tool, the Response Force Task Group, your credibility sinks. Cougar 14 has been the lowest point in history, in this sense.

I agree that attempting to start a specific programme for a "lower end" frigate is not going to work, in the UK. In France and Italy, where the fleet is already two-tiered, it is relatively straightforward to make separate cases for supporting the modernisation of both tiers. In the UK, where only the High Tier remains, reintroducing a secondary fleet would go entirely to the detriment of the first class ships. A resurrection of C2, in other words, is highly likely to be impossible.

It must also be remembered that a second tier ship would be, of course, limited in the range of tasks it can cover when things get hot. However, a balanced fleet can’t be made of sole high-end warships. If we take a look at the Royal Navy’s daily tasks, there are several which do not require the presence of a Type 45 or a frigate. The Atlantic Patrol Tasking North, in the Caribbean, would be best served with a cheaper OPV, ideally forward based in Bermuda. This would at one stroke remove quite a bit of stress from the rest of the fleet. Operation ATALANTA is another task that does not really require a full sized frigate. Gibraltar could be the base of another OPV / second tier vessel which would deliver much wished for political reassurance, while being available to restore a more visible british presence in the Mediterranean and along the western coast of Africa, an area which has been growing in importance and an area which could get progressively hotter if the piracy in the gulf of Nigeria escalates further.

A number of other presence and defence engagement tasks could be covered by less ambitious warships, if they were available. Relieving the high end warships of some of these tasks would help frigates and destroyers being available for commitments of greater importance. The high end warships should still have a lot to cover, so any pressure removed from their duties is a big gain:

-          Operation Kipion in the Gulf; here, the risk is always high, and arguably the Royal Navy should maintain one Type 45 and one ASW frigate in the area enduringly. To achieve this aim, the Royal Navy is now extending to 9 months the duration of deployment in the area, with a mid-deployment crew rest and ship maintenance “break” in Bahrain.
-          South Atlantic Patrol Tasking; an ASW frigate, with its all-around capability is excellent reassurance. The Royal Navy is extending South Atlantic deployments to 9 months as well, on the same model used in the Gulf.
-          Towed Array Patrol Ship; an ASW frigate with 2087 “tail” kept at readiness in home waters to support the deterrent and the effort against sneaky Russian subs probing the waters around the UK. A task rarely mentioned, but one that should have gotten a lot more important with the (inexcusable) loss of the maritime patrol aircraft
-          Fleet Ready Escort; one warship at high readiness for deployment worldwide
-          Standing NATO RF Maritime Groups; which in the new cold climate with Russia are returning to the fore. The Royal Navy has been unable to do much for the groups since 2012, but now they are again in the top slots in the list.

Finally, the ever important task of being actually available for what is the Navy’s true answer to a crisis, the Response Force Task Group. The Credibility of the Navy is best served by being able to deploy and train a coherent task force including at least one destroyer for air area defence and at least one ASW frigate for anti-surface, anti-submarine defence and for naval gunfire support and other supporting roles. The sight of the capital ships Bulwark and Ocean going around without escort is not my idea of credibility. Not at all. And when the carrier capability is finally restored, the lack of escorts will be even more unacceptable.

The extension of deployments to Kipion and South Atlantic help in covering more ground with limited resources by reducing the number of ship rotations, and cutting down on transfer times as the same vessel stays in the area for longer.
However, even with a break in the middle, it is still a 9 months stint for the same crew. It is probably the time for testing again the practice of sea-swapping the crew of major warships, because if it could be made to work, the same ship could stay deployed at least one year, while the crew would rotate to keep the pressure on personnel more bearable.
The germans are notoriously building presence warships, the F-125 frigates, which are designed specifically to deploy abroad for a whole 2 years, while the crews are rotated every four to six months.
The Royal Navy’s warships haven’t been designed for such use, but it might be possible to achieve a 12 month time on station, with the right approach. Going ahead, it might become unavoidable to try again: the RN made a first try back in 2007, swapping the crews of two Type 42 destroyers: HMS Exeter’s crew was flown from Britain to the Falklands to relived in place the crew of HMS Edinburgh which was to spend 10 months in South Atlantic. In the same period, the US Navy made its own trials, but at the time it was assessed that difficulties with maintenance and the impact on morale of detaching crews from their very own ship were too serious to go ahead with the concept.
However, the US Navy has signaled last year that Sea Swap might make a return, and the 9 months deployment for the Royal Navy might be a step in the same direction. Newer ships, new infrastructure in Bahrain and a ever growing use of training in land-based “warship simulators” might make times mature for a new attempt, successful this time.
After all, Sea Swap is not new per se: the MCM crews rotate onto deployed ships regularly. The OPV crews, including of course HMS Clyde’s, do the same. The RFA vessels spend years deployed abroad, rotating crews, and so do the survey vessels. Clearly, a complex high end warship is a different story, but I highly doubt it can’t be made to work.

The other way to ease the problem, is the second tier fleet. The first chance the RN gets to adopt a small second-tier flotilla is connected to the incoming River Batch 2 class of OPVs, of which i've already talked at length. Here, the optimist in me is hoping that the incoming deployment of HMS Severn to the Caribbean is not just a desperation move of a navy terribly stretched in manpower and hulls, but a way to plan for a future in which the new OPVs are put in service to cover some of the constabulary tasks that are the navy's everyday job. These ships are being built regardless of any other consideration, and I firmly believe that a serious effort must be expended to get the best operational value out of them and of the still young Batch 1s already in service. 

The incoming River Batch 2

The second opportunity, in the longer term, is the C3 / MHPC. 
The first MHPC vessel is planned to be procured in 2028, and this is interesting because, with the plan for 13 Type 26 stretching well into the 2030s, it would imply simultaneous work on two quite large programmes. Possibly the explanation is that MHPC as currently envisaged, while having a patrol capability, will have such a limited “combat” element to it that it won’t rate between the “complex warships” which require the single “frigate factory” plant planned on the Clyde. In fact, it would be nice to know more about how the future of shipbuilding is seen at the MOD: while plans never survive the impact with the enemy (budget), it is interesting to think that, in theory, the building of MARS FSS should start quite soon (since the Forts are supposed to leave service by the middle of the 2020s). Simultaneously, Type 26 should be ongoing. At some point in the 2020s, Argus and Diligence will need replacement, and in 2028 the replacement of the MCM ships should begin with the MHPC.
How all these tassels fit into the british shipbuilding situation isn’t clear, as of today, and the feeling is that, for the logistic vessels at least, building the hulls abroad will be the choice of the day, as has happened with MARS FT.
In theory, in the early 2030s the LPDs Albion and Bulwark will also be in need of a replacement, while the complex combat ship of the late 2030s, after the ending of the Type 26 build, would probably be a replacement for the Type 45.

My proposal for credibility and affordability is to cap Type 26 at 10 hulls, like the once planned C1. All ten of these hulls will have to be properly equipped as ASW frigates, inclusive of 2087. This is because where the Navy needs credible combat ships, an handicapped frigate won’t really do. These frigates are built to be ASW and ASuW vessels: let them be what they must be.
After that, put a greater focus on MHPC. A separate C2 programme is not realistic, but the mistake in my opinion was to mix C1 and C2 into the same class by merely handicapping some of the vessels in it. There is another programme which is going to happen for sure, because of the specialized roles it goes to cover: C2 should have been merged with C3. MHPC is expected to be a decently sized ship (at least 3000 tons) which will have large cargo and work space in the stern for carrying modular MCM and Survey payloads. It will have a flight deck and, differently from the Rivers, a good hangar. The ship is planned to have good sea legs and be globally deployable, but so far it has been described as having very light armament, probably just a 30 mm gun in OPV fashion.
This self-inflicted limiting factor, however, is relatively easily corrected: one only has to look to ships like the Khareef, built in Britain, to see that it is possible, at low cost, to uplift the potential of a modest hull and give it firepower adequate to be credible in a far larger range of circumstances. The UK, besides, has the advantage of CAMM, a very, very clever missile system which can be installed with minimum effort pretty much on any ship. A MHPC with a 76mm gun and a small battery of CAMM won’t make a frigate, but it will become credible for a much wider range of tasks. And it will have greater usefulness in keeping the yards busy and in preserving skills between the end of Type 26 and the beginning of the next major surface combatant project which, history suggests, will be late as the Type 45s will have their life stretched again and again for lack of cash.

The conclusion to my reasoning is that when having more high end warships is not a viable option because there’s no budget and no manpower for them,  the only way to cover more ground with less frigates is to make sure that the few hulls available are truly capable and only employed in the tasks they are meant for.
The credibility of the Navy is the task group, with its full range of capabilities, not the frigate hurriedly stolen from a standing task to be sent at speed towards a crisis.
The high end warships must be there for the task group, for the “hotter” standing tasks, for training for their actual, very demaning roles, and for showing the flag in NATO groups, so that they can actually respond to a developing crisis.
There are other ways to cover less demanding standing tasks.  

When people thinks back to the “want of frigates” of admiral Lord Nelson, they should realize that, back in his days, the Ships of the Line were today’s Type 45 and 23/26, and the frigates were the second tier flottilla. 
He did not ask for more Ships of the Line.
He asked for more workhorses to act as forward presence, as eyes and ears for the fleet, so that he could survey many places, and lead the Ships of the Line timely into decisive actions only where they could achieve the actual victory.

It is still a valid concept today, as it was back then. 

And i'm hoping that the First Sea Lord, in his experience, realizes this. I like to believe that he is showing us his best poker face, talking in a way that protects the Type 26, but with his mind planning ahead to give it some helping hands.


Type 26 frigates: new info and some thoughts

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My earlier post on the reported troubles with firming up costs for the Type 26 and with getting to contract award have been generating a healthy discussion in the comments section, and that is great. Someone has been reading in my post a sort of hostility from me against the Type 26. I deny this very firmly. My point is another: for what we know about the ship requirements (settled in May 2012 and stable since then) and MOD-endorsed design (which has been frozen in its main lines for quite a long while, now), there is nothing excessively revolutionary that should make this platform unaffordable, considering how much equipment will be carried over from the Type 23 frigates.
It is not my invention, but a fact, that the Royal Navy has deliberately shaped Type 26 as a program which builds on earlier, incremental improvements adopted on the Type 23s and then moved across, without seeking innovation at all costs. A rough figure has been suggested, putting Type 26 in the field of "80% old, and 20% new".
This does not mean that Type 26 won't deliver a step change in capability from the current Type 23s, but rather that it will deliver so using already existing technology, and indeed re-using a fair amount of equipment.
The savings obtained by re-using equipment and by sticking with proven technology and systems are to be employed, in the idea behind the programme, to ensure a decent number of hulls get built, and to ensure that those hulls come with some new and exciting capability thanks to their large size, large aviation spaces and vast "flexible" mission space and, importantly, a large vertical launch silo that will open up routes the Type 23 has simply never been able to pursue.
I very much like the general idea, and my only wish is to see it working as intended.

I'm writing this new article because i've come across some excellent material that provides some great details about the Type 26 design that has been finalized and is being costed ahead of the Main Gate. The document is a letter, dating October 2014, from the Secretary of State for defence to the house of common's defence committee. The SoF replies to a series of direct questions, and provides some excellent information.

First of all, the Flexible Mission Bay. There is no indication of its size and shape, but the SoF finally provides a confirmation that the helicopter hangar is directly connected to the Mission Bay, with a passage large enough to enable the transfer of manned and unmanned aircraft from hangar to mission bay.
Hangar size unsurprisingy at least matches that of the Type 45: the destroyer is slightly larger in beam, but the hangar is not full-width, as it has the RHIB bays on both sides. On Type 26, there are no boat bays, although it is likely that the helicopter bay will be flanked by logistic and aviation stores spaces and by the delivery end of the new mechanized Air Weapons Handling System, designed by Babcock, which is to store, retrieve and deliver the weapons for the embarked helicopter to the Weapons Preparation Area.
Apparently, the AWHS will also handle the Stingray torpedoes for the ship's launch tubes (if they will be fitted, see further down in the article).
The hangar thus can be assumed to match the Type 45's one and it might actually be larger: the SoF says it "comfortably" fits one Merlin or 2 Wildcat. Using the Mission Bay space, more aviation resources could be carried: UAVs, both fixed and rotary wing, but also additional manned helicopters. It would be possible, albeit with limitations, to embark a second Merlin in the Mission Bay, the SoF specifies.
The ability of the mission bay to communicate directly with the hangar (and thus with the flight deck) is an eminently sensible feature to have, and it is good to have the confirmation that it will be there, and with ample chances of exploiting it over the long life of the ships (at least 25 years of design life).

It is also confirmed that the Flight Deck is being sized to allow a Chinook to land and deploy the ramp to enable comfortable embarkation and disembarkation. The compatibility with Chinook, while not strictly necessary, is useful as the heavy transport helicopter could make good use of the ample Embarked Military Force contingent that can sail into a Type 26, and it could also be used to bring aboard capability modules and stores.
Moreover, the Chinook-sized deck should also, and probably mainly, be seen as a way to ensure that simultaneous UAV and manned helicopter operations can happen with suitable space available for necessary deconfliction.
These features add a huge amount of flexibility to the design.


The mission bay itself is a large open space stretching from side to side, with large doors on both sides for deploying boats, unmanned surface and subsurface vehicles, as well as to embark mission modules which can come in containers as big as 20 feet standard TEU.
The mission bay can hold up to four 12 meters boats (and probably a few containers of additional equipment in the middle of the bay, judging from images seen this far) or up to 10 modules / 20 foot containers.
This flexibility will be invaluable in adapting to future missions and in enabling the adoption of future unmanned vehicles which are almost certain to become not just the main MCM system, but also more important in ASW. Having space and infrastructure is, consequently, very desirable for warships which have to last long into the future.
The UK is actively collaborating with France to develop modular payloads for MCM operations, and such developments are happening in other nations across NATO: the UK has taken the lead, according to the letter, for a project that aims to set international standards for the module interfaces, so that foreign systems in future can be embarked and operated where necessary.
One thing which isn't yet detailed is what kind of equipment the ship will have for embarking and disembarking containers and modules: will she depend on external infrastructure, or will the slide-out gantry crane be able to lift not only boats, but also the containers? It will be interesting to see which solutions are adopted. The mission bay will require a strong deck, as reinforced as the flight deck itself. A fully loaded TEU can weight some 24 tons, so a useful payload margin of at least 240 tons is apparently requested. The mission bay estimated size, considering what it can fit, is probably not inferior to a 15 meters long, 20 wide space.


The Type 26 will have a crew of 118, and room for 72 other personnel for the aviation element, for boarding teams, pre-landing forces of the Royal Marines, or for specialists coming to operate the modular mission systems. From the SoF letter, it becomes clear that some real attention has been paid into giving the frigate excellent capability to host the Royal Marines pre-landing party.
In recent times, HMS Montrose, a Type 23 frigate, experimented with a sizeable pre-landing force of over 70 Marines in 2012: must have been a real tight fit on a Type 23, but on the Type 26 there will be space and infrastructure to do much better.

In terms of weapons fit, the letter specifies that the vessels will be fitted at build with a sizeable Flexible Strike Silo numbering 24 cells, for anti-ship, land attack and anti-submarine weapons. The letter specifies that the cells will be american MK41. This is a surprise, since earlier info suggested that since MK41 is somewhat larger than Sylver modules, only two launchers (for 16 cells in total) could be fitted: it appears it is not so, and the higher number of cells has been confirmed in the finalised design.

Confirmed are the 48 Sea Ceptor canisters as well, almost certainly in the two silos configuration seen in CGIs and models so far, so with 24 cells on the bow, ahead of the strike cells, and 24 aft of the funnel mast, amidship.
The Type 26 will have a 127mm gun, too, replacing the old MK8. I'm told that, although it has not yet been officially announced, only the MK45 Mod 4 remains in the frame, with the Oto Melara 127/64 out of the race. Jane's had reported a while ago that the MK45 had been given preferred bidder status, so it seems things are moving in that direction. The new gun will "allow" the Navy to buy into the new long-range guided ammunition being developed for the calibre, which is a NATO standard, unlike the 114 mm of the MK8.
There will also be two 30mm light guns, as expected, and the possibility to fit two Phalanx CIWS.

The list shown in the letter comes without one notable piece, however: it makes no mention of Stingray torpedo tubes, which is very surprising considering that the Type 26 is an ASW platform, and that the launcher systems could reasonably be transferred from the Type 23s.
It is an omission that causes questions to arise: it seems unlikely that there would not be such a fit on this kind of vessel, especially since vertical launch anti-submarine rockets, which are mentioned in the letter, are not in british service, and would have to be somehow procured (read: financed, as that is the issue). It is not a product line where there is much choice: the americans have the ASROC, the italians have the MILAS (which is not vertically lauched, however) and the South Koreans are producing a system of their own. Japan also has its own anti-submarine missile system. None of these is fitted with a british Stingray torpedo, obviously, although this could probably be fixed quite easily.
Not fitting the torpedo tubes would be a puzzling decision, if confirmed. The ship's tubes are admittedly more of a snap self-defence fit than anything else, considering the limited range of the lightweight torpedo fired from them means that the frigate launching them would probably already be under attack by the enemy submarine; but doing away with them entirely, besides while not having a clear path to a vertical launch solution, is questionable.
Might it be just a case of them having been "forgotten" in the letter? Can't be excluded.

The letter also has another nice little bit of a news in itself: the FASGW(L) missile, the Thales Light Multi-mission Missile, has been given the name MARTLET in british service. This hadn't been disclosed to the public before, as far as i'm aware, unlike Sea Venom which was named earlier this year.

(Secretary of State for Defence - Type 26 letter to the defence committee)




A displacement of 8000 tons? 

Type 26 is going to be a large and "dense" warship. The 6000 tons displacement quoted by BAE is pretty much certainly not the weight of a fully loaded Type 26, and indeed some recent news reports have suggested that the ship might now be an "8000 tons full load displacement vessel". I'm however not sure i can believe the 8000 tons value at this point, because it sounds excessive in relation to the specifications and the size of the vessel, but it will be an heavy ship, that's for sure. The SoF letter does not provide any helpful indication about this subject.

Type 26 is 148,5 meters long and around 20 meters in beam. Not too far from the 144,6 and 19,7 meters of the italian variant of the FREMM frigates (the french ones are slightly shorter, as the italian ships are being lenghtened post-build by some 3,5 meters adding an additional section in the stern) which have a declared displacement of 6700 tons, sometimes indicated in more than 7000. The italian navy has released some different, contradictory figures for the displacement, which consequently isn't identifiable with certainty. Even the reason for the lenghtening isn't yet fully clear: officially, the expansion was mainly due to the need to improve all-weather operations with the AW-101 Merlin helicopter and was exploited to provide additional accommodation space, 100 tons of additional fuel (bringing endurance to 6700 nautical miles against 6000 earlier) and a second RAS station. The weight increase coming from the lengtening was indicated in 250 tons.
Unofficially, there have been strong suggestions that the lenghtening has been inspired by the wish to correct weight distribution, as the italian FREMM have been given the same huge main mast of an Horizon destroyer, carrying the heavy, powerful EMPAR radar system, and this has, again reportedly, made the ship remarkably bow-heavy, with consequences on handling, particularly in rough seas.

In many ways, the italian FREMM is a good comparison to Type 26: the italian navy is taking delivery of two variants, the General Purpose and ASW. The first replaces the towed sonar of the second with a stern ramp for the deployment of a 11-meters RHIB. The other main differences are that the GP is armed with a 127 mm gun and a 76 mm gun-CIWS, while the ASW has two 76 mm guns. The GP is, for now at least, not fitted with the SLAT anti-torpedo decoy system, which is instead standard on the ASW.
Both ships carry two helicopters in two hangars: one, slightly larger than the other, can house an AW-101 Merlin, while the other is sized for the NH-90 helicopter. The frigates can employ one AW-101 and one NH-90, or two NH-90.
In fairness, i've heard comments suggesting that the AW-101 hangar is quite tight, and considered more adequate to carry a NH-90 and offer spaces for its maintenance rather than allow the actual enduring embarkation of an AW-101 Flight. The smaller hangar bay has been described as just large enough to house the NH-90, without work spaces, so it does seem more practicable to go with two NH-90s, which is by the way more likely as Italy is procuring 40 to 46 NH-90 NFH, while the AW-101s are much fewer (10 ASW, 8 amphibious assault / transport and 4 AEW) and generally meant for use on the Cavour aircraft carrier.  
Both ships employ one 11-meters RHIB and one 7-meters one, with the GP adding a second 11-meters in the stern, as already said.

It would be interesting to have an accurate displacement value, as it could provide a useful ballpark idea for what the Type 26's own displacement might be.

The italian FREMM has accommodation for at least 200 following the modifications (180 on the french FREMM), but also has a core crew considerably larger than the french variant (108 including 14 men of the helicopter flight): the GP was meant to have a crew of 131, and the ASW of 133. Use of the platform at sea has since inspired an expansion of 34 men, as well as some 23 for the aviation department.
The increase in crew size has had some impact on the vessel: currently, the space originally preserved to fit two 8-cell Sylver A70 launcher modules for strike missiles has been sacrificed to provide additional accommodation spaces.
The standard of accommodation, especially in the original rooms, is very high. The room with more bunks has only 4 beds. That's a lot of volume used in what does not appear to be a very efficient way.  

The Type 26 is aiming for a core crew of 118, with accommodation for another 72 personnel. On the Type 45, junior rates sleep 6 per room. On the Queen Elizabeth class, the 6 bunks rooms are larger, but come with two folding beds which can be used to embark 2 more personnel.
On the Type 26, which will need some pretty well optimised use of space for fitting accommodation for 190 plus a large flexible mission bay and a substantial number of VLS, the arrangement of bunks has not yet been detailed. However, back at Euronaval 2012 some reporters talked about 9-bed rooms, a bit of a sacrifice in terms of crew spaces to make everything fit.

Sensor-wise, the italian FREMM is fitted with the EMPAR, as said earlier, a system considerably larger than ARTISAN 3D: the antennas of the two systems weight 2,45 tons against 0,7 tons.

In armaments, the italian FREMM carriers two 8-cell Sylver A50 modules, with the SAAM - Extended Self Defense control system, which enables limited area defence employing not just Aster 15 but Aster 30 as wll. The limitation in area defence performance comes, effectively, from the fact that the FREMM does not support the EMPAR with a long-range radar as happens instead on the Horizon destroyers.  
Type 26 will be able to employ up to 48 CAMM / Sea Ceptor missiles, distributed in two silos. Weight-wise, despite the big difference in numbers, it is the SAAM-ESD that weights the most, since each Aster 15 in its canister weights a full 550 kg, with Aster 30 reaching the 700 kg, while each CAMM canister is in the region of the 100 kg, and being a cold-launch weapon it does not need a VLS as bulky and complex as Sylver (over 8 tons per module, but exact weight not available).
The FREMM armament is completed, in the GP case, by a 127/64 gun (34 tons with turret ammunition drums filled with 56 shells) plus 305 shells in an automated handling two-storey ammunition depot; two 25 mm guns, two triple MU-90 torpedo tubes, eight TESEO anti-ship missiles (770 kg each in their canister) and a 76mm gun on top of the hangar, weighting 7,9 tons without ammunition.

The Type 26 however will have, as of October 2014 information, 24 MK41 strike lenght cells available in addition to Sea Ceptor. Each module, bare of weapons, weights some 14,5 tons. If each cell was filled with a MK14 Mod 2 canister containing a Tomahawk missile (the heaviest, at 2,777 kg each), the weight would rise rapidly! The maximum weight of the Flexible Strike Silo, launchers plus Tomahawk canisters, could be in the region of an impressive 110,15 tons.
However, to this day there is no real indication yet of what the Royal Navy wants to fit. Tomahawk appears to be likely, but the Royal Navy also needs to replace Harpoon, and the only MK41 candidate which could be readily available by then would be the american LRASM solution. The anti-submarine "rocket", if it will be actually pursued at some point, would be another novelty.

The italian FREMM carries enough fuel for 6700 nautical miles, and enough stores for 45 days, officially. The Type 26 reportedly aims for no less than 7000 nautical miles and 60 days, so there might easily be dozens of tons of difference in the amount of fuel carried, and a significant difference in the volume and weight of stores, as well, but providing exact figures is not possible at this point.
The propulsion systems have in common the presence of a gas turbine and four diesels, but that's about it. The italian FREMM uses a 32 MW LM2500+ G4 gas turbine and 4 Isotta Fraschini VL1716 diesels and 2 Jeumont Electric motors, while the Type 26 will have a 36 MW Rolls Royce MT30 and 4 MTU V20 diesels generating 12 MW. However, the FREMM is a CODELAG ship which can run the gas turbine and the diesels at once to sustain high speed in rough sea or obtain greater max speed, thanks to a RENK 170-175 gearbox set weighting some 120 tons; while the Type 26 will be CODELOG, which means the diesels will be used to generate electric power for silent cruise speed, but will be detached when max speed is requested, leaving the sole MT30 to directly drive the two shafts.
The electric motors of the Type 26 are to be supplied by General Electric, and the gearbox by David Brown.

Overall, it is quite natural to expected a loaded Type 26 to exceed 7000 tons and the weight of the slightly smaller and less armed FREMM, but 8000 tons would seem to be an exaggeration.



Costs  

It is a good thing that the Type 26 does seek to reuse much of the expensive equipment fit (main radar, Future Local Area Air Defence System / Sea Ceptor, light guns, navigation radars and other equipment) and build on existing technology (including the shared infrastructure common combat system, which is being rolled out across the Royal Navy's surface fleet in the coming years, having already been installed on HMS Ocean, ordered for the Type 23s and mandated for the new build OPVs), because otherwise there would be no chance to meet the ambitious cost targets set for the programme.
The hull is going to be big and capable, and very dense, with such big spaces being requested for the Strike VLS, mission bay, fuel and stores. The Strike VLS fit is not new (it builds on something that is operational on hundreds of ships around the globe) in general terms but is a new entry in the Royal Navy, so will need to be acquired anew.

Ultimately, we do not know which is the current target pricetag for the Type 26. The newspapers have recently made headlines about Type 26 being a 4 billion project, but this isn't too helpful because government has notoriously indicated that there is likely to be a first contract for 8 ships, to be followed (hopefully) by 5 more later. If 4 billion applied to the first 8 hulls only, the cost per ship would 500 million pounds, rather non ambitious at all. On the other hand, 4 billion for 13 ships would likely be too little, at little more than 307 million per hull. Result maybe not beyond the realm of the possible in general terms, but looking too ambitious for british shipbuilding, which isn't really famous for being cheap.

Maybe the danes could get it done: they have very successfully built the IVER HUITFELDT class frigates, three capable air area defence warships which have cost an amazingly low 313 million USD each.
These impressive vessels, however, build their hulls on the experience of the commercial operator Maersk, a factor not to be underestimated. The design has also benefitted from previous work done to design the Absalom class, another success story.

The IVER class use a fully-diesel propulsion with 4 large MTU sets which can push the ship for 9300 nautical miles at 18 knots, but that can also thrust her to over 29 knots speed with a 120 seconds acceleration time. The base crew of 116 isn't too far from Type 26's target, nor is total accommodation available, set at 165+ men.
The IVER is a 6649 tons displacement vessel, about as large in beam as Type 26, but around 10 meters shorter.
The ships are fitted with an advanced combat system and with the excellent APAR multi-function radar used also on the german SACHSEN ships, supported by the SMART L, the long range radar which equips the Horizon and Type 45 destroyers (in the S-1850M variant). They have a 32-cells MK41 Strike Lenght silo amidship, supplemented by 24 additional cells for ESSM missiles and by space for more ESSM or for up to 16 Harpoon. They are fitted with two 76 mm guns, and a Millenium CIWS, but could soon enough swap one 76 for a MK45 MOD 4 gun. The other 76 could stay or be replaced by another Millenium.



Amazingly cheap, these ships deliver formidable value for money. The budget for all three was 940 million USD, supplemented by 209 million in re-used equipment (ESSM cell modules, Harpoon and 76 mm guns, mainly). The budget did not include the purchase of the SM-2 missiles for air area defence, so for now the MK41 is empty and only ESSM is available, and the 127 mm gun is planned but not yet purchased.
Deep in the hull, they have space reserved for a towed sonar, and further space for other equipment with a footprint equivalent to four 20 feet containers. 







It will be a big challenge for the british shipbuilding industry to keep Type 26 costs down. There is no revolutionary system being requested, but on the other hand there is admittedly quite a lot of capability being designed into a dense hull.
The amount of re-use of existing equipment migrating from the Type 23 could be a real lifesaver for the programme: the abundant carry over should represent a big "saving" of sort (money will have of course have been spent for all items, but early and separately), especially since it covers most of the big-money items of the combat equipment.

Saying how much it will cost to fit the new MK45 main gun and the MK41 silo is not easy, but thanks to an immensely useful USN document detailing the cost of new build DDG-51 destroyers by major subsystems, i've put together a ballpark estimate. Take it with prudence and salt, of course: this is a very rough method for estimating costs, but i think it is interesting enough to be included as a basis for discussion and reflection.



To provide a rough cost indication, i've scouted US Navy documents which helpfully provide a major breakdown of the cost of a DDG-51 by major subsystems and related components and activities, looking at the years 2013, 2014 and 2015. There are, as always happens in these things, some pretty large variations in price from a year to the next, but it is at least possible to get an idea. The yearly data suggests that ordering many in the same years significantly lowers the costs with economies of scale. (USN document)




The MK41 fit on a DDG-51 is a 12 launch modules affair, with a cost in the region of the 48 million dollars. 12 modules, however, are the fit of 4 Type 26s, according to the info we now have. So it might take around around 160 million USD to put 24 MK41 cells on all Type 26s. Rough estimate, of course, i want to say that again. The number of modules is lower per hull, but there are more ship sets. However, there should not be a big difference per se in terms of ship sets installation. Dropping 36 modules in three hulls or 39 in 13 hulls shouldn't be excessively different, but for the fact that they would be separate operations happening on different years. This might raise the cost, but overall i would like to think that things would even out in a reasonable way.

If it is decided that the Type 26s have to be able to successfully employ Tomahawk, they need the Tactical Tomahawk Weapon Control System fit too, and that could require up to some 16 million USD per ship (cost for a single ship set in 2014, the unitary cost drops as low as 11 million with 3 sets in 2013 and 13 million with 2 sets in 2015). 16 million for all 13 ships would add up to 208 million for the class. Again, rough estimate. All costs inclusive of technical support, engineering, initial spares etcetera. I don't know if LRASM has a comparable, separate mission planning system. Probably not, but there would be of course integration costs of its own with it having its own backend in a shape or another.

The rest of course depends on the missile, and how many All Up Rounds are purchased. The last Tomahawk contract, which included 20 submarine torpedo tube TLAM for the UK, was a firm fixed price order for 231 rounds (147 Vertical Launch rounds for US surface warships, 64 encapsuled rounds for US navy submarines with VL cells and 20 torpedo tube launch TLAM rounds for the UK) for 251,13 million dollars.


In theory, and i'll say it again in theory and in rough estimates, 24 MK41 cells + Tomahawk mission system + 231 missiles (using the 231 figure and its cost, even though the torpedo tube missile is more expensive than the VL) = 619.13 million dollars, or around 396 million pounds, at today's rates. And that's with a 231 TLAM order thrown in for good measure, that we all know isn't going to happen. Probably there would be a finite, much smaller number of missile loads purchased, and the deploying ships would stop by the Upper Harbour Ammunitioning Facility prior to deployment to take the rounds on board, since pretty much never are we going to see all 13 vessels on operations at once anyway.

All this, just to have a ballpark idea based on something. Better than speaking purely on wild speculation.
If you follow the link to the US Navy document, you'll see that it quotes Unitary Item Costs which are all much lower than the amounts i used. I did that deliberately, by looking at the total expense per ship related to the various items so to include, albeit of course in a rough way, the spares, engineering and services costs which are very much inevitable. Using the unitary cost alone would not be realistic, as the amounts resulting would be much lower than the real ones. In this other way, the cost figures should be much closer to the truth. 
This is mainly to indicate that it won't be the fitting of MK41 launchers that will break the programme's budget on its own: they fit 32 MK41 cells on the cheapest high end combat ships out there, as we saw.

As for the MK45 Mod 4, it is also of some interest to see its cost is in the region of some 25 million apiece, apparently. Again, the cost for a british purchase might be different, and it is indeed likely to be somewhat higher since for the UK it will be a totally new system, while it is business as usual for the US Navy. 



In this long piece, i've wanted to share the quality info i've found about what the design of Type 26 offers, and i've also tried to explain why i talked the way i did about the reports of cost issues and the delay in clearing Main Gate. The requirements, taken as a whole, are ambitious in several ways, and i won't deny that. But they have maintained steady over time, and they are being mitigated by a responsible approach to the programme. I hope that now the whole package can be made to work, and work well. Because one thing is certain: this programme is of vital importance to both the Navy and the british shipbuilding industry. It is in the interests of both that it goes as planned. 
If it did, it really might be a renaissance for british yards, because this ship, while not revolutionary in its subsystems, is very much (r)evolutionary in terms of what it delivers as a whole. A good product at a reasonable price: what is needed for the Navy to survive, and for export orders to return to british shipyards.


Merlin progress - UPDATE with AEW squadron plan

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Merlin for the Royal Marines

846 NAS is training with the Merlin HC3 with the aim of going out to sea soon. According to ADS Advance, the plan is to have them having their first sortie at sea before Christmas, presumably on board of HMS Ocean, due to RFA Argus being deployed to Sierra Leone in support of Operation Gritrock, the british intervention against ebola.
There is not much time left, if the plan is still in place, so their debut at sea might be truly imminent.

846 NAS has re-formed in September in RAF Benson, with 10 helicopters and 14 crews, for a total of 28 pilots. Over 300 aircrew and engineers from the Royal Navy have been training in Benson from 2012 to reach this moment. 846 NAS will remain in Benson for a while still, working alongside the remaining RAF Merlin squadron, 28(AC) Sqn. The squadron is expected to relocate to Yeovilton by Easter 2015, and next year 845 NAS should also gradually take Merlin in, with 28(AC) disbanding. 845 NAS should reform in August 2015, operating at least for a few months with a mix of Merlin and Sea King.

The Merlin is handed over from RAF to RN; september 2014


25 Merlin HC3 (the HC3 is the original RAF variant, known by Agusta Westland as AW101-411; 22 were originally purchased) and 3A (built for Denmark with an enhanced mission fit including a nose modified to take a LOAM low flying collision avoidance sensor; known as AW101-512, they have been purchased by the MOD for a UOR and used for training in the UK to increase the number of deployable HC3s available) are transfering from the RAF to the Fleet Air Arm, and they are all due to be life-extended, upgraded and navalized under a GBP455 million contract.
In order to maintain a core of operational capability constantly available, this process and the withdrawal of Sea King HC4 are organized in phases.

One of the first few Merlin HC3 in Royal Navy markings, by P_H_images

Phase 1 began in October 2014, and includes the partial navalization of 7 helicopters. These will receive a manual folding rotor head, lashing down points, upgraded undercarriage and fast rope harnesses, to be suitable, at least partially, for use on ships and in support of Royal Marines operations. All 7 helicopters, to be known as HC3i (Interim) should be operational by April 2016, when the last Sea King HC4 (no more than 11 remain in service, used by 845 NAS) will be withdrawn from service.

Phase 2 will involve the full navalization and upgrade of a first batch of 9 helicopters, to be uplifted to HC4/4A standard. The HC4 adds an electrically folding tail boom and a cockpit upgraded at HM2 standard as well as a new Tactical Mission System by General Dynamics UK, partially common with the one of the Wildcat. These 9 helicopters should be fully operational by February 2020, and there have been earlier indications of HC4 deliveries beginning in September 2017. Following trials, HC4 IOC with up to 7 helicopters could be achieved during 2018.

HM2's shiny new glass cockpit


Phase 3 will uplift all remaining helicopters to HC4/4A standard, including the 7 HC3i. Deliveries are to be completed by March 2022.
The Commando Helicopter Force will have a total of 37 crews for the 25 Merlin by the end of the transition from Sea King.

A number of Merlin HC3 deployed to Albania this year to work with the Royal Navy and Royal Marines during Albanian Lion 2014. Hopefully we'll see the HC3 on ships soon.

It will be quite a long transition period, which will keep the Royal Marines short of fully ship-compatible helicopters for a long period.



HM2

The HM2 Merlins have achieved operational capability early, and have been through months of very intense training, culminating in exercise Deep Blue, which saw, for the first time in many years, a full ASW squadron of 9 helicopters embarked on HMS Illustrious to fend off the attacks of british and french SSNs and of Dutch diesel submarines.


The Merlin HM2 squadron of exercise Deep Blue

Deep Blue was also a chance to test the Merlin HM2 night capabilities, with the NVG available (finally) to the crew. Here is HMS Richmond seen at night.

The Royal Navy now plans for a fleet of 30 HM2 which will try to sustain a forward available fleet of 25 at any one time, with the other 5 in maintenance.
Of these 30, up to 14 will be embarking at once on the aircraft carrier when deployed, so that the task group can line both a 9-strong ASW squadron and a 4 to 5 strong AEW component (see CROWSNEST further down in the article).
In addition, the Merlin fleet will also be required to sustain at least 5 Small Ship Flights for operations on frigates and destroyers.

HM2 have been carrying on Stingray drops in Falmouth bay as well
The Royal Navy is consequently still hoping to be able to fund the HM2 upgrade for a further 2 to 8 Merlin. The HM1 fleet numbers 38 operational machines and 4 airframes in storage / cannibalised for spares.
30 helicopters are being upgraded to HM2, but the option for 8 more was at one point dropped. However, the Royal Navy now hopes to be able to obtain 2 to 8 more HM2 machines, and a decision might be taken before the year ends.

A busy HMS Illustrious in ex Deep Blue
 
By February 2015, all squadrons (824, 820, 814 and 829) will have converted to the HM2. 



CROWSNEST  

The important AEW capability for the fleet will be a Merlin HM2 task as well, once Sea King is retired. IOC for CROWSNEST is expected in 2019, while the last Sea King ASaC Mk 7 will be withdrawn by September 30, 2018.
The Sea King ASaC force will be downsized quickly in the coming months, and probably it will soon be down to the sole 849 NAS. The number of operational helicopters will be further reduced from 11 to 7 in the forward fleet, and one in reserve. However, this beats by far the earlier plan of having the ASaC going out of service in 2016, with an AEW coverage gap for 3 to 4 years.

CROWSNEST is a programme lead by Lockheed Martin as Main Contractor due to its role in delivering the upgraded mission system used by the Merlin HM2.
Lockheed Martin is also a contender for the requirement: teaming with Elta, they are offering the VIGILANCE radar pods. The pod contains a Elta AESA radar complete with power and cooling system, IFF interrogator and ESM: The pod is carried in place of the torpedo pylons, and only needs a single point power and data connection to the helicopter: the mission system is already compatible with the HM2 software and consoles.

A Thales team is offering a new upgrade of the CERBERUS system used on the Sea King Mk 7, with the Searchwater radar carried inside the well known inflatable "bag" radome. Up to DSEI 2013, the Thales offer involved installing the radar, upgraded to deliver greater detection capabilities, on rails added on the starboard middle fuselage of the Merlin HM2s. After take off, when the undercarriage is folded away, the bag would slide down the rails so that the radar hangs below the helicopter, from where it has unobstructed 360° field of view.
In 2014 the design seems to have been tweaked doing away with the rails and adopting instead an hinge which swings the radar beneath the fuselage. The hinge assembly would go on the weapon pylon station, and from the CGI it appears a cleaner installation. The inflatable radome used on the Sea King MK7 might also be replaced with a solid radome.


Both systems are already being test flown from Boscombe Down, and the two rival bids are expected to be filed in by the end of January 2015. A selection of the winning bid is due in the first quarter of 2015. Operations should begin in 2018 and reach IOC during 2019. Thales has repeatedly said they believe they can deliver operational capability quicker than that, while LM has not been as talkative so far about the progress of the VIGILANCE trials.

The 2014 Thales offer as shown in a CGI by flightglobal.com.

A model showing the Thales solution and the rails on the fuselage, as shown at DSEI 2013

Merlin HM2 with Thales CROWSNEST payload seen in the sky over Wiltshire in november 2014

Rick Ingham shot this great photo of Merlin HM2 ZH831 fitted with two VIGILANCE pods for CROWSNEST trials. Photo from airplane-pictures.net; @ Rick Ingham

So far, the plan has been described as including the purchase of 10 AEW mission fits and the modification of all 30 Merlin HM2 to enable quick installation and removal of the system. Any helicopter in the fleet could thus move from ASW to AEW role in hours.

The new consoles of the HM2, with the large Barco displays, is suitable for displaying AEW data when CROWSNEST is in use

The concept seems brilliant, but i'm very much of the opinion that the Royal Navy, if it manages to fund the upgrade of 8 more helicopters, would better be served by removing the ASW kit from them and fitting them out to serve as AEW platforms full time, in a separate squadron.
My suspect is that the vast and precious range of capabilities and competencies of the very different arts of ASW and AEW cannot be mixed in the same crew. Perhaps the helicopters can be made capable to take the kit as quickly as promised, but the AEW and ASW specialists will, i believe, stay as two separate families.
Modifying a smaller number of helicopters for CROWSNEST transport and having them in their own squadron continues to look to me as the best solution.

UPDATE: there will indeed be an AEW squadron. The Royal Navy today announced that 849 NAS, as well as going ahead solo with the Sea King MK7 up to March 2018, will then continue as a Merlin HM2 squadron operating CROWSNEST.

854 NAS is being re-absorbed into 849 NAS as "Normandy Flight", and 857 NAS will revert to Flight identity, taking the name "Palembang Flight", with formal decommissioning in the new year.
849 NAS will carry on as a frontline squadron with 3 Flights, one presumably with training function and two operational flights. The third flight is expected to be called "Okinawa" after one of 849's battle honours.









A sensible organization, which reflects my expectations. Now, if it was possible to go ahead with the last 8 Merlin to upgrade them and use them in the AEW squadron, that would be a very good development.




A few more force structure updates

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In the last few days some more force structure plans have been announced. Firstly, RAF Odiham has now officially said that the Chinook OCU Flight will migrate to RAF Benson next year. This is the "minimum" assured measure, with the possibility of further Chinook elements going to Benson during 2016 as the HC6 comes fully online.
There is not yet a formalized plan to form an additional squadron, though. The Chinook OCU Flight could be put into a new OCU squadron comprising the Puma HC2's own OCU Flight. The use of a new standard, or the standard from one of the disbanding RAF Merlin HC3 squadrons are both possibilities. For now, absorbing the Chinook OCU Flight into one of the two Puma squadrons is another possibility.

My hope (and ultimately my belief) is that one of the standards from the disbanding Merlin force will go to a new 2-type OCU squadron. Of course, this, like everything else, also depends on the next SDSR: if the reports of new huge cuts to come are proven right, there's no telling what will be left after the slaughter.

Meanwhile, the last Chinook HC2 has gone into factory for the upgrade to HC4 back in September 2014. The HC3s are to follow, to be upgraded into HC5s to complete the JULIUS fleet-wide upgrade programme.



Elsewhere, we have finally a clue about the future of the Reserve special forces regiments. Rumors have been circulating for a long while, and now it has been officially announced that both 21 and 23 SAS have re-subordinated to the new Intelligence and Surveilllance brigade. The effect of this move on their status as special forces elements is unclear, but the units are being assigned the new specialized role known as HERA, for Human Environment Reconnaissance and Analysis. The reserve special forces patrols will be required to observe and understand the human dimension of the battlefield.

The same role will in part fall on the Honourable Artillery Company as well. The HAC will still be paired to 5 Regiment Royal Artillery and will keep its Ground Based ISTAR role, operating sensors and counter-artillery radars and providing covert observation patrols.
The covert observation patrols, used to reinforce the capability provided by the regulars of 473 Sphinx Battery, 5 Regiment RA, come from 1 (Special OP) Sqn. These patrols will have a HERA focus as well.

2 Squadron and 3 Squadron are in GB ISTAR role, and are paired with P and 93 Batteries in 5 Regiment RA.
The HAC is also getting back the gun role that it lost a few years ago: a Gun Troop has been reformed, with some 35 men and three L118 Light Guns, to provide a reserve capability to 7 Royal Horse Artillery in the air assault role. 7 RHA has lost its reserve gun battery as part of Army 2020, and is now getting back a small depth thanks to a reserve troop coming from the HAC.

29 Commando Royal Artillery is looking to stand up its own Reserve Artillery Troop, as it suffers the same problem.



Meanwhile, in 104 Logistic Brigade, the 2 Operational Support Group has been formed. Based in Prince William of Gloucester Barracks, Grantham, this reserve unit is composed of:

498 Labour Support Unit; which brings specific competencies to manage contractors and locally employed civilians during operations abroad

497 Operational Support Unit; which brings high level logistic planning expertise.

499 Contract Management Unit

Communications Troop; supports deployable field hospitals with a communications capability



Elsewhere in the Reserve, 295 (Hampshire Battery), 106 Regiment RA has formed to operate the Stormer HVM anti-air missile system.
In Germany, as 28 Regiment Royal Engineers is disbanded and the wide wet gap crossing capability moves to the reserves of 75 RE, the 23 Amphibious Engineer Troop is temporarily moving to Minden, in Germany, alongside the german regiment equipped with the same M3 rigs.
Reservists from 75 Regiment will regularly visit the Troop in Germany to train on the M3 on the river Weser, until 23 Amphibious Engineer Troop can move back to the UK, to Halton training camp. The move is planned to take place by November 2016.


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