MAJOR UPDATE:

I have corrected and completed the Army 2020 ORBAT published early on these pages, to include the data relating to the Reserves. This is, at the stage, the planned full Army ORBAT, reserve units included.




Analysis, further info and comments to follow.

Among the most interesting changes, the expansion of 6 Regiment Army Air Corps is significant. Two new squadrons will stand up after april 2014:

675 Squadron, centered around Taunton and Yeovilton, will be mainly targeted at supporting the Wildcat helicopter force destined to to airbase.

678 Squadron will stand up with centres in Milton Keynes and Luton.

677 Squadron, already existing, sees its activities consolidated at Bury St Hedmunds.

A bit of a mystery for me is constituted by 679 Squadron, given as already existing and centered at Middle Wallop. I can find no mention of 679 Squadron AAC anywhere: Middle Wallop is the base to the reserve squadron 655 (Scottish Horse), as far as i'm aware, and the British Army website agrees. Of course, the website could well be not updated, but i never heard nothing suggesting a re-badging at Middle Wallop. Either it is planned now (but not properly explained in the documents) as the squadron expands gaining a new foothold in Portsmouth, or the document is wrong, or 655 changed identity very silently and away from the spotlight.

UPDATE: i'm told that the squadron indeed is 655 (Scottish Horse). It is re-badging to 679 Squadron as it expands taking over a TA centre in Portsmouth. The Reserve army air corps regiment will thus have, possibly already by the end of next year:

675 Sqn, in support of the Wildcat helicopter force.
677, 678 and 679 (newly renamed 655) squadrons in support of the Apache force.



The Royal Engineers element of the Reserve will provide the Army's wide gap river crossing capability with the M3 rigs, following the disbandment of 28 Engineer Regiment.
The Wide Gap crossing capability will pass to 75 Engineer Regiment (Reserve), which will have two squadrons (107 and 202) plus an Amphibious Engineer Training Cell.
75 Engineer will be paired to the regular Force Support regiment, 36 Engineer.
71 Engineer regiment (Reserve) will also be in the Force Support pool. It will maintain the squadrons 102 and 124 in the Air Support role, while losing 236 Sqn, withdrawn from the order of battle. In exchange, the regiment takes command of 591 Field Squadron, the only RE squadron left in Northern Ireland.

72 and 73 Engineer regiments will be withdrawn from the ORBAT.

With a decision that, in my opinion, is badly wrong, 299 (Parachute) Squadron Royal Engineer and 131 Independent Commando Squadron RE are both moved into Hybrid regular/reserve regiments.
Instead of trying to better bring together 299 (PARA) Sqn with 23 Engineer Regiment (Air Assault), the Army decided to assign the formation to 21 Engineer Regiment.
Similarly, instead of trying to make the reserve Commando squadron work more closely with the lonely, regular 59 Independent Commando Squadron RE, the Army moves 131 Sqn under 32 Engineer Regiment.

21 and 32 and the two Hybrid regiments assigned to the Adaptable Force pool: they will have two regular and two reserve field squadrons each (103 Sqn and 299 (PARA) Sqn for 21 Regiment ; 106 Sqn and 131 Commando Sqn for 32 Regiment).
At the same time, they will also be composed by two engineer squadrons which are clearly meant to support the High Readiness reaction brigades, 16 Air Assault and 3 Commando. In my opinion, there are too many conflicting loyalties and requirements in this part of the plan.

The Royal Monmouthshire Royal Engineers (Militia) loses one squadron (108 Field Squadron, withdrawn from the army's ORBAT), but retains the other three and its RHQ, and moves under the 170 (Infrastructure Support) Engineer Group, along with 65 Works Group. Reserve elements also make up the other Works Group in the force, which are all hybrid formations.

135 Geographic Squadron ceases to be independent and moves, sensibly, under 42 Engineer Regiment (Geographic).  

33 Engineer Regiment (EOD) gains 350 Field Sqn, in addition to the already present 217 Sqn.
101 (City of London) Engineer Regiment (EOD) also has two reserve squadrons in its structure: 221 and 579.

12 (Air Support) Engineer Group becomes 12 (Force Support) Engineer Group and takes charge of both 39 and 71 regiments (Air Support oriented) and of 36 and 75 regiments (Land Support oriented). Included is 20 Works Group (Air Support).
The close-support regiments are grounded under a new group, 25 (Close Support) Group, while 29 Group becomes EOD & Search, and takes control of the EOD regiments (11 RLC included) and of the Military Working Dogs Regiment.
2 (101 and 105) out of five squadrons of the Military Working Dogs Regiment move to the Reserve.
170 (Infrastructure Support) Engineer Group retains the Works Groups and gains the Royal Monmouthshire Royal Engineers (Militia) regiment.  



In the Royal Artillery it must be underlined that the batteries meant to support 16 Air Assault brigade and 3 Commando brigade are both lost: as 100 Regiment RA is moved into suspended animation, the 201 (Hertfordshire and Bedfordshire Yeomanry) Parachute Battery is lost, while 266 (Gloucestershire Volunteer Artillery) Battery Royal Artillery, which used to support 29 Commando Royal Artillery regiment, will now resubordinate to 104 Regiment RA (Reserve) and re-role into a mini-UAS bty.

Another decision that in my opinion does not seem adequate to the army's needs is the retention of 101 Regiment RA (Reserve) as the GMLRS formation. It made perfect sense when the regular GMLRS component was based close by, at Albemarle Barracks, with 39 Regiment RA. But now that 39 Regiment disbands and the regular rocket batteries move south to Salisbury Plain to join the Reaction Force artillery regiments (19 RA, 26 RA, 1 RHA), it makes little sense to plan to have four reserve GMLRS batteries around Newcastle, Blyth and Leeds.
In addition, 101 Regiment RA is meant to be paired with 3 Royal Horse Artillery, based at Abemarle Barracks. Geographically, it makes sense. Operationally, it is a bit hard to see what real benefit can come from pairing a GMLRS reserve formation to a regular Light Gun regiment!

106 Regiment RA, in the air defence role, will have three batteries. 265 (Home Counties) Battery will employ the lightweight, triple-launcher Starstreak missile launcher, while 295 (Hampshire Yeomanry) Battery [new battery to replace 210 (Staffordshire) Battery, which moves into 103 Regiment and re-roles to Light Gun] and 457 (Hampshire Yeomanry) Battery will employ the self-propelled, Stormer-mounted Starstreak variant.
This allows the regiment to mirror the structure of the regular vSHORAD regiment, 12 RA, which has 12 Bty armed with the Lightweight LML (12 Bty's main role is provide air defence for high readiness reaction forces, particularly from 16 Air Assault brigade) launcher and two batteries on Stormer.

Despite reports in 2009 / 2010 that the Stormer HVM would be retired, the system is still going strong and it is one of the most interesting bits of kit around. Following the modernisation, it has built-in training simulation features, a new Thermal Imaging sight and the capability to employ the LMM missile together with / in replacement of the normal Starstreak.
The multi-role LMM missile, if brought into Army service (for now it is only on order for the Royal Navy as an anti-FIAC weapon for the Wildcat helicopter), would make the Stormer HVM a powerful multi-role platform capable to strike ground targets at long range. The new Thermal Sight also makes it useful for reconnaissance and surveillance roles.
12 Regiment has two batteries of 12 vehicles each (in two troops of 6), and 106 Regiment should have the same structure, even if it'll normally work with just an handful of vehicles for training purposes.

Not directly related to the Reserves, but important, is the news that 7 Royal Horse Artillery, the artillery regiment supporting 16 Air Assault Brigade, is restructuring on just 3 batteries, down from 5.
Manpower levels and guns will be retained: this suggests that the HQ and TacGroup batteries will be merged, and the guns will be given to two larger batteries instead of three smaller ones. This reflects the reduction of the brigade to just two regular PARA battalions.



The Royal Armoured Corps is re-badging a regiment, transferring the RHQ of the Royal Mercian and Lancastrian Yeomanry to Edinburgh and renaming it to The Scottish and North Irish Yeomanry.
The "new" regiment will be paired to the Royal Scots Dragoon Guards.
The Queen's Own Yeomanry and The Royal Yeomanry are the other two light cavalry formations. 

The Royal Wessex Yeomanry is confirmed as the Armoured Resilience Regiment. It is restructuring on HQ plus three Sabre squadrons, to reflect the new Type 56 structure used by the regular tank regiments. The Reserve formation is expected to provide Challenger 2 crews on 90 days and a formed Sqn on 180 days.



Original Article:

Philip Hammond is still replying to questions in the House of Commons regarding the White Paper for the armed forces reserves restructuring. The White Paper itself, along with supporting documents, is available on the MOD website.

Information on the "hundreds" of changes to units and sub-units within the newly renamed ARMY RESERVE is still very lacking to say the least (what a surprise), but the following changes are already official:

Changes to Army Reserve:

Royal Mercian and Lancastrian Yeomanry HQ moves to Edinburgh, takes command of yeomanry units in Scotland and Northern Ireland, becomes Scottish and North Irish Yeomanry.
Existing RMLY squadrons stay where they are, get re-subordinated to the english light cavalry regiments.

The following units will be withdrawn from the ORBAT, with their sub-units will either be withdrawn, re-roled or re-subordinated to another unit in the Army Reserve’s Order of Battle

100 Royal Artillery
72 Royal Engineer
73 Royal Engineer
38 Royal Signal
88 Postal and Courier
160 Transport
165 Port
166 Supply
168 Pioneer

The following units re-role / change:

152 Transport regiment becomes, as expected, 152 Fuel Support Regiment
155 Transport regiment re-roled, re-badges and becomes the new 165 Port and Enabling Regiment
156 Transport regiment becomes 156 Supply Regiment

The REME get:

101 Bn
104 Bn
105 Bn
106 Bn

Intelligence Corps get two new battalions:

6 Bn
7 Bn


The above information is contained in the ministerial Written Statement.

There is still a lot of holes in the coverage of this huge reform programme: even the House of Commons is revolting against the lack of information, as the documents related to the brief and undetailed oral statement have not arrived or have been distributed only very late in the debate.


New or re-opened Reserve sites: 

Site summary: New or re-opened Reserve Sites:

Site	Location	RFCA	Force
ARMY
Kinnegar Bks	Belfast	N Ireland	Army
Batley TAC	Bradford	Yorks & Humbs	Army
Bristol	Bristol	Wessex	Army
Redford Cav Bks	Edinburgh	Lowlands	Army
St George's Bks	N Luffenham	East Midlands	Army
LWC	Warminster	Wessex	Army
Rochester Row TAC	Westminster	London	Army
Carver Bks	Wimbish	East Anglia	Army
Yeovil TAC	Yeovil	Wessex	Army
NAVY
Cardiff	Cardiff	Wales	Navy
Edinburgh	Edinburgh	Lowlands	Navy
RAF
RAF Woodvale	Formby	North West	RAF
RAF Cranwell	Sleaford	East Midlands	RAF
Total:	13

Reserve sites to be vacated:


Site Summary: Surplus Sites

Site	Location	RFCA	Force
ARMY
Armagh TAC	Armagh	N Ireland	Army
Ashington TAC	Ashington	North East	Army
St John's Hill TAC	Battersea	London	Army
Berwick-upon-Tweed TAC	Berwick-upon-Tweed	North East	Army
Eden Armoury TAC	Bishop Auckland	North East	Army
Belleview Bks	Bradford	Yorks & Humbs	Army
Coltman House TAC	Burton-upon-Trent	West Midlands	Army
Caernarfon TAC	Caernarfon	Wales	Army
Clapham TAC	Clapham	London	Army
Myrtle St TAC	Crewe	North West	Army
Bothwell House TAC	Dunfermline	Highlands	Army
Dunoon TAC	Dunoon	Highlands	Army
McDonald Rd TAC	Edinburgh	Lowlands	Army
Stanney Lane TAC	Ellesmere Port	North West	Army
Carmunnock Rd TAC	Glasgow	Lowlands	Army
Newport TAC	Isle of Wight	South East	Army
Keighley TAC	Keighley	Yorks & Humbs	Army
Keith TAC	Keith	Highlands	Army
Kidderminster TAC	Kidderminster	West Midlands	Army
Kirkcaldy TAC	Kirkcaldy	Highlands	Army
Townsend Ave TAC	Liverpool	North West	Army
Argyll Road TAC	Llandudno	Wales	Army
Ardwick Green TAC	Manchester	North West	Army
Stockton Road TAC	Middlesbrough	North East	Army
Northallerton TAC	Northallerton	Yorks & Humbs	Army
Redhill TAC	Redhill	South East	Army
London Rd TAC	Romford	London	Army
Seabrooke House TAC	Rugby	West Midlands	Army
New Broad Street TAC	Stratford upon Avon	West Midlands	Army
Swaffham TAC	Swaffham	East Anglia	Army
Walsall TAC	Walsall	West Midlands	Army
Washington TAC	Washington	North East	Army
Wick TAC	Wick	Highlands	Army
Ubique Bks	Widnes	North West	Army
Duncombe Bks	York	Yorks & Humbs	Army
NAVY
DORSET HOUSE	Bristol	Wessex	Navy
RMR HENLEY	Henley-on-Thames	South East	Navy
HMS SHERWOOD	Nottingham	East Midlands	Navy
Total:	38

More updates to follow as information is released.


UPDATES

Among the changes and re-roling, there are impressive changes:

307 Battery, 100 Royal Artillery regiment will be absorbed by 4 (East of England) Company, 4th MERCIAN infantry battalion.

D Coy, 3 Princess's of Wales Royal Regiment will have an even more impressive change of heart, as it will make way for a new reserve Army Air Corps squadron, 679 Sqn, part of 6 Regiment AAC.



SABRE.co.uk has a series of useful infographics showing what the White Paper is about.




UPDATE:

Thanks a million to Benjamin of Wight for finding and linking the document containing the whole restructuring plan.
This same document (possibly along with others?) is expected to become available tomorrow on parliament.uk. 

DOCUMENT detailing the changes 

A wider selection of documents is available, with an useful graphic on roles and position of the Reserve elements in the Army structure, pairings included.  

Typhoon: it'll keep us waiting forever

The Ministry of Defence has revealed, in an article on the magazine Defence Focus, issue 273, August 2013, the next planned milestones for the Typhoon fighter jet.
A lot of capability is coming, but, as always with this plane which has sucked the MOD budget dry over decades, slowly. So slowly that, well before the plane is mature, the 52 jets of the Tranche 1 will be withdrawn from service unless there is a (more and more unlikely) change of plan. So slowly that, unless Typhoon gets a mid-life upgrade and life extension, maturity will be achieved just nine years before the type is expected to retire from service.
It is frankly astonishing and depressing to see how the Typhoon sets for itself modest targets and yet constantly fails to achieve them. The weapons that have to get integrated on the aircraft aren't new, except for the Meteor anti-air missile. Brimstone, Paveway IV, Storm Shadow, have all been in service for years and have all long been expected to be integrated on the Typhoon. Yet, even the In Service Date (ISD) for Paveway IV is two years away (2015). A depressingly long time, for the integration of a laser/GPS guided bomb and for the preparation of the force for its use.

The milestones ahead are:

January 2014: delivery of first Typhoon Tranche 3A (airframe number BS116) to the RAF
April 2015: 5th (and last, almost certainly) frontline Typhoon squadron stands up on RAF Lossiemouth
2015: full ISD for the Paveway IV
2016: first Typhoon tranche 1 scheduled to be withdrawn from service, a mere 10 years after the first frontline RAF squadron (3 Sqn) was stood up at Coningsby
2017: Meteor initial testing
2018: Meteor ISD. Storm Shadow ISD at the "end of the year"
2020: Brimstone 2 missile ISD
2021: AESA radar expected to reach full capability

2030: currently expected Out of Service Date for Typhoon

A tiny little bit of good news comes from the fact that the 27mm gun mounted on Typhoon (which years ago barely survived a mental plan to get rid of it to save some money) has now been given Frangible Armour-Piercing (FAP) ammunition, made by the german Rheinmetall.

The company thus offers a new type of ammunition for its 27mm automatic cannon. Highly effective against hard- and soft-skinned targets, the company’s frangible armour-piercing (FAP) ammunition 27 x 145mm/ PEB 327 performs its mission without conventional explosives or a fuze. Weighing 260 grams, the projectile is completely inert. It consists of a core made of a frangible tungsten mix, enveloped by several layers of tungsten-steel alloy. When the projectile penetrates the target’s outer skin, it progressively breaks up, causing catastrophic damage as it travels deeper into the internal structure of the target. A high-energy cloud of fragments and shrapnel results, reliably destroying the target. Thanks to its inert projectile and lack of toxic elements, the FAP 27mmx145 is also suitable for training purposes. Moreover, there is no need to store special service ammunition, obviating the need for expensive demilitarisation at the end of its shelf-life. This results in substantially lower lifecycle costs. Rheinmetall has already started to supply the Royal Air Force, the first customer for the 27 mm FAP, with 244,000 rounds of this innovative ammunition.

FAP ammunition is a valuable addition to the Typhoon's capability, especially when coupled with the proper software for land attack, rolling out now with the current program of Typhoon enhancements. This includes gun strafing modes.  

But all the rest is not pleasant. The dates are all uncomfortable. And this is before further delays happen, obviously. In particular, the AESA radar is likely to suffer further slippages, as there is no contract at all agreed by the partner nations with the Euroradar consortium. Only hopes that drag themselves forwards, year on year, barely alive.
Paveway IV integration is ongoing by a long time, and it is depressing to see that ISD is still so far away. I don't think there's any other case in the whole world where the integration of a 500 lbs bomb and its release to service take so damn long.

There is a contract signed for the integration of Meteor on the Typhoon, finally. The document was only signed last June, buring the Paris air show. The 2018 ISD for Meteor represent the hundredth slippage of the intended entry into service of this new air-to-air missile. In the NAO Major Projects report 2012, the ISD for the missile was described as:

The first Front Line Unit is declared Operational with at least (CONF)*** missiles and having demonstrated achievement of In-Service Date 2 Key Performance Measures.

and was scheduled for June 2017, after having been planned for 2015. Earlier still, the ISD had been planned for 2012. 
The extent of the delays to Meteor has been so great that the RAF has had to maintain a stock of AIM-120 AMRAAM missiles for use on the Typhoon, which would otherwise have entered service without a medium/long range AA weapon. The OSD for AMRAAM has had to be pushed to the right already twice, and the NAO notes that the AIM-120 missiles could exhuaust their intended shelf life before the replacement is delivered.

There is some risk that part of the Advanced Medium Range Air-to-Air Missile stocks will not endure until the revised In-Service Date and hence we may fall below the minimum required stockpile liability, although this cannot be confirmed at present.

As far as i know, the Storm Shadow and Brimstone situation could be even worse. Their integration has suffered constant delays in the years, and there is not yet a signed contract, which means that further delays are more than possible.
Storm Shadow, however, should begin test flights on the Typhoon this year, thanks to Saudi Arabia's money and requests. Hopefully, at least the (ridiculous) 2018 target will be met.

The Brimstone 2020 ISD is an even greater problem, as the Tornado GR4, the only platform currently employing the missile, will be retired from RAF service by the end of March 2019, meaning that even in the best case scenario, there will be another gap (the hundredth) in the capabilities of the british armed forces. Any further delay would make the situation even worse. The Typhoon is due to receive the Brimstone 2, the new variant, in development, of the successful Brimstone Dual Mode, comprising a new, more lethal and multipurpose insensitive-munition (IM) compliant warhead and IM rocket motor.

It is expected that the Typhoon will be used, possibly as early as next year, as the platform for the flight tests of the SPEAR 3 missile, a new weapon in development specifically for use on (and into, crucially) the F35. It would be a nice addition to the Typhoon's capability, but there seem to be no plan for integration, and judging from the other weapons, it would take a decade anyway...

The Conformal Fuel Tanks aren't mentioned among the milestones, but one has to hope that they will be adopted at some point, because Storm Shadow, despite early promises, seem to only be compatible with the two "wet" underwing pylons. Which means that, in order to carry the larger cruise missile, Typhoon must do away with external tanks, dramatically reducing its fuel load and, consequently, its strike range. CFTs would remedy to this problem.

There is a very real risk (and in some cases, a certainty) that important capabilities will be (at least) gapped as the Tornado GR4 force is swiftly reduced, then wholly removed from service in March 2019. The RAPTOR high-definition imaging reconnaissance pod has not a planned future after the withdrawal of Tornado, and a replacement is not in sight. For a while at least, there might not be the capability to fire Brimstone missiles. And further delays are always possible, which would make everything even worse.
By April 2014, two of the five Tornado GR4 squadrons will be disbanded: 617 Sqn and 12(B) Sqn will go, with the first scheduled to move onto the JSF program to work up to become the first british, frontline F35B squadron.
It will 2016 before the squadron stands up again, in the US, on the MCAS Beaufort airbase, and 2018 before it moves to Marham, in the UK, and achieves an initial combat capability. A second F35B squadron, with navy colors, will stand up later on, with the plan yet to be finalized and announced.

With the fifth squadron on Typhoon to stand up only in 2015, it means that next year the RAF will be down to just 7 frontline squadrons (four on Typhoon, three on Tornado GR4) and only in 2015 will return to 8 (5 + 3).
The consistency of the frontline fleet will further drop in 2019, when the remaining Tornado squadrons disbanded. It is seen as highly likely that, during 2019 and 2020 at least, the UK will be lining a paltry six frontline squadrons of combat jets (5 Typhoon, 1 on F35B) rising to seven possibly within 2023.

Some time ago, it was suggested that the Tranche 1 Typhoons could be kept into the 2020s, to sustain a sixth and perhaps even a seventh squadron, to keep up the number of frontline fast jets formations. It does not seem to be the plan. The suggestion would appear to have been turned down, if it ever was seriously made within the RAF.
That means retiring 52 Typhoons aging just about 10 years each, while cutting, in the next six years, the number of combat squadrons from 9 to 6.
Before the SDSR 2010, the combat squadrons were 12 (3 Typhoon, 2 Harrier, 7 Tornado GR4), and this means that, in less than ten years, the consistency of the UK's fast jet force will have been brutally halved. And despite promises of possible "additional F35 orders", it is hard to see the force being in the position to argue for the regrowth of combat squadrons if the number is allowed to drop so much, so quickly.

This Typhoon shows off its payload capability: from bottom to top, ASRAAM, Meteor, Storm Shadow, Brimstone 2, Meteors and 1000 liters fuel tank under belly, a SPEAR 3 rack, Taurus, Meteor, ASRAAM. In practice, for several more years, the only stores actually cleared for use on Typhoon are ASRAAM and the belly fuel tank.

Regardless of what you think of the airplane, Typhoon is a disaster under many points of view. It is taking ages to live up to its promises, a lot of its capability will continue to exist only on paper for many more years. It has sucked the MOD budget dry over decades, swallowing billions of pounds. And when the deliveries are completed, around 2018, the RAF will have taken 160 Typhoons without, on current plans, ever having more than 5 frontline squadrons. That's a combat force of 60 aircrafts, from a total order of 160.
For each frontline Typhoon squadron of 12 airplanes, if the retirement of the Tranche 1 between 2016 and 2019 goes ahead, the MOD will have procured and paid for 32 aircrafts. An abomination.



F35: 48 guaranteed. Maybe not.

The F35, in the meanwhile, is moving onwards. Main Gate 4 is due in the coming months. This is expected to mean approving the purchase of 14 jets, which will be used to form the first frontline squadron on the new type (617 Sqn).
The UK has so far received three airplanes, to be used for tests and evaluation. A fourth aircraft will be part of the LRIP 7 lot of production, and long lead orders have been placed for four more inside LRIP 8.
The fourteen jets to be now approved might or might not include these four. It is not clear yet.

17 Squadron has given up its Typhoons (moved to 41(R) Sqn) and has disbanded to move onwards towards an F35B role. Between late 2014 and early 2015, the squadron will stand up again, on Edwards AFB, in the USA, as Operational Evaluation Unit for the british F35B force. 617 Sqn is scheduled to stand up in 2016 as the first operational squadron, based on MCAS Beaufort, where the personnel will be trained and the squadron built up to strenght before it moves back to the UK in 2018.

Flightglobal reports that decisions on weapons integration will have to be made as well. Unfortunately, this part is not as clear as we'd like. SPEAR 3 is described as a replacement for Brimstone, and this is incorrect as they are two completely different weapon systems and will actually co-exist at least for part of their service life. The misunderstanding probably generates from the fact that all complex weapons programs in the air sector have been grouped under SPEAR (Selective Precision Effect At Range); with SPEAR Capability 1 covering development and improvements to the Paveway IV bomb, SPEAR Capability 2 covering the evolution of Brimstone, SPEAR Capability 3 being a whole new weapon primarily developed with the F35 in mind, and with SPEAR 4 being the planned mid-life upgrade to Storm Shadow, to be made in the early 2020s in collaboration with the french. 
Here is interesting to note the 24 number: in order to carry 24 SPEAR 3 missiles, the F35 will have to carry six quadruple racks, which means four will be carried externally, under the wings. This seems a wise approach.

Paveway IV, at least for now, is only being integrated for internal transport, which means just two bombs. Hopefully, this is only valid for Block 3 software, with an expansion to cover external pylons afterwards, because it would be a waste to ignore the other hardpoints.

The ASRAAM situation couldn't be more confused than it is. Once it was planned (who knows why) that it would be integrated for all-internal carriage, with four missiles to be fitted in the bays. This ridiculous arrangement, which would give a stealth load consisting of just four short-range AAM, in a sort of modern imitation of the Sea Harrier FSR1, was abandoned by 2008, with the decision to move to an integration plan comprising two internal and two external missiles.
Now, although it is not clearly explained, it seems we are down (as was to be expected, see my earlier reports on the complexities of using IIR, rail launched missiles from inside the weapon bays) to the sole external integration.

F35 sporting an internal load of 8 SPEAR 3 and two Meteor missiles. Sometime in the future. Hopefully...

The good but bad news of the day is that the MOD is still only hoping to have Meteor integrated as part of the release of the software Block 4 on the F35 fleet (not before 2020, indicatively). The news is good because it confirms that the MOD is working on it, but it is bad because, by this point, we should have much more than just hopes in hand.
One year ago, the US hoped to finalize the list of requirements for Block IV by March 2013, but it seems the target has been missed.
The delay in formulating a final request for Meteor integration might be partly due to difficult negotiations between UK and Italy: the two nations hope to share the Meteor integration costs on a 50:50 basis, but in Italy the F35 is a particularly sore political subject right now, and the italian MOD is probably having a tough time in getting a go ahead for this project.

Perhaps more worrisome is the news that even the 48 F35B order promised as part of the 10 year budget will actually be approved on at least two separate Main Gates: according to Flightglobal, a "Main Gate 5", planned for around 2017 is "expected to approve the remaining balance of the first tranche of F-35 procurement."
In practice, if Main Gate 4 approves the order of 14 airplanes, in addition to the 3+1+4 already delivered, ordered or pre-ordered, Main Gate 5 will have to confirm the order for the remaining 26 airplanes.

In the middle, in 2015, there's a Strategic Defence Review. And they never seem to deliver good news.

If it is true, the British Army is dead 

The Telegraph says that in October all the 31 remaining battalions of the army under Army 2020 will be cut back further, to 520-man establishments.

This is a completely new thing. The Army has been planning to reach the 82.000 regulars figure having only Light Role infantry battalions cut back to comparable levels, and even those actually higher: 561 men. Considering that this means removing one rifle platoon from each Company, hoping in a top-up coming from paired reserve battalion before deployment, i can't even begin to imagine what a battalion of 520 men would look like. It would probably be utterly useless.


The reduction to Light Role Infantry battalions and Gurkhas already can't be described as smart because the Reserves recruitment is, so far at least, going horribly, and there are three such downsized infantry battalions which do not have at all a paired reserve battalion from which to draw manpower: 1 SCOTS battalion and the two Gurkha battalions are left unpaired in the announced Army 2020 plan, because there are not enough reserve infantry battalions.

The figures released so far to Parliament and Defence Committee about the establishments of the major components of Army 2020 speak of:

729 armoured infantry battalion
709 mechanised infantry battalion
561 Light Role Infantry
581 Foxhound-mounted infantry
567 Gurkha battalion
660 PARA battalion
587 Challenger 2 tank regiment
528 FRES SV reconnaissance regiment
404 Jackal-mounted light cavalry regiment
370 Adaptable Artillery light gun regiment (apparently with only two gun batteries, a paltry 12 L118 guns. I'm unable to confirm this at 100% certainty at the moment)
around 600 Reaction Artillery regiment (18 AS90 in three batteries, 6 GMLRS in one battery)
around 600 Reaction Royal Engineer regiment
around 500 Adaptable Royal Engineer regiment

An armoured infantry battalion of 520 is frankly unthinkable of. It would probably be able to field a single company.

Since the above are Army 2020 figures, the new cut announced by the Telegraph is either:

- Not true
- Indication that the Army and MOD are total idiots which did not understand the extent of the manpower reduction and are back to square one
- Indication that the 82.000 regulars are to become even fewer already, while sticking to the absurd rule that no more goddamned capbadges must go

In any case but the first, the Army is about to become entirely useless. If the Telegraph is right, the mania of protecting capbadges has reached the level of absolute foolishness.

If the second point is true, serious questions must be asked about Army top brass, and about the Army itself, because if the target is still 82.000 regulars, they have to explain where all the manpower goes. 82.000 should be more than adequate to sustain the establishments announced so far. 



Assembly of the Ski Jump on HMS Queen Elizabeth: more complex than you think 

The 200-ft.-long ramp is the longest ever fitted to a carrier and, like the Queen Elizabeth-class carriers (QEC) themselves, is the first of its type to be purpose-designed from the outset for F-35 operations. Angled at 12.5 deg., the ramp wiii be 20-ft. high and is designed to reduce the required deck roll on takeoff by up to 50%, or allow an increased payload of up to 20%. The ramp achieves this by boosting vertical velocity, giving the aircraft a ballistic launch profile that provides it with additional time to accelerate to flying speed.

The assembly of the Ski Jump on HMS Queen Elizabeth has started, and it is not so straightforward a process. The ramp has been carefully designed by BAE in collaboration with Lochkeed Martin, to make sure that it is fully and safely compatible with the F35B.

You'll find the details on Aviation Week & Space Technology / 19 Aug 2013 pp.33-34, in the article: "RAMP UP - Deck-mounted ski-jump assembly marks key step toward U.K. carrier-based JSF operations", by Guy Norris.

The first section of Ski Jump is already on deck. Photo by cockneyjock1974

A spectacular diagram showing the current state of the assembly, by Wizz

Remember that an excellent place where to follow in almost real time the assembly of the new carriers is the huge thread up at MilitaryPhotos.net.



RAF pilot is the first non-US pilot to operate an F35B at sea

RAF Squadron Leader Jim Schofield, is the first international pilot to have conducted sea-based launch and landing in the F-35B.
Schofield made history while flying from USS Wasp, during the ongoing second period of sea trials for the F35B. A third test period is planned for the future, to lead to US Marines Initial Operating Capability in 2015. 

Short description of the contract or purchase(s):

Armoured military vehicles. To provide Fleet Conversion services for the Army's Protected Mobility (PM) fleet of vehicles to achieve the correct variant mix to meet the requirements of the Army 2020 (A2020) Force Development Strategy, against the following vehicle types, hereafter known as 'The Platforms'.

Mastiff – all variants,

Ridgback – all variants,

Wolfhound – all variants,

Fleet Conversion.

Currently envisaged deliverables to include, but not be limited to:

— Mastiff Troop Carrying Variant (MAS TCV) to Mastiff Enhanced Communications Variant (MAS ECV) Conversion,

— Ridgback Troop Carrying Variant (RBK TCV) to Ridgback Command Variant (RBK CV) Conversion,

— Wolfhound Explosive Ordinance Disposal (WHD EOD) variant to Wolfhound Military Working Dog (WHD MWD) variant Conversion,

— Mastiff 1 to Mastiff 2 Conversion.

Note that none of the variants mentioned are new. The Mastiff 2 Enhanced Communications Variant is already in service. Work to outfit this variant, as well as the Ridgback Command Variant was done in 2010 by General Dynamics UK.
These variants are among several others that are less known that the standard troop carriers. The MOD in 2010 stated, via DESIDER magazine, that "just under 200" Mastiff 2 had been procured since December 2008, in six variants:

- Troop Carrying Variant (making "more than half" of the fleet)
- Battlefield ambulance
- Protected Eyes
- Interim Electronic Countermeasures
- Interim EOD (at least 23)
- Enhanced Communications Variant



There is even a RAF Regiment variant of the Mastiff, the PRAETORIAN, which in itself very closely resembles the Mastiff PROTECTED EYES, the command vehicle for the Talisman route clearance convoys. They appear to be fitted with the same ROTAS eletro optic sensor turret on telescopic mast and with the same M151 Protector Remote Weapon Station. PRAETORIAN isn't listed among the variants, possibly because it is counted together with Protected Eyes.

Mastiff 2 Protected Eyes, leading a Talisman convoy during training. Beautiful photo by Rick Ingham, all credits due to him.

The Enhanced Communications Variant carries the BOWMAN Enhanced Communications Suite, comprising HF and VHF radio, plus satellite communications. A similar suite equips the Ridgback command vehicle.

Evidently, however, the vehicles available in these specialist variants aren't enough to meet the requirements of the Army 2020 force structure, so a number of conversions are needed. It would appear likely that these conversions will mostly be done to Mastiff 2 and Mastiff 1 uplifted to MK2 standard, leaving the more modern and capable Mastiff 3 (around 100?), which offers greater mobility, for the troop carrying role.

The Mastiff 3 in fact introduced a more powerful engine, assisted by a gearbox with six speeds instead of five. Increased braking power is also available, while comfort and ease of embarkation for the two crew members and eight dismounts is given by a roof height increased by 7 inches and by opening armoured front doors.  

American sources suggest that the UK has bought a total of 314 Mastiff vehicles, all MKs, all variants.
The Wolfhound order total sits at 125, on two separate contracts.
The Ridgback order was for 154 vehicles.
For obvious reasons, it is likely that not all of them will be useable and retained once their use in combat operations in Afghanistan ends.  

It is curious to see that Wolfhound EOD variants are apparently considered excess to requirement, while a greater number of Military Working Dogs pods are required. This might indicate that the EOD regiments have settled on different platforms for their needs (Mastiff itself, perhaps?) while the Military Working Dog regiment is happy with its own variant.
Again, both variants are in fact already in service: according to MOD sources, at least 44 pods for the transport of dog kennels have been procured, alongside an unspecified number of EOD pods. The wolfhound is also used for general, tactical transport duties and has also been used in theatre as towing vehicle for the L118 Light Gun. In fact, three variants exist: general purpose flatbed cargo carrier, EOD and Military Working Dog carrier.

The MOD also procured 30 surplus american Cougar 6x6 and 4x4 vehicles, to be used as basic training fleet. The Cougar 6x6 is the base vehicle which, with many extensive modifications, turns into Mastiff, while the 4x4 is the base for Ridgback. These 30 vehicles, known as Cougar Training Vehicles (CTV) might or might not be kept in the long term as training fleet. The uncertainty comes from an earlier contract notice put out by the MOD for the provision of: 

Post Design Services (PDS) including the design and development of modifications and the delivery of associated mod kits, against the following vehicle types, hereafter known as “The Platforms”.

— Mastiff – All variants;
— Wolfhound – All variants;
— Ridgback – All Variants;
— Roll Over Drills and Egress Trainer (RODET);
— Possibly, Cougar Training Vehicles (CTV);
— Possibly, Buffalo – All Variants;
— Possibly, CHOKER Mine roller System.

Note that in the "possible" platforms are not mentioned in the newer contract notice. This could mean a separate contract will eventually follow, but among the possible meanings there is also the intention of the MOD not to continue investing in this valuable equipment. This would be particularly painful in the case of Buffalo Rummage A2 and Rummage A2 MK2 (improved, safer and 1 ton heavier), as these are fundamental pieces of the Talisman route-clearance convoys. Abandoning CHOKER would also be quite a waste of equipment which continues to have a value, was high in demand until very recently and would again be in high demand as soon as the armed forces were once more dealing with the IED and mine menace. 

Buffalo Rummage A2 towing a PANAMA unmanned Land Rover with IED search equipment. The future of the excellent Talisman "system of systems" remains unclear. What is the Army planning to do with it?

Following the evolution of the Protected Mobility Fleet and its ancillary equipment, such as mine rollers and other kit, will be an important (and challenging) part of studying, analyzing and surveying the fate of the British Army.
At least, the variety of combat proven variants already available means that the Cougar-derived family is the perfect base for building a capable fleet covering all the key roles. That's very important because many of these roles truly need modern solutions rolled into service.
It is also important because, while we are promised that FRES UV will replace Mastiff in the mechanized battalions by around 2025, history reminds us that the 6x6 "super-trucks" could end serving the Army for a far longer time.

In the meanwhile, other vehicle fleets are being brough back home, and restored to full efficiency to return in service.

 

The concept art released for MARS SSS clearly shows a Ro-Ro ramp access (closed), a couple of LCVP MK5s with cranes, a triple hangar for Merlin helicopters and a large, two-spot flight deck. The stern view shows what seems to be a well dock, open for boat operations. Two H-RAS masts are present on the port side, while only one is provided starboard. The RAS masts on the port side are positioned to be able to link up to aircraft lifts openings in the hull of the Queen Elizabeth class aircraft carriers.

USS Ponce and Cardigan Bay together in the Gulf, followed by the minesweepers that they support and protect. Cardigan bay shows the hangar she has finally been fitted with, and the Marinised Land Phalanx Weapon System installation on the cargo deck.

This close up better shows the temporary solution represented by the MLPWS Phalanx fit

RFA Lyme Bay, deployed on Cougar 13 right now, shows, for the first time, a properly integrated fit of Phalanx CIWS guns, placed in the intended, originally Fitted For But Not With positions.

The Bays could have been fitted with Goalkeeper mounts, but the Royal Navy is standardizing on Phalanx and will withdraw from service all Goalkeeper mounts by 2015. The positions evidenced in the photos above have now been used for Phalanx, at least on Lyme Bay. It is hoped that all three ships will be similarly outfitted. A careful look at the photos will also show that Cardigan Bay and Lyme Bay show new radomes, probably part of the Data Link 16 and communications fit coming from the withdrawn Type 22 frigates.

Boats in the well dock

The dutch JSS shows the stern "steel beach", right near the opening of the RoRo access ramp

Design detail of the steel beach

An image of the hull of the JSS during her building. The large steel beach is very evident

RAS operations today with Fort vessels.

Storm Shadow missile being pulled out of its shipping container

Operation Kipion is the constant presence in the Gulf of powerful RN assets, centered on the MCM force of four minesweepers.

The expanded MCM force in the Gulf has now been given the collective identity of 9th MCM Squadron. The badge has already been worn by MCM forces of the Royal Navy in the Gulf in the past

MCM global deployment, US Navy style

One of our submarines had already watched the Args laying mines to the east of Port Stanley harbor entrance (called Port William, incidentally), which was after all the most obvious place for us to land. So we knew well enough that they were perfectly capable of laying mines across the northern end of Falklands Sound as well. For that matter they might even go for the Southern end too, depending on how many they had, how much time they had and whether they thought it necessary. And since it now seemed fairly certain that our General Directive would change in a way that which would render Carlos Water our automatic choice for the landings, I wanted to do my best to ensure that we did not lose half a dozen ships and a couple of thousand men four miles short of the landing area.

If I had been an Argentinian and had suspected even for one moment that the british were coming in to land in Carlos Bay, I would have laid as many mines in the north and south entrances to Falkland Sound as I could. That would have eliminated all worry about the Brits landing anywhere along either side of the Sound. It would have been a considerable weight off my mind. We did not, of course, know whether they had done just that… or something very like it.  

For my part, however, mine-sweepers and their special equipment I did not have, which meant that I would have to use something else – and the hull of a ship was the only suitable hardware available. The only steel which would go deep enough. Now, plainly I could not use the two indispensable Type 22 frigates Broadsword or Brilliant with their close-range Sea Wolf systems. I also clearly could not send in my remaining Type 42s Coventry and Glasgow with their invaluable long-range Sea Dart systems. And equally surely, it really wasn’t on to send a merchant ship or RFA. It had to be a ship though – and it would have to be a Royal Navy warship. But it would also have to be something cheap and cheerful which I could replace, like a 3000-ton Type 21 frigate. Like Alacrity. Like expendable Alacrity.

Now, I did not particularly relish the prospect of ringing up Commander Christophere Craig and saying, “Tonight I would like you to go and see if you can get yourself sunk by a mine in the Falkland Sound. By the way, I will put Arrow up at the northern end to observe events and in case she’s needed to pick up survivors.” Nor, when it came to sending the amphibians in, could I possibly follow the instincts of the fabled American Civil War admiral, David Farragut, who roared at the entrance to Mobile Bay in 1869, “Damn the torpedoes. Full speed ahead!”

I did neither. Instead I phoned Commander Craig on the voice-encrypted network and said, “Er,… Christopher, I would like you to do a circumnavigation of East Falkland tonight, all the way around to the south, then north up Falkland Sound and out past Fanning Head to rendezvous with Arrow.” I also told him to come up the Sound very noisily, exploding a few star-shells and generally frightening the life out of the Args. I added, “If you see anything move, sink it, but be out of there and home by dawn, so you are clear of the land before they can fly.”

He was silent for a few moments and then he said, “Umm, I expect you would like me to go in and out of the north entrance a few times, Admiral. Do a bit of zig-zagging.”

“Oh,” I said, feigning surprise and feeling about two inches high. “Why do you ask that?”

“I expect you would like me to find out whether there are any mines there,” he said quietly.

I cannot remember what I said. But I remember how I felt. I think I just mentioned that I thought that would be quite useful.

He replied, with immense dignity, “Very well, Sir.” Then he went off to prepare for the possible loss of his ship and people the best way he could. I shall remember him as one of the bravest men I ever met. This was Victoria Cross material but, strangely, only if it went wrong.

I personally felt awful not to have had the guts to be honest with him and wondered what the devil he was going to tell his ship’s company about their task tonight and about my pitiful performance, which, for a sea-going admiral to one of his commanders, beggared description.

Thus ended quietly, and no doubt gratefully so, an extraordinary story of courage, which will go, I’m afraid, largely unnoticed in the annals of maritime history. COMAW (Commodore, Amphibious Warfare, Michael Clapp) certainly was completely unimpressed by Alacrity’s efforts. But had it ended in tragedy it would have joined the sagas of Jervis Bay or Glowworm being presented to young naval officers of the future as a supreme example of selflessness and devotion to duty. If they had hit a mine, Commander Craig would have been most strongly recommended for the award of a VC – but, thank goodness, he didn’t.

Type 26 frigate

On April 17 this year, the Armed Forces Committee of the House of Representatives had a hearing on the aviation plans of the services, with the following high-profile witnesses:


• Lieutenant General Charles R. Davis USAF 
Military Deputy, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition

• Lieutenant General Burt Field 
Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, Plans and Requirements, U.S. Air Force, USAF

• Rear Admiral Bill Moran USN 
Director of the Air Warfare Division, U.S. Navy

• Lieutenant General Robert E. Schmidle USMC 
Deputy Commandant of the Marine Corps for Aviation, U.S. Marine Corps

• Vice Admiral W. Mark Skinner USN
Principal Military Deputy to the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development, and Acquisition), U.S. Navy

• Mr. Michael J. Sullivan
Director of Acquisition and Sourcing, U.S. Government Accountability Office


During the hearing, a juicy information was dropped about the future shape of the fighter/attack fleet of the US Marines Corps, which represents a very noticeable change from earlier plans daring back to the 2010 and 2011 aviation plans. The subject is, of course, the F-35. The US Marines continue to plan for a purchase of 420 aircraft, but the split between F35B and F35C has changed from 340 / 80 to 353 / 67, and the planned number of squadrons has changed very significantly.Let's see how the USMC aviation plan has evolved.


2010 plan
Up to the Memorandum of Understanding for the integration of tactical air fleet between US Navy and USMC, signed in March 2011 by the admiral Gary Roughead, the secretary for the Navy Ray Mabus and the commandant USMC James F. Amos, the USMC planned to operate a force of 420 F35B.
These were to entirely replace the "legacy force" composed by:

7 squadrons of F/A-18 Hornet A/C (12 aircraft per squadron)
5 squadrons of F/A-18 Hornet D (12 aircraft per squadron)
1 squadron of F/A-18 Hornet C (Reserve) (12 aircraft per squadron)
7 squadrons of AV-8B Harrier (14 aircraft per squadron)

1 Fleet Replacement Squadron of AV-8B and TAV-8B (28 aircraft)
1 Fleet Replacement Squadron of F/A-18 B/C/D (36 aircraft)

with a fleet of:

14 squadrons of F-35B (10 aircraft per squadron)
7 squadrons of F-35B (16 aircraft per squadron)
3 squadrons of F-35B (Reserve) (10 aircraft per squadron)

3 Fleet Replacement Squadrons of F-35B (20 aircraft each)


Post-MOU
Following the signing of the MOU on TACAIR integration, the USMC split its planned buy of F-35s between the B and C variant, with the committment to provide five squadrons of F-35C to complement the 15 US Navy squadrons on the same aircraft, needed to equip all 10 Carrier Air Wings.
This represented an uplift in the CVN responsibility of the USMC, which has so far provided only three squadrons of F/A-18 B/C/D aircraft.

The immediate effect was a change in the number of 10-aircraft F-35B squadrons, which dropped from 14 to 9, as five squadrons were now planned to deploy 10 F-35C each instead.


Today
The new USMC plan detailed in the April hearing is very different, and comes with a significant drop in the overall number of squadrons, probably due to the need to achieve significant savings in the budget.
The USMC now plans to have:

9 squadrons of F-35B (16-aircraft each)
5 squadrons of F-35B (10-aircraft each)
4 squadrons of F-35C (10-aircraft each)
2 squadrons of F-35B (Reserve) (10-aircraft each)
1 Operational Evaluation Squadron (6 F-35B)

2 Fleet Replacement Squadrons of F-35B (25 aircraft each)
10 F-35C provided for training alongside the USN's own training fleet, probably enabling the US Navy to stand up 16 instead of 15 F-35C squadrons, keeping the total of 20.

The remaining aircraft will be assigned in this way:

58 F-35B
12 F-35C

as Backup Aircraft Inventory

25 F-35B
5 F-35C

as Attrition Replacement Aircraft

The Backup Aircraft Inventory (BAI) is a reserve of airframes which are rotared into the frontline units to keep them up to strenght while aircrafts undergo scheduled and unscheduled depot-level maintenance, modifications, inspections and repairs.

The Attrition Reserve is an inventory of airframes used to replace unanticipated losses due to peacetime accidents or wartime attrition. The aircrafts can also be used to reconstitute combat units in the event of mobilization. 


The new plan will of course have an impact on Basing plans, as well. When 21 regular squadrons were planned, they were expected to be spread in the following way:

10 squadrons (plus 1 Reserve Sqn) between MCAS Beaufort and MCAS Cherry Point
5 squadrons plus OEU Sqn in MCAS Yuma (one squadron would actually be stationed to Iwakuni, Japan) 
6 squadrons in MCAS Miramar

Now it seems that both USMC F-35B training squadrons will be home-based in MCAS Beaufort, with the first, VMFAT-501 "Warlords" squadron, transferring from Eglin AFB in January 2014.
The bases will now be in competition to get a share of 18 (instead of 21) Active Component squadrons, and 2 instead of 3 Reserve Component formations.


The US Navy requirement remains set at 40 Active Duty frontline squadrons, with 440 aircraft, spread over 10 Carrier Air Wings.
In the long term, 20 squadrons will have the Super Hornet (12-aircraft per squadron) while 20 (in 2011 planned to be 15 USN + 5 USMC, now 16 + 4) will have the F-35C (10-aircraft per squadron), giving to the standard peacetime air wing a consistency of 44 strike fighter jets. Each carrier wing has two squadrons of F-35C, one squadron of F/A-18E single-seat Super Hornet and one squadron of F/A-18F twin seat.

Two Reserve squadrons (20-aircraft each) are planned, probably one for Super Hornet and one for F-35C.
There is a Fleet Replacement Squadron on each Coast, for both types. FRS have 30 aircraft each.


The transcript of the Hearing is available here.

Thanks to Tony Osborne's tweeter feed. He is one to follow, if you are not doing it already.

Tony Osborne‏@Rotorfocus40m
Tristar retirement still expected in March 14, but RAF has option of six month extension. #avgeeks

Tony Osborne‏@Rotorfocus34m@Airtanker will base one Voyager in the Falklands from March after Tristar retirement, but RAF is exploring other tanker options#avgeeks

Tony Osborne‏@Rotorfocus35m

A330/Voyager will not fit into hangar at Mount Pleasant airfield, Falkland Islands, among issues #avgeeks

Again i say, could the BAE 146 MK3 become the Falklands tanker after Afghanistan is over...?

Also, one sad but not unexpected news:

Tony Osborne‏@Rotorfocus39m

RAF will retire/withdraw four C-130J C5 (short) models during 2016 as part of drawdown of Hercules fleet. #avgeeks

In this photo by Navy Recognition, the Type 26 model seen at Euronaval 2012: there are 24 SYLVER A70 cells

Two graphics showing the complex MK26 twin-arm launcher that the MK41 replaced.Missiles were vertically struck down in the two conveyors, and vertically pushed up onto the launcher's two arms.

The uptake hatch between the two rows of four cells is very evident in this image, showing the launch of a Tomahawk. Notice the high pressure, high-temperature gas venting upwards from the hatch.

What looks like a 5+crane MK41 module is being lowered into the silo, to join three 8-cell modules already in position. Note the density of the installation. A further four 8-cell modules will follow, to form a 61 cell large silo.

Open MK41 cell hatches, showing the empty shafts. Without canisters, the MK41 is little more than a metallic frame.

An overview of the MK14 canister, employed by Tomahawk

The Tactical Lenght MK15 canister, containing the ASROC missile, and showing the MK18 canister adapter that allows the use of shorter canisters in the Strike Lenght cells

Inserting a canister down a MK41 cell

The old 5-cell plus crane MK41 module. This is no longer produced or employed, as the crane never worked as well as hoped. It remains an impressive bit of kit, though.

The original development of the MK 41 Vertical Launch System (VLS) for cruisers and destroyers in the late 1970’s included a requirement to replenish ten VLS canisters per hour, day or night in Sea State 5 conditions. The system actually installed consisted of the STREAM rig to transfer the VLS canister to the missile ship sliding padeye; then deck handling the canister to a position where a crane could tilt up the canister over an empty cell and then strike the canister down. The crane was a commercial Swedish folding crane. Three canister cells were combined to make stowage for the crane. An elevator raised or lowered the crane. The at sea VLS Unrep technical evaluation discussed in Miller (1992) identified that the crane did not have the capacity to lift Tomahawk VLS canisters; SM-2 VLS transfer rate was three per hour and the pendulum action of the crane limited Unrep to Sea State 3 conditions. The cranes are now in layup.

The new, specialized rearming facility built for Royal Navy use, with the two cranes for VLS reloading.

The concept for replenishing 15 VLS per hour in Sea State 5, shown in Figures 9, 10, 11 and 12 centers around a transportable VLS rearming device that is stowed and maintained on the Combat Logistics Force (CLF) ship. When the combatant ship comes alongside for at-sea rearming or load adjustment, the rearming device is transported from the CLF ship by the new Heavy Unrep rig to the combatant ship sliding padeye along with a team to operate the rearming device. A swing arm at the base of the sliding padeye is used to position the rearming device onto three low profile rails permanently mounted atop the VLS launcher. A hydraulic power unit on the combatant ship powers the swing arm and also the rearming device after it is on the rails. 

The CLF ship will next transfer a loaded VLS canister to the sliding padeye. The canister will be lowered to the swing arm by the sliding padeye and then be released from the transfer rig. The canister will be swung around and be picked off from the swing arm by the rearming device two clamp rings. The canister will be moved by the rearming device to a position over an empty cell. The cell hatch will open and the rearming device will erect the canister to the vertical. The canister will be lowered by a wire rope hoist into the cell. The rig will be disconnected from the end of the canister, the cell hatch will close and the canister will be connected below decks to the VLS circuits. When the VLS rearming or VLS load adjustment is completed, the rearming device and team will be returned to the CLF ship.

Loading a SYLVER A70 canister on a FREMM frigate of the french navy, in an image by DCNS. The canister is circular, not square, so more similar to Russian and Chinese systems than to the MK41!

On Singapore's FORMIDABLE frigates

On Charles De Gaulle

Replacing the Rivers?

The biggest news of the last while is the announcement that military shipbuilding in Portsmouth is closing down and 1775 jobs in the shipbuilding sector are to go, with 940 coming from Portsmouth itself and the balance from Filton, Rosyth and the Clyde's yards. The announcement did not come as a surprise, as it had been in the air for a long while. The surprise came from the fact that, althout the battle to obtain funding for the construction of two new OPVs to be produced in Portsmouth, to both reinforce the navy and keep the shipyard alive, has failed, the MOD intends to actually buy three OPVs.
This could be excellent news, wasn't for the fact that it won't actually do anything to save Portsmouth and for the fact that, at the moment at least, these three new, larger and more capable OPVs, are not presented as reinforcements but as a replacement for the current three River-class OPVs of the fishery protection squadron.

The three new OPVs are going to be larger, coming with a flight deck sized for medium helicopters up to Merlin size, and with "additional operational flexibility through extra storage capacity and accommodation". This seems to suggest that the new OPVs will have more to share with the Amazonas taken up by Brazil than with the current Royal Navy's Rivers. Depending on what exactly is meant with extra storage capacity, the new ships could also act as "prototype of sorts" for the future MHPC ships, but from the little we know the project should essentially be based on the 90m OPV design by BAE. According to BAE, the 90m OPV can embark 6 standard TEU containers 20' without occupying the flight deck.



The expected marginal cost of these three ships is expected to be in the range of 100 million pounds in addition to unavoidable TOBA fees which the MOD would have had to pay to BAE systems anyway in absence of work for the shipyards.

Under the terms of the TOBA, without a shipbuilding order to fill that gap, the MOD would be required to pay BAE Systems for shipyards and workers to stand idle, producing nothing while their skill levels faded. Such a course would add significant risk to the effective delivery of the T26 programme, which assumes a skilled work force and a working shipyard to deliver it.

Ordering ships, therefore, does make plenty of sense and it is exactly what myself and others have been shouting for a long while, asking for just two such vessels as a way to keep Portsmouth going, knowing that in a few years time the shipyards are supposed to experience another phase of major activity, enough to assume that it would be possible to keep all three major yards busy. In particular, observing the MOD plans (even bearing in mind that changes and cuts are a constant...) we have:

- Main Gate for Type 26 frigate at the end of next year with building of the first vessel expected to start in 2016. 13 vessels to be built, with the first entering service in 2021 and the last not before 2036;

- MARS Solid Support Ship: while the MARS Fleet Tanker requirement has been met ordering hulls in South Korea on the ground that tanker hulls are simple and are best built by yards which build commercial tankers all the time, the assumption is (was?) that MARS Solid Support Ship, being more complex and technologically sensitive, would be built in british yards. The Fort class supply vessels are due out of service in 2023 (Fort Austin) and 2024 (Fort Rosalie) and undoubtedly Fort Victoria is also planned to bow out roughly in the same timeframe (2025, possibly?), so the replacement vessels have to enter service in the early 2020s. If they are to be built in Britain, and now doubting of it is licit, they will overlap with the work for the Type 26 frigates.

- MHPC: in late 2012 a DSTL document said that the MCM, Hydrographic and Patrol Capability programme should deliver the first new vessel in 2028. MHPC will replace the Hunt and Sandown minesweepers and, possibly, the hydrographic ships HMS Enterprise and HMS Echo. HMS Scott and her oversized equipment are unlikely to be replaceable by the relatively small multipurpose vessel (some 3000 tons, according to most sources) envisaged for MHPC. Delivery of the first vessel in 2028 implies an overlap with the activities on the late Type 26 ships, which will continue to be built into the 2030s.

These three programs, in theory, could have kept all three the major shipyards going, if only the short gap in workload between the aircraft carriers and the Type 26 was bridged. But the decision taken indicates that either the remaining yards can do it all; or someone is anticipating being far less busy than planned; or work on MARS SSS hulls is, like that on MARS FT, heading for foreign shipyards.

The boat building activity in will survive the closure of the major surface warship activity. Of interest in this field we have the Royal Marines requirements for a Fast Landing Craft, which has however been put on hold and won't resurface before 2020, when the slow LCU Mk10 is supposed to finally retire; and the requirement for a Force Protection Craft. The fate of this second Royal Marines requirement is not clear at the moment. During DSEI this year, CTrunk, while unveiling its THOR catamaran solution for riverine, force protection and inshore mission, said that they are in contact with the MOD, which hopes to reveal its final requirements for the boat during next year.
The Force Protection Craft programme, at least until 2011 or early 2012, hoped to deliver 12 crafts, which would partially replace the current fleet of 21 LCVP MK5, from 2016.
Hopefully, the programme is still going ahead.

Waiting for clarity on how the closure of Portsmouth affects the above shipbuilding plan and hoping that closing the yard doesn't turn out to be only the first one of a series of bad news, i want to focus on the building of the three OPVs.
Subject to approval in the coming months, these new vessels will begin being built already next year, with the first due for delivery in 2017. Their biggest merits are that they do good use of money that the MOD couldn't avoid spending (in absence of the order for these ships, BAE would be entitled to around, i believe, a couple hundred millions of payments under the TOBA agreement) and that they keep the workforce going and preserves the shipbuilding skills ahead of the critically important Type 26 project.

The unpleasant bit of news about them is that they are expected, at least for now, to replace the River OPVs. These cheap and effective vessels have only been purchased outright from BAE last year, for 39 million pounds. Initially, in fact, the three ships were not owned by the Royal Navy, but they had instead been built under an arrangement with the shipbuilder, Vosper Thornycroft (VT), under which the Royal Navy leased the vessels from the shipbuilder for a period of ten years. VT were responsible for all maintenance and support for the ships during the charter period. At the end of this, the Navy could then either return the ships, renew the lease or purchase them outright. The first lease period was renewed in 2007, out to 2013. In September 2012 the outright purchase was announced.

The oldest one was only launched in 2002, so in 2017, if replaced, would bow out after a mere 15 years of life and just 14 years of service, having been commissioned in 2003. In my opinion, this is shameful and can't be allowed to happen, especially not in a Royal Navy already struggling to cover its basic, daily committments.
There is no real operational reason why the Rivers need to be urgently replaced by larger OPVs with aviation landing facilities. While additional capability is always welcome, it should not come at the cost of the Rivers. The Rivers are not combat vessels: they patrol the economic zone of the UK and control that fishery respects the rules. They are very busy ships and they are very precious in forming the officers that will then transfer to the large warships. But they have little to no combat use, they are tied to home waters and they do not really need aviation facilities that would be seldom used at best. A flight deck could be handy to operate small rotary wing UAVs, perhaps, but a Camcopter does not take a Merlin flight deck, and i'm pretty sure that enough space could be arranged in the stern of the current Rivers, if that was the idea.

The new OPVs announcement, in other words, as it has been made, smells of back-door capability slashing. The Merlin-capable flight deck immediately made me imagine an horrible scenario in which know-nothing MPs with little understanding of the military are made to think that the ability to refuel a land-based Merlin helicopter away from the shore using the OPVs is a replacement for the missing Maritime Patrol Aircraft capability, for example. Most obviously, for a tons of very good reasons, this wouldn't even rank as mitigation of the gap, and never could it be "a replacement".

The Rivers are very busy in their intended role, besides, and the replacement vessels would be just as busy, meaning that they would actually have very little chance to even try and use their greater capabilities, which in home waters are useful, at best, but not essential.
And having a Merlin-flight deck is of little use when the availability of Merlin helicopters is going to be next to none, with just 30 of them being retained and all of them already overtasked, especially with the AEW role falling on them as well, under CROWSNEST. 

One thing for which the large flight decks could be useful is for landing the S-92 helicopters of the civilian SAR service coming up, to refuel them and enable them to expand their reach out at sea, but even this might be an illusion as it is unclear if the PFI-supplied crews will even have any deck-landing certification.


MP Bob Stewart has, admiradly, thought of the same thing, but still we have no precise answer on whether that would be possible. The helicopter could surely use the deck, but would the crews be qualified for it? That's the real question.

Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con): Most people suggest that our biggest defence capability is not in maritime patrol aircraft. I am no expert—although I can see that there are many naval experts in the Chamber—but could this new River class OPV, with its enhanced length and helicopter deck, also be used to cover the gap between 240 nautical miles, the distance a land-based helicopter can go out from our shores into the Atlantic, and the 1,200 nautical miles for which we are treaty responsible? Could it perhaps play some sort of MPA role in that area?

Mr Hammond: I have not looked at the specification in detail, but I do not envisage that the thing will be able to take off and fly. I understand the point that my hon. Friend is making, however, and we are conscious of the gap in maritime patrol aircraft capability. It is one issue that will be addressed in SDSR 2015 and we will manage the gap in the meantime through close collaboration with our allies. We are considering all the options, including, potentially, the use of unmanned aerial vehicles in a maritime patrol role in the future.

Also note how, as i feared, irrealistic mentions of MPA capability are made. Back-door capability cutting, camouflaged as new capability being delivered. Disasterous, and tipically suited to politicians. Better to keep one hunded eyes open on this matter. 

In other words, there is no real need to replace the Rivers with these new vessels. Losing the current River vessels would be a waste, and the greater capabilities of the replacements could also end up largely wasted.
In fact, these new vessels would be perfectly suited for interdiction of smuggling, for protection of oversea territories (And the Caribbean standing task springs to mind) and counter-piracy work as well, as noted by Hammond himself in answer to a question by Peter Luff: 

 
Peter Luff (Mid Worcestershire) (Con): I commend the Secretary of State, the Minister for defence equipment—the Under-Secretary of State for Defence, my hon. Friend the Member for Ludlow (Mr Dunne)—the Chief of Defence Matériel and all those involved for making the best of a very difficult situation. Will my right hon. Friend clarify the purpose and capabilities of the three new very welcome offshore patrol vessels?

Mr Hammond: They will be more capable than the existing River class, as they will be able to take a larger helicopter and will be 10 metres longer. They will be able to undertake a full range of duties, including not only fishery protection but the interdiction of smuggling, counter-piracy operations and the protection of our overseas territories.

To do all that, though, the new vessels would have to sail far away from home and, most likely for it to have any sense, they would have to be forward based, like HMS Clyde in the Falklands. While the OPV is suited for ocean navigation, it has a very short logistic endurance in terms of stores and, in part, in terms of fuel, so that sailing it back and forth from the UK would be unworkable.
The new OPV would be a perfect solution for the West Indies committment, if it was forward based there. If the ships end up home-based, and tied to the River's current role, they won't be able to do anything of what they could and should do. 

In my opinion, the Royal Navy can obtain an excellent boost in capability if it manages to retain the Rivers for fishery protection and home waters, using the new vessels in addition, forward-basing them overseas. I can think of three locations:

Caribbean, removing a committment that has been a source of problems and embarrassment for the Royal Navy which has long struggled to find a way to send a warship, having to resort extensively to RFA vessels which would also be very much needed elsewhere, for their actual role.

Gibraltar, because from the base the OPV would be able to engage with allies, with North and West African countries while also providing much needed reassurance to the Gibraltarians, which are loudly calling for a more tangible sign of UK support

Bahrain, because the OPV would be able to provide additional anti-FAC protection to the minesweeper squadron there and/or deploy to piracy-infested waters, restoring more enduring british presence in the wider area and relieving the warships from another role which has been hard to cover with a sheet which is, at the moment, just too short.

The challenge is, of course, in budget and manpower. The Royal Navy is exceptionally lean-manned, following the latest cuts. The insufficient manpower is possibly the biggest problem that must be overcome to bring the second aircraft carrier into service alongside the first, and trying to man three new patrol vessels as well, even with the crews being pretty small, is not going to be straightforward at all.
In terms of cost, the River class costs annually just about 20 millions per year. More correctly, it did in 2010: the current value is probably different. The outright purchase of the vessels has been made in the assumption (hopefully supported by facts) that removing the lease costs would reduce the annual expenditure, while further differences are likely because of inflation and other factors. Anyway, we are talking of a very small amount for three very useful vessels with plenty of life left in them. The new OPVs will also be hopefully quite cost-effective, so the Royal Navy should make every effort to secure all six in the longer term.

The door for such a decision, at least in the words, is left open:

Mr Julian Brazier (Canterbury) (Con): I, too, pay tribute to my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North (Penny Mordaunt) for her doughty struggle to get a good city deal for her constituents and for the vision for the OPVs that to my knowledge she has been outlining for at least two years. Will the Secretary of State confirm that the OPVs will to some extent provide a force multiplier for our frigate fleet? Some of the roles carried out by frigates do not require full frigate capability, so the OPVs could be a way of partially expanding that capability.

Mr Hammond: At the risk of causing her to blush, I am happy once again to praise my hon. Friend the Member for Portsmouth North. I should say to my hon. Friend the Member for Canterbury (Mr Brazier) that no decision has yet been taken about whether the old River class vessels will be retired after the new OPVs are brought into service. That decision will have to be made in SDSR 2015 based on the ongoing budget challenges of maintaining additional vessels at sea. That will be a decision for the Royal Navy.

This is somewhat reassuring, as well as the admission that there has not been a decision on where to base the new OPVs. If they were already certainly meant as a replacement for the Rivers, the basing answer would be pretty simple.
Of course, the door is not locked, but this does not make it easy to push it wide open and squeeze the new ships and the old ships through. I can only hope that the Royal Navy realizes how decisive the next SDSR is going to be for its future, and i hope people is hard at work, already now, to make sure to fight the incoming battle with the utmost determination.

Any possible solution should be actively considered. To overcome the manpower issues, it might be attractive to use RFA manpower, but we must not forget that the SDSR took away 400 men from it as well, leaving it far from being overmanned.

Another chance, which has the favor of government, is the use of reserve personnel. This is the only area that is seeing a manpower increase, and it is also low-cost manpower compared to regulars, so it might be very helpful to find ways to fill as many posts as possible on board of the OPVs with reservists, even though it is challenging: normally, a crew member on a River stays onboard for four weeks and then rotates ashore for two weeks, while the ship is at sea for most of the year. Finding a way to make good use of reserves in this cycle could be challenging. 



A note on the aircraft carriers as well: as part of the announcement, Hammond confirmed that the cost of the enterprise has grown further, to 6.2 billion, an increase of 800 million from the last announced figure. If we believe to the secretary, however, this has had no impact on projects other than the carriers themselves, as the increase has been absorbed using the programme's own built-in financial margins. This, we are told, has avoided the use of any of the 4 billion pounds contingency reserve built into the 10-year budget:

In 2012, I instructed my Department to begin negotiations to restructure the contract better to protect the interests of the taxpayer and to ensure the delivery of the carriers to a clear time schedule and at a realistic and deliverable cost. Following 18 months of complex negotiations with industry, I am pleased to inform the House that we have now reached heads of terms with the alliance that will address directly the concerns articulated by the PAC and others. Under the revised agreement, the total capital cost to Defence of procuring the carriers will be £6.2 billion, a figure arrived at after detailed analysis of costs already incurred and future costs and risks over the remaining seven years to the end of the project. Crucially, under the new agreement, any variation above or below that price will be shared on a 50:50 basis between Government and industry, until all the contractor’s profit is lost, meaning that interests are now properly aligned, driving the behaviour change needed to see this contract effectively delivered.The increase in the cost of this project does not come as a surprise. When I announced in May last year that I had balanced the defence budget, I did so having already made prudent provision in the equipment plan for a cost increase in the carrier programme above the £5.46 billion cost reported in the major projects review 2012 and I did that in recognition of the inevitability of cost-drift in a contract that was so lop-sided and poorly constructed.
I also made provision for the cost of nugatory design work on the “cats and traps” system for the carrier variant operation and for reinstating the ski-jump needed for short take-off and vertical landing operations. At the time of the reversion announcement, I said that these costs could be as much as £100 million; I am pleased to tell the House today that they currently stand at £62 million, with the expectation that the final figure will be lower still.
Given the commercially sensitive nature of the negotiations with the Aircraft Carrier Alliance, I was not able publicly to reveal these additional provisions in our budget, since to do so would have undermined our negotiating position with industry. However, the MOD did inform the National Audit Office of these provisions, and it is on that basis that it reviewed and reported on our 10-year equipment plan in January this year.

I am therefore able to confirm to the House that the revised cost of the carriers remains within the additional provision made in May 2012 in the equipment plan; that as a result of this prudent approach, the defence budget remains in balance, with the full cost of the carriers provided for; and that the centrally held contingency of more than £4 billion in the equipment plan that I announced remains unused and intact, 18 months after it was announced.
In addition to renegotiating the target price and the terms of the contract, we have agreed with the Aircraft Carrier Alliance to make changes to the governance of the project better to reflect the collaborative approach to project management that the new cost-sharing arrangements will induce and to improve the delivery of the programme. The project remains on schedule for sea trials of HMS Queen Elizabeth in 2017 and flying trials with the F35B commencing in 2018.

Hoping that this is true, because any penny matters, these days, and the two major army programmes, the FRES SV and Warrior CSP, are both dealing with some trouble and delays which might cause cost increases, and i'll talk of armour in the coming days in a new post.

A Desert Hawk detachment with a Husky vehicle. 12 DHIII detachments are routinely active in Afghanistan

"Why would you not make use of these pretty good armoured vehicles? If you could sort these out, you could save money on Bulldogs and have better command and control elements based on Warrior."

ALVIS produced a prototype of the "turretless Warrior" ABSV Ambulance

The Turretless Bradley proposal gives a good idea of what ABSV should be about. A turretless Warrior family would be very precious for the british army

One of 124 specially up-armoured Bulldog APCs used in Iraq. Command, Ambulance, General Purpose and Mortar Carrier variants of the FV432 are still serving in the army, but growing more and more ancient

Warrior Crew Served Weapon carrier as offered by BAE: will the Royal Marines variant be this "full optional"...?

Viking mortar carrier as proposed by BAE

Viking variants. The Royal Marines could use at least some ambulances...

1: Of aircraft carriers and OPVs
2: Land Forces


Merlin HM2 and CROWSNEST

The upgrade program is progressing, and the first helicopters in HM2 standard have been delivered to 824 NAS, the OCU squadron, which will bring the machine and crews to the entry in service. The first frontline squadron to convert is 820 NAS, which is already looking forwards to becoming the first Merlin HM2 squadron to operate on HMS Queen Elizabeth when the aircraft carrier trials will begin. 829 NAS will follow (beginning this month, if the plan is respected), with its six Small Ship Flights destined to frigates and destroyers, and 814 NAS will be the last to convert. The delivery of the last four helicopters uplifted to HM2 standard is now expected to happen in the first half of 2015, as these last machines will incorporate a number of additional capabilities provided under UOR on the HM1, including DAS installation, armor for the cockpit and the MX-15 EO/IR sensor turret.
The helicopters fitted with these additions are in more or less constant use in the Gulf, and it is not clear how they will be replaced when they enter the conversion process.

The Merlin HM2 upgrade delivers much improved multi-mission capability and comes with massively improved glass cockpit and mission crew consoles, with a much improved Human Machine Interface which eases the workload of the mission crew and expands the capabilities of the system. The two mission operators can now work indipendently, doing more things at the same time and disseminating greater volumes of data and information via improved Data Link 11 connectivity. Data Link 22 will be installed in the future as it enters in service with the Royal Navy's ships and, afterwards, with the helicopters fleet. Communications have also been enhanced with the introduction of SATURN secure airborne radio. The navigation system has also been improved, with embedded GPS and Inertial Navigation System (the new GPS antenna on the tail is one of the very few external differences between HM1 and HM2).

The FLASH sonar from THALES is exploited better thanks to a new Common Acoustics Processor and new detection and tracking algorythms. The Blue Kestrel surface surveillance radar has also been improved, with new SAR and ISAR modes and track-while-scan features.
The cockpit has been fitted with five NVG-compatible displays and touch screen panel units, while the information on the rear mission consoles is shown on new 24-inch (1920x1200 pixel) widescreen colour displays by BARCO, 30cm (1024x768 pixel) interactive display units and 30cm (1024x768 pixel) touch screen control units, replacing the dual 30cm displays used in the old HM1 consoles, which were source of trouble as they cluttered up with information very quickly.

The NVG-compatible cockpit of the HM2

The rear mission consoles can now be split to the opposite sides to make room for other mission configurations, or they can be removed entirely with just around two and a half hours of work, making space for carrying up to 16 fully equipped troops or 12 stretchers for medical evacuation. Also thanks to a 200 kg saving in weight due to the new avionics, the HM2 can now lift some 4500 kg of under slung load. An M3M .50 machine gun is provided for maritime security duty.

While externally there seems to be little difference, everyone agrees that the mission system is now much more capable. Another great accomplishment has been made in the training sector, with the Merlin Training Facility having become so efficient that even ab-initio trainees now prepare for Merlin HM2 operations spending two thirds of the time in the simulators and just one third in the air, a result that goes far past the stated ambition of achieving a 50:50 split.

Inside the HM2 in full ASW mode, with sonar and sonobuoys. Still has space for an observer, three seated passengers and a stretcher.

The new rear mission consoles with the large full colour displays provide much increased capability and ease the workload

The Merlin HM2 entry into service is going well, but it is perhaps more hurried than would be desirable. Only a handful of old HM1 remain available to the fleet, with most by now taken into the 9-month conversion process to become HM2s, so the Royal Navy needs the helicopters to return to service quickly.
Even if this means losing them again, for a short while, soon afterwards, as In-Service Retrofit delivers the upgrade System Release software (SR). For example, the machines delivered to 824 NAS have the wiring in place for Night Vision Googles operations, but won't be able to actually use NVG before undergoing the ISR to get the SR-6 software. A further SR release is due in January 2014.
820 NAS is due to embark on HMS Illustrious during 2014, and they will have NVG capability, even if at an IOC level. NVG training will be bespoke to requirements.

The HM2 delivers great capability to the Royal Navy, and represents the base for the implementation of CROWSNEST, the program for the replacement of the AEW capability currently provided by the old Sea King MK7 ASaC, expected to go out of service in 2016.
The current assumption is that all 30 the HM2 helicopters would receive the Mission System and the airframe adaptations eventually needed for the embarkation of the palletized AEW kit, yet to be selected. 10 such kits would be procured, and up to 8 helicopters would be routinely flying with it, in the AEW role.
The program is part of the core budget, but currently planned to hit Main Gate only in 2017, with IOC in 2020 with four helicopters and FOC as far away as 2022, leaving a dangerous, prolonged gap in capability for the Royal Navy of at least four years. A gap long enough to require current Sea King MK7 crews to go abroad to serve in naval AEW units in France and in the US to keep their expertise alive.

The Royal Navy is trying to speed up CROWSNEST, and would like to bring all the planned dates forwards, hitting main gate as early as next year if possible, to have the entry in service in 2018 instead of 2020. Philip Hammond has promised in a written answer to the House of Commons that the underspend money of the MOD budget 2012-13 will be used, among others, to finance the accelleration of CROWSNEST.
Thales and Lockheed Martin are in competition for the supply of the Mission System, with THALES offering the CERBERUS already in use on the Sea King MK7 and LM offering its VIGILANCE solution. The podded radar will be chosen among 4 competitors: the Searchwater 2000AEW (as used in the Sea King MK7), a Northrop Grumman AESA derived from the AN/APG-80 family, an unspecified ELTA product and another from SELEX ES.

The THALES proposal as seen at DSEI 2013: updated CERBERUS mission system and Searchwater 2000AEW radar in radome sliding up and down along external rails on the fuselage. Here the radome is lowered to achieve 360° field of view: it is lifted upwards before landing.

The LM offer, with AESA radar mounted in pod. One radar pod is carried on each payload pylon, giving 360° field of view.

Commodore Andy Lison described CROWSNEST as a way to deal with tight budgets, delivering a platform capable to cover as many roles as possible. He noted that it is about "stretching the Multi-Role concept far beyond any other military helicopter in the world". I agree with the description, and i can't help but observe that it is very much about stretching the multi-role concept way too far.
What is likely going to happen is that the separation between ASW and AEW will re-appear at the crew level. The radar pods might come off and go on a Merlin HM2 in two hours, but the crews won't be able to properly adapt to doing both jobs and switching so easily from one to the other. Either the squadrons get larger, in order to have men devoted exclusively to ASW and others for AEW, or the squadrons will remain as they are but one of them (820 or 814) will end up becoming an AEW formation. 

The Merlin is high in demand across the fleet, and adding the vital AEW role on shoulders already so burdened will only exacerbate the problems. With six Small Ship Flights, an OCU with 7 aircraft, three machines devoted to escorting the SSBNs in and out of Faslane in absence of an MPA capability, there are only going to be some 14 Merlin in total for ASW and AEW roles on large ships, with the new aircraft carriers in the first place in the list. With an ASW group having its best size at 9 airframes, and with the unavailable airframes left out of this count (there will always be machines broken down, or in maintenance, or used for tests of a new upgrade or something), it is clear that there is absolutely no headroom.

Officially, the fate of the 8 non-upgraded HM1 airframes is not yet sealed. Decisions have yet to be made, and i can only continue to cling to the hope (actually quite thin) that eventually money will be found to give an HM2 uplift to these machines (excluding the ASW suite) to dedicate these permanently to AEW, in a separate squadron.

It is also quite disturbing that, after years of operations and much money expended in the HM2 upgrade, the "Multi-Role" Merlin still does not have a properly integrated EO/IR sensor turret, nor the possibility to employ anti-surface missiles, nor a Defensive Aids Subsystem (DAS).
The absence of DAS was more than acceptable in a "flying frigate" meant to attack enemy submarines in open sea, but things have changed and look like they will change even further: submarines are gaining the capability to fire anti-air missiles from underwater and, much more relevant and urgent, shoulder-launched missiles are a very real threat for helicopters that more and more frequently are used in the Littoral and in Maritime Security operations. If the Merlin HM2 is to scout over ships that could well hide pirates or terrorists with MANPADS, a DAS becomes essential. And the HM1 in recent times has been also used extensively in support of the Royal Marines, even working to deliver under slung loads ashore. Doing it all outside of exercises without a working DAS is very, very dangerous.

The absence of a properly integrated EO/IR turret on the british Merlin is even harder to justify considering that the italian AW101 in Maritime Patrol Helicopter configuration (the italian equivalent to the HM1) does have such system integrated and in routine use. Photo by Luca Granzini

In 2007, a UOR process lead to the purchase of 4 DAS kits for use on four suitably adapted airframes, to be destined to maritime security duties in the Northern Arabian Gulf (NAG). The DAS kit, developed by Lockheed Martin UK, was put in service 13 months later, in early 2009. It incorporates the BAE Systems AN/AAR-57 Common Missile Warning System, the same company’s AN/ALQ-157 IR jammer and an AN/ALE-47 Countermeasures Dispensing System to eject IR flares.
Under separate UORs, "selected" Merlin helicopters received naval full motion video capability enabling them to send back to the ship or other receivers the images taken by the Wescam MX-15 EO/IR sensor turret. A number of these are available, along with a number of fittings made by Teledyne Reynolds, which allow the installation of MX-15 turret at the cost of one of the two weapon carrying pylons of the Merlin HM2.

The DAS installation is well visible just above the head of the Marine fast-roping from this Merlin HM1

While fast-rope kit and M3M machine gun are now available to the whole Merlin fleet, and any Merlin can be fitted with a MX-15 if this is available, the fully-equipped "maritime security" helicopters will remain only four, at least in the near future. These will be the last to be upgraded, and will have the full fit of Full Motion Video, M3M, ballistic protection, DAS and two-way Bowman radio.

This HM1 of 814 NAS shows the MX-15 turret installation and the M3M machine gun

These additions are meant to integrate the Merlin and its MX-15 in the XERES Maritime Interdiction System, employed by the Royal Navy. XERES (also procured under UOR process...) is fitted to all the Type 23s and Type 45s. It includes an independent, dedicate workstation on the frigate or destroyer, which takes the relevant informations from the ships' Combat System and forwards it to the RHIBs and boarding teams. The RHIBs are fitted with their own small console, chart system, VHF radio and SATCOM. The boarding team carries two buoyant 12.5 kg cases, one containing the VHF communication system and one containing a ruggedised digital camera housing special authentication software, allowing images to be certified and accepted as evidence within a court of justice. Also included are a flatbed scanner, a video camera and a sensor which monitors the surrounding air for the presence of explosive gases, with audible and visual alarms. 

The communications case contains VHF equipment which in five minutes from boarding is operational, allowing to stay in touch with the RHIB and with the mothership up to 10 nm away. Chat messages, encrypted communications and sharing of digital images, video and scanned data all can be exchanged over the network. The mothership can forward to the teams its own information, including navigation waypoints and GPS mapping of up to 15 vessels, including the mothership itself and the RHIBs.




Anti-surface missile integration is still not in sight for any of the Merlin, either. The Merlin fleet is being pushed in the wrong direction, pursuing a concept of "multirole" that just won't work (not as well as they'd like us to believe, at least), while the actual capability that could and should be integrated (DAS, EO/IR, full network suite, anti-surface weapons) are not coming. This is a serious problem for the "multi role" helicopter fleet of the Royal Navy, because the fleet is, overall, not at all capable to cover multiple roles. The Wildcat has no ASW capability (no sonar and no sonobuoys, can only drop torpedoes on indications coming from third parties); while the Merlin has no anti-surface capability, lacking DAS, EO/IR and missiles. While the lack of sonar on Wildcat is overall acceptable in the balance of the likely risks to be faced in the near future, the lack of anti-surface capability on Merlin is far harder to justify and accept, as surface threats including suicide boats and fast attack crafts are only becoming more and more of a real threat.
Wildcat carries very few men for a boarding mission, so Merlin is the favorite choice in the NAG area, yet the equipment of the two fleets does not really reflect the operational reality. And the warship "system of systems" suffers, because to be genuinely multi-role the warship should carry at once both a Merlin and a Wildcat. Something that can't be done by any of the in-service frigates and destroyers. 

So, by all means welcome HM2, but there actually is a lot of work to be done to bring balance of capability in the fleet.



Navalization of the Merlin HC3 

Still not much to report on the technical side of the conversion from land-based HC3 and HC3A helicopters to naval HC4. The conversion remains planned, the expectation is for 25 (19 HC3 and 6 HC3A) helicopters but there are not yet known activities ongoing beyond the assessment phase studies.
The Merlin fleet originally included 22 Merlin HC3 built for the RAF. 6 HC3A were urgently purchased from Denmark to boost the consistency of the fleet without waiting for new airframes to be produced.
Of the 22 original Merlin HC3, at least one has been written off (ZJ138/X after crashing in Afghanistan on June 23, 2010) while another is known to have been badly damaged in a crash landing during pre-deployment exercises at El Centro, in the USA on November 9, 2009. The helicopter crashed at El Centro is likely one of the three HC3 apparently destined not to be updated. 

The HC4 helicopters are expected to receive a HM2-like cockpit, folding rotor blades and folding tail boom, deck lash-down points and other fixes for use at sea. A capability gap is expected between the retirement of Sea King HC4 (in 2016) and the entry into service of a properly navalized variant of the Merlin, expected not before 2017. The current plan sees 846 NAS equipping with ex-RAF Merlin HC3s in 2015. 845 NAS will follow in 2017, operating the fully navalised Merlin HC4. 848 will continue as OCU squadron, preparing crews for the frontline sister units.

Availability in the Sea King HC4 fleet is already going down. Five crews were lost already in 2012 as they began training on the Merlin HC3 instead, and the process is ongoing. The reduced force availability has been evidenced by the tiny number of Sea King helos deployed this year on Cougar 13. The Merlin force has participated in Cougar 13 operating with HMS Illustrious in Albania, but the Merlins actually deployed on land, leapfrogging across Europe to get there. They were not embarked on the LPH, but they operated from its deck and from an austere base on land, put up by Commando Helicopter Force's ground support elements.

The first flight by an all-Commando crew on a Merlin HC3 was reported in September 2012. In June this year, the Merlin HC3 4-year deployment in Afghanistan ended, and all the helicopters moved back to the UK, marking an important milestone on the way to the passage to the CHF.
Training for crews and ground support team will ramp up in RAF Benson, to reach the figure of 8 crews trained per year. The Commando Helicopter Force expects to have 37 trained crews when the force will hit Full Operational Capability. 

The RAF Squadrons currently using the Merlin HC3 and HC3A (78 Sqn and 28 Sqn) are apparently both expected to disband, even though the Chinook force is being expanded with 12 new helicopters (plus 2 replacements for machines lost in Afghanistan). One of the two squadrons might actually stand up again with the Chinook HC6 as decisions are taken on how to base and man the new helicopters.



Chinook

The new Chinook HC6 had its first flight in March 2013 in the US, where the first three examples have been undergoing tests prior to delivery. The first HC6 should arrive in the UK before year's end.

The upgrade of the 46 Chinooks already in the inventory is going well, and a part of the helicopters, uplifted to HC4 standard, has already served in Afghanistan. An order has been placed recently to purchase the TITAN 385ES-HD FLIR turrets needed to equip each and every Chinook.
As part of the upgrade, the infamous HC3 variant, purchased years ago for Special Forces use but grounded for years by software problems caused by the MOD's decision to buy an american helicopter and then try to develop a new software for it, will be uplifted to the HC5 standard. The main difference is represented by the very evident bulges in the sides, which are caused by larger, long-range fuel tanks. The HC5 examples are thus expected to be operated, with decades of delay, by 7 RAF Squadron, the special forces support Chinook squadron.
The HC3 were in fact delivered in 2001 but were sad hangar queens from then until 2010, when they were "downgraded" to the standard HC2 in order to be operable and support operations in Afghanistan. They are expected to be upgraded in 2016, following the HC2 and 2A conversions.

Project JULIUS is upgrading and harmonizing the fleet of Chinooks built up over the years. The HC2 are uplifted to HC4, the HC3 becomes HC5 and the new build are known as HC6, but all the helicopters are given the same TITAN EO/IR sensor, the same Thales Top Deck  glass cockpit and the same Honeywell (formerly Lycoming) T55-L-714A engines, offering much increased performance over the previous L-712.

The 14 HC6 helicopters are costing a total of 841 million pounds, made up by:

(a)The non-recurring costs for development, test and evaluation

(b)The recurring production costs for the aircraft

(c)Initial spares provisioning

(d)Separate contracts for the purchase of equipment (TITAN sensor, DAS etcetera) which is then supplied to Boeing and installed in the airframes

(e)Contingency money provvision, to cover the possibility of cost growth 

Puma HC2 

24 old Puma helicopters are being upgraded to HC2 standard, to support, out to 2024/25, a forward fleet of 22 battlefield support helicopters. The upgrade is carried out in the Eurocopter facilities in Romania. The first helicopters have been delivered to the RAF, and test activity has been started, along with training for the crews. The Puma HC2 features new uprated Turbomeca Makila 1A1 engines and glass cockpit avionics, a secure communications suite, the implementation of a digital automatic flight control system, new defensive aids and ballistic protection for crew and passengers.
The new engines are more powerful and consume less: thanks to them and to enlarged fuel capacity, the Puma HC2 is said to be able to carry twice the payload over three times the distance covered by the original HC1. 


The Puma is and will continue to be operated by 33 and 230 Squadrons RAF. More than 300 million pounds have been expended over the HC2 upgrade programme.



AW159 Wildcat  

The Wildcat is progressing towards its own entry in service. The 2011 announcement of a third variant and of a small neat increase in the number of airframes to be procured, however, appears to now be on hold. In 2011 a plan was announced that would see four of the AH1 Reconnaissance helicopters from the army order taken and "converted" into Light Assault Helicopter (LAH) configuration. Four additional helicopters would also be procured, again in the LAH configuration, giving a total order of 28 Wildcat for the Navy, 30 reconnaissance variants for the Army and 8 LAH, which were identified as replacement for the Lynx AH7 employed by 657 Sqn Army Air Corps in support of the Special Forces.
This plan, reported and costed by the NAO, now appears to be on hold as the Special Forces director is reportedly unconvinced by the proposed Wildcat LAH. The idea seems to be to transit the current Lynx AH9A in the role, perhaps keeping them beyond the planned 2018 pay-off date.

The Lynx AH7 will bow out entirely by 2015, replaced by Wildcat, but the improved fleet of 22 Lynx AH9A, greatly enhanced by numerous UOR processes inspired by the Afghan experience is not expected to bow out before 2018. After that date, the AH9A would be cannibalised to provide spares for the new Wildcats (they use, for example, the very same engine). At least a part of the AH9A fleet could now perhaps live on at least until 2022, however.

The full extent of the capability of the Wildcat once in service with the british armed forces is unfortunately still a bit of a question mark. In particular, the Army variant (which will also be used by the Royal Marines of 847 NAS, the first squadron to convert to the new helicopter) seems destined to be limited by choice to the ISTAR, C2 and Liaison roles, cutting back sharply on its capability as light utility and escort platform.
There are apparently concerns with the weight of the airframe impacting the effective payload in hot and high conditions (the Wildcat has the same engines as the AH9A, but is heavier than it) and overwhelming doctrinal resistences inside the green army, tied to safety considerations as the force returns to "peacetime footing", so to speak.

The way the Wildcat's potential will be developed, or wasted, is yet to be seen. According to AgustaWestland, the Wildcat is more than able to replicate the AH9A Light Assault Helicopter configuration, with M3M machine gun installation, fast rope kit and 4 fully equipped troops. Indeed, these four soldiers would now sit in S5000 crash-resistant seats. It is to be seen if the Army will agree with the assessment.

The Wildcat configured as LAH, with crashworthy seats for four soldiers plus one seat for the M3M gunner. Honestly, the gunner's seat does seem to be in the way of free use of the machine gun.

The LAH configuration would be of particular interest for the Royal Marines, and for the Royal Navy, as it could be used in a variety of situations, including ship boarding. 
Some trials for the various capabilities of the Wildcat have already taken plane, including fast rope and under slung load trials.





The naval variant has been undergoing trials with the winch and with torpedoes.



The Wildcat is still only fitted with a manually foldable rotor, not with automatic folding blades. In addition, differently from the Lynx HM8, it does not have a folding tail boom. However, this is no longer a problem as there are no hangars in the Royal Navy which will struggle to welcome the little Wildcat.


South Korea has ordered 8 Wildcat helicopters, but these (differently from the Royal Navy's ones) will be fully kitted for ASW work, and completed with the FLASH Compact dipping sonar.

Wildcat ASW with dipping sonar fit. Not on Royal Navy Wildcats, not for now at least.

MEDEVAC / SAR cabin configuration

It is assumed that the Wildcat will enter service with the validated capability to employ the M3M heavy machine gun. Pintle-mount 7.62mm GPMGs are also a possibility, and there is some interest for the use of Miniguns, too, which reportedly are part of the arsenal of the Lynx AH7 of the 657 AAC Special Forces support squadron.
Adding rockets and / or missiles is a possibility, but on the Army / Royal Marines variant it is a remote possibility. The Royal Marines are reportedly quite interested, since they have been without an organic missile attack capability ever since the TOW was removed from the Lynx AH7 arsenal. 847 NAS was once expected to get its own Apache helicopters, but it never happened. Now, Army Air Corps Apache are expected to regularly embark on ships, but the Commandos might still want to fully own their own attack capability, even if light.
A number of weapons are offered, including SPIKE NLOS, mainly aimed at South Korea (which already uses the surface-launch variant of the missile). However, now that the SPIKE NLOS is also in service with the Royal Artillery as EXACTOR, so it could be an option in the future.

The Naval Variant is due to be armed with the new FASGW weapon family, but the Heavy segment of said family has been delayed by the slow progress of the negotiations with France for the joint funding of the development. The weapon has finally been given the go ahead with the french White Paper confirming the contribute to the enterprise, but it is highly likely that the old Sea Skua will have to soldier on for longer than expected. Or, worse, the anti-ship missile capability will once more be gapped, as the Wildcat replaces Lynx HM8 in 2015. This possibility is very real, as gapping removes the cost for integration of the old Sea Skua on Wildcat, in the waiting for FASGW(H).
FASGW(L) is the Light Multi-mission Missile LMM made by Thales re-using Starstreak components. There's an agreement for the purchase of 1000 missiles. At least this weapon should be available in time, in theory, but the go ahead for its production and integration wasn't given last year, according to the NAO, because the MOD waited for progress on the Heavy segment before making committments.

When both weapons are integrated, the Wildcat should be able to carry up to 4 FASGW(H) or 20 LMM in four clusters of five missiles each, or a combination of the two. For the attack against submarines, the Wildcat will be able to employ two Stingray torpedoes, or two depth charges.


The 28 naval Wildcat should allow 815 NAS to form 19 Small Ship Flights. 847 NAS is expected to have four helicopters in the Army configuration. They will, in fact, come from the Army's arsenal and won't even be marked "Royal Marines" as their predecessors.
The Army hopes not to disband any of the five squadrons of the AAC regiments 1st and 9th as they merge: the plan is still evolving, but the last suggestion was that 1st Regiment AAC would have four frontline squadrons, with the fifth acting as a Conversion to Role training unit. The tiny number of helicopters available will mean that they are all centrally pooled, and they will be made available to the squadrons as the situation dictates. 1st Regiment AAC is to join the RN Wildcats on the royal naval air base Yeovilton.



Apache AH1 Capability Sustainment Programme

The fundamental upgrade for the Apache AH1 fleet is still in assessment phase. Sequestration cuts in the US have eased somewhat the pressure upon the Army, which has gained some time to refine its decisions (and try to secure a large enough budget).
The main concern for the UK was the end of support activities for the Apache Block I helicopter: with the US Army upgrading all its old Apache to Block III standard, and indeed acquiring dozens of new-build helicopters as well, Boeing planned to cease Block I services in 2017.
The british AH1, although quite widely modified with british-specific systems (Rolls Royce engines, folding rotor, limited wet-sealing for ops at sea, increased all-weather capability and Selex HIDAS self protection system) is based on the AH-64D Block I, so the end of support would mean tremendous logistic challenges.

Sequestration has however delayed the start of the production of the new-build Block III Apaches from 2017 to 2019 / 2020. This gives the british army some additional time to put together a programme which will hopefully limit the reduction in airframes. The UK originally purchased 67 (out of more than 90 once planned) Apache helicopters. One has since been written off after a very hard landing, leaving 66 in six frontline squadrons. The fear was that the Apache CSP would come only with a significant reduction in airframes, with the frontline squadrons going down to just four.

The production line for the Apache Block III (AH-64E) will now be open and running at least out to 2026, giving the UK some flexibility. All options for the CSP are being considered, including scrapping the current fleet and buy new helicopters (most likely new AH-64E, although officially the UK is open to all options).

Perhaps the most likely option is re-manufacture of the existing helicopters, however. Speaking at ADEX in South Korea earlier this year, David Koopersmith, vice president Attack Helicopter Programme in Boeing, explained that his suggestion to the British Army is to opt for remanufacturing. In practice, while the production line is open, the British Army should purchase wholly new airframes and transfer inside them, pulling them out of the existing AH 1, any system that is still valid, such as the M-TADS targeting system, the gun, the engines (unless a choice is made to abandon the Rolls Royce engine, which has partial commonality with the Merlin's own, in favor of the new, more powerful engine used on the US Block III), the HIDAS system and other high-cost elements.
The use of new airframes would zero-hour the whole fleet, and the re-use of existing systems would cut out much of the cost.

The AH-64E introduces dramatic improvements in all areas. The mission system core processors will be reduced from six to two (and two is only for redundancy). The wiring inside the aircraft has been reduced from 11 to seven miles, saving on weight. The M-TADS will finally be given a full colour display for the day sight, instead of the current monocrome, easing target acquisition and identification. A ground fire acquisition system (GFAS) is added, and it warns the crew of incoming enemy fire including small arms and rockets, pinpointing its source anywhere in the 360° under and around the helicopter.
The Longbow radar can be replaced by a Manned unmanned teaming (MUM-T) device which allows the Apache's crew to take control of UAVs, using them to scout ahead and acquire targets without exposing the gunship. In the US Apache helos, the radome above the rotor is used either by the Longbow or for achieving MUM-T thanks to the Lockheed Martin UTA, a two-way datalink which replaces the Longbow and allows the Apache's crew to take control (level 4) of UAVs flying over 50 km away.
The helicopter comes with all-new split-torque face gear, composite main rotor blade and more powerful General Electric T700-701D engines. When the British Army purchased the Apache, the UK decided to power it with the Rolls Royce - Turbomeca RTM322, which offered significantly greater power compared to the american solution of the day. The greater power offered by the RTM322 allowed british Apache to fly in the Afghan heat and altitudes without giving up the Longbow radar, which was instead removed by the US examples. The new engines of the Block III, however, reverse the situation, and the British Army might be interested in a change.

The british army Apaches have however a number of specific requirements, due to their use at sea on board of amphibious ships. This presence at sea has become more and more common, and it is planned that it will become even more important in the future.

The Apache AH 1 has very limited navalization at the moment. Apart from the manually folding rotor,

Philip Dunne (Ludlow, Conservative)

The current Apache AH Mk1 aircraft are based on the US Army Apache AH64D. In common with those aircraft, the Apache AH MK1 airframes were dry-built. There is currently no engineering solution available, and therefore no cost information, for undertaking a retro-wet assembly of the in-service aircraft airframes. They have, however, been treated with a two stage protection process to reduce the effects of corrosion and maintain the airworthiness of the aircraft in the maritime operating environment.

Limited, further enhancements were made on the Apache helicopters deploying on HMS Ocean for operations in Libya, to improve their resistance to corrosion and to include a solution to disperse sea spray in the windscreen wiper system.
However, operating aboard warships has evidenced the need for much more relevant additions:

- A stronger rotor brake
- A flotation device
- A new canopy jettison system to enable safe escape with the helicopter fallen into water
- An I-band trasponder to ease navigation back to the mothership
- An extension in battery life, as the current system has only 6 minutes of life in case of total electrical system failure

It must be noted that activities to correct these deficencies has already started: AgustaWestland and GKN Aerospace subsidiary FPT Industries have been contracted to study a flotation gear kit which would keep the helicopter stabilized and afloat long enough to allow the two-person crew to escape. The study should have ended "this spring", but it is too early to know the results. A contract notice went out in the summer, but i can't find it anymore online.


The MoD and the Pentagon are reportedly jointly funding a technology demonstrator project to investigate an alternative to the current Apache canopy severance device that will substantially reduce the blast effect experienced by the aircrew if operated. The current system, if operated in the water, will result in the death of the crew. 
With the Apache already working hard at sea these days, waiting years for these safety enhancements is not wise, so the purchase of a number of modifications before the CSP even starts is a possibility.



The complexities connected with upgrading and life extending the British Army Apaches are many and significant, especially because the budget is notoriously tight.
Remanufacturing the Apaches with new airframes as suggested by Boeing could offer the chance to think better this time around, and actually prepare the Apache for the sea, without resurrecting the full "Sea Apache" proposal of old. New airframes could probably be built with better wet sealing and anti-corrosion features; a flotation gear solution could be better integrated in the machine than a late add-on, a new rotor brake could be put in, and perhaps the rotor itself could be of the powered folding type, instead of manual.
Using new-built airframes gives, in other words, greater options, although the tightness of the budget and logistic considerations suggest that the course to follow will be the limitation to the minimum, whenever possible, of the differences between UK and US examples. The naval modifications would also of course add more weight, which could become a very serious reason to switch to the more powerful US engines.

The UK might not want the UTA data link, since mounting it requires removing the Longbow. However, it would like to quite urgently acquire the VUIT video-networking system. This can fit within the Longbow's radome and allow the Apache to receive full motion video data from UAVs. Again, there is a possibility that this improvement will be introduced before the CSP even starts.

A longer-term modification for the British Apache could be the replacement of the Hellfire missile with the next evolutions of the Brimstone. The Hellfire is due out of british service in 2021, and the evolution of Brimstone is the likely successor. 
The US Army is also introducing laser-guided 70mm rockets on its Apache. The UK however is already introducing into service the LMM, which is similar in conception and mission (albeit larger and heavier), so integrating LMM could be an option for the future.

The Apache CSP is a crucially important programme for the Army, so it will be very important to get it right.   



Gazelle: what happens afterwards?

According to the MOD, the Gazelle fleet still includes 34 airframes, supporting a forward fleet of
24. The Gazelle remains the equipment of a single frontline AAC Squadron, the 665 Sqn, 5th Regiment AAC, based in Northern Ireland. Flying from Aldergrove, the Gazelle provide surveillance and overwatch in support to police service. For this end, some of the helicopters are fitted with EO/IR turrets and flashlights.

British Army photo

The Gazelle is also used by 29th Flight, the helicopter formation which supports training exercises in BATUS, Canada.

The technical support contract for the Gazelle was due to expire this year, but the MOD launched the process to extend this to the planned Out of Service Date (OSD) of 31 March 2018. What comes afterwards, is a mistery. 5th Regiment AAC might struggle to stay alive, as the MOD would probably look to hiring some kind of civilian service to provide helicopter surveillance in Northern Ireland, while the support to BATUS activity could also be outsourced, or perhaps covered with a provvision of airframes made within the planned renewal of the Rotary Wing Training Fleet.



Search and Rescue, Cyprus and the Falklands

In another round of "what happens afterwards?" we have the situation of the SAR service. In the UK, the current mixed fleet of RAF and RN Sea Kings will be replaced by 22 helicopters, 11 of which will be S-92 for long range SAR and the others will be AW-189 for shorter range operations. These will all be supplied and crewed by Bristow Helicopter, in a major outsourcing deal. SAR responsibility will move from the MOD to the Department of Transports.

More complicated is the situation in the Falklands and in Cyprus.
For the Falklands, the MOD put out a contract notice on August 2, 2013. By 1 April 2016, a new SAR provvision is expected to be in service, capable to fly out at least 150 nm, 24 hours a day, every day of the year. The helicopter must be able to take aboard at least two casualties on stretchers.
There is also the possibility that the same contract will also replace the current Support Helicopter Service: this is about moving soldiers and loads (including under slung ones) across the islands.

The new SAR service will have to replace the current two RAF Sea King HAR.3 of 1564 Flight, based in Mount Pleasant air base. The current Support Helicopter Service is already outsourced, and currently delivered by British International Helicopter Services with two old S-61 also based in Mount Pleasant. The MOD could replace both the SAR and Support Helicopter services with a single new contract. Hopefully without cutting back on the number of helicopters, but this is to be seen.

In Cyprus, the RAF maintains the 84 Sqn, which flies the Griffin HAR 2 helicopter from Akrotiri, a variant of the Griffin helicopter used for crew training for the British Armed Forces. 84 Sqn provides SAR, support helicopter service for the resident battalions, support to training, firefighting and other capabilities. Its fate is also somewhat uncertain as SAR exits from the MOD's interest and as the Griffin HAR 2 approach the end of their useful lives. For now, the plan is that 84 Sqn will continue business as usual, retaining their SAR role as well. If this continues to be the case in the longer term, as is overall likely given the very wide range of roles covered by 84 Sqn, the replacement for the HAR 2 could come through the future contract for the provvision of a new Rotary Wing training fleet.





Rotary Wing Training Fleet renewal 

Choices will have to be made about the provvision of defence helicopter training from 2018 onwards, with a process already underway. The current contract with Cobham-owned FB Heliservices, which provides tri-service training at the Defence Helicopter Flying School (DHFS) as part of the wider Military Flight Training System programme, expires in 2018 and the MOD needs to plan out how to carry on beyond that.
The current fleet of Squirrel HT 1 and Griffin HT 1 helicopters is likely to be replaced as part of the process.



Flights and Squadrons 

8th Flight Army Air Corps, known for flying AS 365N Dauphin helicopters in civilian colors for the Special Air Service urban counterterrorism units, was expanded with a fifth helicopter purchased before the Olympic games, and recently took on the rank of squadron, getting the colors of 658 Sqn.

658 Sqn Army Air Corps colours, from its earlier life as reserve squadron.

25th Flight, once assigned with its Bell 212 helicopters to BATSUB in Belize, moved back to the UK with the scaling down of operations in Belize. It has since been supporting exercises on Salisbury Plain, before deploying, this year, in support of BATUK, in Kenya.

29th Flight continues to support BATUS in Canada. The British Army has also announced that jungle training in Belize will pick up pace again: right now the training area is kept busy by dutch and norwegian visits complementing the reduced british presence, and from 2016 the Army plans to restart  regular Company-level exercises (up to 8 per year). It is not clear if this will require the re-instatement of an helicopter support Flight: for sure, it would be handy.

Finally, under Army 2020 the 6th Regiment Army Air Corps (Reserve) is expanding, gaining a third squadron which will be based around Yeovilton to provide ground support to the Wildcat force and a fourth squadron around Milton Keynes and Luton. 655 Sqn, in Middle Wallop, changes its colours to assume the identity of 679 Sqn. The final result, not to be seen before April 2014, will be:

675 Sqn, Yeovil and Taunton (new squadron)
677 Sqn, Bury St Edmunds
678 Sqn, Milton Keynes and Luton (new squadron)
679 Sqn, Portsmouth and Middle Wallop (ex 655 Sqn) 



Technology developments

The MOD is financing research projects for the improvement of protection for its helicopters. The main initiative is the £24m, three-year partnership between the MoD and a Selex Es-led industry team comprising Thales, QinetiQ, and BAE Systems North America for the development and demonstration of a Common Defensive Aids System (CDAS).

The very evident CDAS demonstrators as flown on the Lynx

The demonstration programme is due to show how different soft and hard kill defensive systems can be integrated in an open-architecture system. A demonstrative assembly was ground and flight tested, using a Lynx AH7. The trials were flown over Salisbury Plain and an account of the activities is available here.

The MOD is also working with industry to develop technology able to pinpoint the source of enemy small arms fire, a serious threat to low-flying helicopters, especially in urban environment. It is also seeking systems able to simulate fire against the helicopters, both in real flying and in simulators, to aid crew training. 

Additional research is going in improving resistance to corrosion, particularly in the engines and with special focus on sand and dust-caused corrosion, a problem which in places such as Afghanistan reduces dramatically the useful life of engines and rotor blades, increasing the maintenance required in the field.



Going unmanned

The Royal Navy plans to trial an optionally manned helicopter from a Type 23 frigate next year, to explore the possible roles of a rotary wing UAV in MCM, Hydrographic and maritime security operations. The acquisition of a rotary wing UAV for the surface fleet is an ambition for the early 2020s, and the current demonstration program should help the RN to fix a list of requirements. AgustaWestland is under contract to provide the demonstration, using a SW-4 SOLO helicopter, with a budget of 2.3 million pounds. The SW-4 light helicopter is made by PZL, a polish subsidiary of AgustaWestland. The SOLO version can be flown remotely like a UAV, or with personnel inside. The UAV has a 1.8 tons maximum take off weight and will offer a wide range of capabilities including VERTREP, ISTAR and potentially light attack.

SW-4 SOLO

AgustaWestland is also looking to the future, to a production-standard RWUAS for the 2020s, judging from this model shown at DSEI 2013. The model resembles the Lynx and Wildcat helicopters in several aspects, and likely draws heavily from their experience.

It is interesting to see the Royal Navy willing to explore the potential of air platforms in MCM operations, as part of the development of a "system of systems" for the MHPC programme. It has even been reported that the navy has been considering the possibility to introduce towed sonars and MCM sleds for the Merlin helicopter, like the Japanese have done with their own AW-101.
In the US, MCM payloads have been already demonstrated on RWUAS such as the MQ-8B Fire Scout: one such system is the Airborne Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Minefield Detection System (ASTAMIDS), actually meant to use over land to detect mines and IEDs, and the AN/DVS-1 Coastal Battlefield Reconnaissance and Analysis (COBRA) used to detect minefields and obstacles in the surf and beach zones.

In developing the new rotation, it was originally envisaged that the third Commando unit - the one 'out' of the role - would be engaged in low level training and would take on the numerous support tasks that continually arise, including support to training courses and ceremonial duties. In reality, however, a much greater number of functions has had to be absorbed. A significant one of these is the ship protection task previously undertaken by a predominantly naval squadron within 43 (FP) Cdo RM, a squadron that is being disbanded. This task covers the provision of security for naval vessels when alongside, and some boarding tasks in low threat environments.

The net result of the accumulation of these tasks is that the third unit is now classified as the 'standing tasks Commando' rather than the 'out of role' one. As this unit is also heavily committed, the overall effect is the need to generate about 1.7 units of tasks from the three units.

     63 (SAS) Signal Squadron (R)

Q343Derek Twigg: You mentioned in one of your answers a few minutes ago that obviously this is putting pressure on certain areas in terms of resilience, but you have to find contingency for that. Could you expand on where those pressure points will be on resilience, and are you absolutely confident that they can be dealt with?

General Sir Peter Wall: Yes, I think that in our force structure we are conscious that we have made certain assumptions about the balance between Regular, reserve and contractor logistics, and if those assumptions turn out to be incorrect, then we may find that the dependence on Regulars-because of the threat situation or the tempo of operations, or some other unforeseen sort of delta-is greater than we would like. In that situation, we might have to enrol people from other parts of the Army to do transport functions and things like that.

We can see increasing pressure on the demand for communications bandwidth in the tactical space. We have taken account of that in our design by pro rata reducing the Royal Signals by considerably less than the 20% average, but even so, I can see that demand growing as a consequence of the changing nature of the way that business is done in the future, which is not so much a function of size, but of the changing character of the way we do things, with an increasing dependence on high-resolution imagery for targeting and things like that. I can see that happening. I think in the gunners and the sappers we also might find that they are running a little bit faster than we would like and some of their other cap badge counterparts, but that has often been the case in the previous structures of the Army, depending on the nature of the specific operation and where the emphasis lies.

The Fuchs was hurried into service for Operation Granby in 1991

 

My main purpose in writing this message is to cover a number of issues that arise as a result of the amalgamation of our two Regiments. The RTR Council has been looking at these issues, significantly assisted by members of all ranks from both Regiments.   

The amalgamation issue that will affect serving members of the Regiment in the most immediate way is dress. So I am pleased to be able to say that the Commanding Officers and Regimental Colonel have agreed on the key aspects of the new Dress Regulations to be adopted on amalgamation, the details of which will be promulgated separately. Suffice to say that black will continue to feature highly.     

The Council has determined that there are a number of amalgamation issues on which it is not yet possible to reach decisions, in which the status quo will therefore continue for the time being. For example, we have not yet been engaged by the Army or the RAC in substantive discussions about Recruiting Areas – so for the time being we would expect to continue to recruit from the same areas of the country that 1 and 2 RTR recruited from. In similar vein, we have not yet formed a view on the distribution of tasks between Regimental Headquarters in Bovington, and the new Regiment in Tidworth. I will report back on these, and other important issues such as the future of the Tank magazine, and of the Association, when I am in a position so to do. But I am now able to let you know what the Council has decided on Squadron names, and on the degree of Scottishness we should seek to maintain, topics that I know will mean a good deal to many of you.

The Council accepts that some of our antecedent Regiments have a tradition of using letters, rather than names, to describe sub-units. However, with the benefit of our considerable experience, and time served in both Regiments, we believe that Squadron names strengthen sub-unit identity in a positive way and that the ability to name our Squadrons offers the Regiment a significant brand advantage over others. We conclude that the advantages of using names, rather than letters, for all our sub-units outweigh the loss of some historical precedent. 

We have therefore decided that, upon amalgamation, the three armoured squadrons in the Royal Tank Regiment will be known as AJAX, BADGER, and CYCLOPS. Command and Reconnaissance Squadron will be known as DREADNAUGHT, and Headquarters Squadron will be known as EGYPT. Should there be a future CBRN Area Surveillance and Reconnaissance (AS&R) Squadron, it will be known as FALCON. These particular names have been chosen because they represent a connection all the way back to the Heavy Branch of the Machine Gun Corps in World War 1, as well as to more recent regimental history.  As far as our Scottish heritage is concerned, the Council is proud of this tradition and recognises the benefit it confers in helping us to differentiate ourselves from others. We would not wish it to dominate, but we see it as a net contributor to recruitment. For so long as it is practicable so to do, we would wish to maintain this historical association. We will achieve this by retaining the Pipes and Drums, by painting ‘Chinese Eyes’ on our tanks, and by applying whatever other aspects of Scottishness that the Commanding Officer of the day so authorises. The practicality of this approach will next be reviewed after the referendum on Scottish independence.   

Finally, I should take this opportunity to say something about the formation of the CBRN AS&R squadron. As I write this message, there is a strong possibility that the RTR will be invited to generate an additional squadron to meet this task, over and above our Type 56 Armoured Regiment role. But the Defence Board has not yet made a final decision, so the task may yet fail to materialise, or (less likely) could be given to some other unit to perform. I have been involved in a host of high levels discussions about this task, both as your Colonel Commandant and as a member of the Army Command Group. My position throughout has been that the Army and Defence need an AS&R capability, that the RTR has demonstrated the ability to provide it, and that we stand ready to do so again. My one proviso has been to say that it would not be sensible to double-hat this capability with that of an armoured sub-unit: it needs to be a squadron in its own right. Hopefully, we will know the outcome on this issue within the next few months. 

 

Fear Naught.  

Lt Gen C M Deverell MBE                                                                       15 November 2013